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| MEATBALL June 2006 |
IT HAPPENED... |
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Cdr RS Punia |
Comedy of Errors |
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If you knew that today was the day an accident would occur, you probably wouldn’t even bother getting out of bed. Since this is never the case, and a lapse in awareness can be deadly, situational awareness is your best defence against unforeseen accidents. Comprehension and anticipation is the key to maintaining situational awareness. Thinking through the ‘what’, ‘where’, ‘when’ and ‘who’ of a potential occurrence may mean the difference between success and failure. Human senses, though limited, present one with enormous amounts of information. Even if after thorough planning when everything seems to be going right but you can’t shake the nagging feeling that something is out of place, listen! Most of all appreciate your limitations and don’t try to surpass them with a false streak of bravado. I have an event to narrate. The reader is free to draw conclusions as to how and to what extent situational awareness could have helped in making this sortie a safer and more enjoyable experience. On 09 May 1990, Andhra Pradesh was hit by a cyclone of immense ferocity; wind speeds had reached up to 235 kmph, widespread flooding had occurred as much as 25 kms inland from the coast and the cyclone had cost a death toll of nearly a thousand lives. Visakhapatnam airfield, being low-lying was inundated and closed to fixed-wing operations for more than a month subsequently, however helicopter flying continued in a valiant bid to support relief operations by the civil administration. Ramnad, which was then operating Chetaks from 321 Vizag was tasked to return one Chetak at the earliest. Since my tenure at Ramnad was ending, it was also an opportunity for me to grab a passage back. We took off from Ramnad at first light. On board was an additional portable VHF communication set since the aircraft equipment had been giving very poor ranges. Our flight till about 15 miles from Chennai proceeded smoothly. At this point, Chennai radar gave us a vector of 060o at 1000’ for arrival sequencing. This vector would have taken us way beyond the usual circuit, one which the pilot was not used to. The runway being visual and alluring, the pilot decided to turn left and report base for runway 25. A few seconds later we realised that something had gone terribly wrong when a jumbo directed by radar to carry out a missed approach crossed above us. We, of course, landed! I could well appreciate the state of the controller, who would by now have been bald and bloody from snatching his hairs out. By now the watch supervisor and the tower controller had summoned the crew to meet them immediately upon landing. When we entered the dark radar room, all controllers who were waiting for the prey with baited breath pounced upon us. The error of infringing a radar vector was ours and it was a one-way boxing match, with the Chetak crew being the sandbags. Next was the tower controller; nothing new, just a repeat telecast of the earlier episode. You’d have thought that by now the crew would have got that buzzing, nagging feeling... well, read on. The next leg was from Chennai to Vijaywada with a self-refuelling halt at Nellore. Chirala range (south of Vijaywada) being active, we were directed to route via Tirupati. Being critical on fuel, the crew weren’t happy, but remained silent as the law protected such a directive. We manned the aircraft and asked for start up, indicating POB 04, and got approval. We didn’t report the fifth POB, Murphy. He didn’t take too kindly to this, and promptly became active. Our subsequent call to the tower “permission to taxi” never got transmitted. The pilot, being quite innovative, asked me to do the needful. I walked up to the taxi link with the GU 734, took taxi clearance and departure instructions and boarded the aircraft as it taxied up to the link. The take-off was smooth, but the pilot was fidgeting with the idea of continuing via Tirupati. After a long discussion on the intercom we made a ‘technically supported’ call (I knew what commitment the ATC wants) “will maintain 5nm over land and avoid Chirala range” to the radar controller and got our direct routing to the Nellore parade ground. The area beyond Nellore was completely water logged due to the effects of the cyclone. The roads—lifelines of low-level navigation—were submerged and just not visible. Murphy had seized control of the ADF too and it was wandering around in lazy circles. So instead we latched onto the railway lines. But where was the fuel for this kind of noting? Nevertheless, we managed to reach Krishna canal junction and identified Vijaywada town. A few moments later, the fuel warning light lit up a bright ominous red. No railway line goes from that point to the airport, which is a good 20 kilometres south of town, and there was still no sign of the roads. If we were to make it to the airport, there was no option but to take the direct route. The good thing was that we were in two-way RT contact with Vijaywada. Another quick intercom discussion ensued, and I suggested that we ask for the aerodrome beacon. Lo and behold, the beacon came on; the relief was evident on everybody’s faces. Malevolent Murphy got into the act and our fuel warning light started flickering on short finals. We, of course landed, opted for the nearest parking bay, and reached there with huge sighs of relief. Of course, the shut down procedure was hardly required. All was quiet while the refuelling was done with everybody reflecting on the events of the past few hours. We got airborne for Vizag and this last stretch—again over the railway line—was smooth as this time the line itself crossed right below the approach for runway 05. Our final landing was quite precise. Thus ended an action-packed day. As I said before, I leave it to the reader to draw his own conclusions. Editor’s Note: What went wrong here? It seems that the only thing that went right was the final landing at Vizag. Hurried and perfunctory route planning, non-compliance with ATC instructions, communication shortcuts, and yes, lack of situational awareness. This aircraft and crew could easily have become a statistic. While it is more than 15 years since the incident happened, it surely was not the last and no doubt many more are waiting to happen. So yes, there are still a lot of lessons to learn here. |
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