Indo Russian naval interaction between 1972 and 1975 centred on a number of key issues:

(a) In view of the delay in setting up repair and refit facilities at Visakhapatnam, how to solve the growing backlog of biennial refits of submarines and Petyas which had become due from 1970 onwards and for six-yearly refits which would become due from 1973 onwards. Ships and submarines had developed major defects which needed immediate attention. A stage had been reached when the new equipment received for the Training Complex was being used to replace defective equipment on board ships.

(b) Consequent on the decision, immediately after the 1971 War, to base some Petyas and submarines at Bombay and some missile boats at Visakhapatnam, the maintenance and repair facilities at Bombay and Visakhapatnam had to be augmented.

(c) In the light of the experience gained of operating Russian ships and submarines in Indian conditions and of their performance in the 1971 War, the acquisition of better ships, submarines and missile boats with better sensors and longer range weapons.

(d) The acquisition for the Air Arm of maritime reconnaissance aircraft and, if possible, of vertical-take-off-and land aircraft to replace VIKRANT's aging Seahawks.

(e) The fitment of surface to surface missiles in existing ships and coast batteries.

(f) The feasibility of `Design Collaboration' for building future warships in India.

(g) Finding ways and means to resolve the mounting problems of spares and Repair Technical Documentation.

(h) Resolving the difficulties being experienced as a result of the Russian side's restriction that only use of lubricants supplied by them or of the brand approved by them was permissible during the guarantee period. In effect, this prohibited use of other available lubricants of identical specification on occasions when Russian specified lubricant was not available.

(i) Providing advanced tactical and technical training for officers.

1972

Basing of Russian Acquisitions in Bombay

As soon as the war ended in 1971, the Navy considered it essential that a certain number of operational Petyas and submarines should always be available on the West Coast. This would minimise the using up of engine hours in long transits from coast to coast and make ships and submarines available for longer periods for operations and training. Some new acquisition ships would also have to be based on the West Coast as replacement for the older ships being paid off. The Navy therefore decided to base in Bombay the five newer Petyas and the four newer submarines for which the agreement had been signed in 1971. The main repair facilities however would remain concentrated at Visakhapatnam and only facilities up to annual refit level would require to be set up at Bombay.

Requirements Forwarded to the Russian Side in 1972

After the 1971 war, the Navy forwarded a comprehensive list of requirements to the Russian side. This list included Hunter Killer submarines, anti submarine aircraft, missile boats, landing ships, guided missile destroyers, a fleet tanker, aircraft for VIKRANT, torpedo recovery vessels, minesweepers, solid propellant missiles, anti missile defence systems, harbour defence systems, training of technical personnel in Russia and setting up a Design Organisation in India.

An agreement was signed for the acquisition of a second squadron of longer range missile boats. These new boats would have better tropicalisation, extra air conditioning and more powerful engines. They would also have anti missile gunfire control systems instead of visual sights as in the earlier boats. An agreement was also signed for the supply of these systems for retrofitting in the earlier boats.

The Indian delegations to Moscow in 1971 had requested the Russian side to depute a high level team to India to help resolve major pending problems. These were:

(a) Ships and submarines were overdue biennial refits. The new workshop facilities at Visakhapatnam were not expected to be ready for years. The Visakhapatnam Project needed to be reviewed to investigate the feasibility of setting up the critical workshops on a priority basis so that biennial refits of ships and submarines could commence as early as possible.

(b) Indian technical personnel needed to be trained in Russia to acquire the expertise to carry out the six-yearly and ten-yearly overhaul of equipment and machinery. The services of Russian specialists would also be required to assist in the biennial refits of the first Petya and submarine in India.

(c) The scope of biennial refits, the necessary technical documentation and the standard work lists for ships and submarines, all needed to be known before the first refits were undertaken in India.

These problems were discussed with the Russian Technical Delegation which visited India and workable solutions were agreed upon.

Commissioning in 1972

Three Petyas, ARNALA, ANDROTH and ANJADIP commissioned in 1972.

1973

Pursuant to Russian advice that landing ships be acquired directly from the shipbuilders, an agreement was signed with Poland for the supply of four improved landing ships.

Maritime Reconnaissance Aircraft

By 1973, the Indian Navy had evaluated three types of aircraft the French Atlantic, the British Nimrod and the Russian Beriev 12. The Beriev 12 did not meet the Navy's requirement. The Atlantic and the Nimrod would have to be paid for in foreign exchange which was scarce. The Navy had therefore pressed for the Russian IL 38. The Russian Navy was unable to spare any because they did not have sufficient aircraft for their own needs. Production had stopped and a new model was being developed. The Russian side agreed however to ask their industry of they could produce a few IL 38s for India.

Six-yearly Refits of Submarines

Due to delays in the Visakhapatnam Dockyard Project, the earliest that six-yearly submarine refits could be undertaken in India was end 1978. The existing `interim' facilities were already fully stretched coping with the annual and biennial refits. The Navy therefore suggested that the Russian side accept one submarine per year for six-yearly refit in Russia, with effect from 1975, for the first three submarines. The fourth submarine could be considered for refit in Visakhapatnam depending on the progress of setting up refit facilities.

Commissionings in 1973

Two submarines VELA and VAGIR and the Petya ANDAMAN commissioned in 1973.

1974

The 1972 Russian Technical Delegation had concluded that if certain essential facilities could be set up in Visakhapatnam on a priority basis, the biennial refits of Petyas and submarines could commence in 1974. Target dates had been agreed for the completion of buildings and the installation of Russian supplied equipment and indigenous machinery.

By 1973, it had become clear that the target dates could not be met. A Steering Committee was therefore set up in the Ministry of Defence to direct and take decisions on the progress of the Visakhapatnam Project. The revised target dates approved by the Steering Committee showed that the dry dock, the alongside refitting berth, workshops, services, test facilities, manpower and know-how were not likely to be ready before 1977.

The six-yearly refit of the first submarine was due in end 1973, beyond which it would have to be laid up as unsafe for operations. The Navy had suggested that at least three submarines would need to do their six-yearly refits in Russia, one per year commencing 1974.

When this had been suggested to the Russian side, they felt that it was better to expedite the work in Visakhapatnam. The Russian side therefore sent a Technical Delegation to India to find ways and means to do the refits in India.

From the outset of the discussions, it became clear that the Technical Delegation was in the awkward position of:

(a) Not wanting to the six-yearly refits in Russia.

(b) Knowing that in the Visakhapatnam Dockyard, neither buildings nor equipment were ready to undertake these refits in India.

(c) Nevertheless, trying to find ways and means to do the refits in India to avoid their going to Russia.

After discussion, the general picture that emerged was that the Russian side might reluctantly accept only the first submarine for refit in 1975 but that the refits of the remaining submarines should be done in India.

Meanwhile, in view of the steep increase in the estimated cost of the Visakhapatnam Project, the Steering Committee decided that the remaining work should be planned in phases. In the immediate phase, only those core items were to be provided which were essential for undertaking the major refits of submarines and Petyas.

Since 1972, discussions had been in progress about the acquisition of larger newer ships. As regard frigates, the Navy preferred that they be fitted with surface to surface missiles, surface to air missiles, medium and short range gunfire systems long range sonars, long range anti submarine rockets and torpedoes and an anti submarine helicopter. At that point in time, the Russian Navy's frigates were being equipped either for the anti submarine role or the anti ship role because combining the two roles in one ship resulted in an unacceptable increase in ship size. The Indian Navy's reasoning however was that since it could afford only a limited number of frigates, it was preferable to have multi role frigates. In 1973, the first APEX Committee approved the Navy's proposals for acquiring multi role frigates, ocean going rocket boats, minesweepers and anti submarine aircraft. By then, the Russian side had veered round to the view that a multi role frigate might be possible. During 1974, discussions were held to finalise the weapons and systems to be fitted in the new acquisitions.

IL 38 MR-ASW Aircraft

In 1974, the Russian side intimated that it would be possible to give three IL 38 MRASW aircraft.

Six-yearly Refit of Submarine in Russia

In end 1974, an agreement was signed for the first submarine KALVARI to be refitted in Russia.

Commissioning in 1974

Two submarines VAGIR and VAGSHEER and the Petya AMINI commissioned in 1974. In the same year, the Integrated Type Training Establishment in Visakhapatnam was commissioned as SATAVAHANA and the Missile Boat Technical Position in Bombay was commissioned as TUNIR.

1975

In February 1975, an Inter Governmental Agreement was signed for the Navy's largest acquisition of Russian ships and aircraft and their supporting infrastructure. The agreement was for:

- 3 multi-role guided missile frigates frigates with KAMOV anti submarine helicopters.

- 3 ocean going rocket boats with surface to surface and surface to air missiles.

- 6 coastal minesweepers.

- 3 IL 38 MRASW aircraft.

- Ammunition and support equipment for all the above acquisitions.

- Technical Positions for each of the new missiles and torpedoes.

- Spares for the submarines.

To minimise the kind of difficulties which had been experienced with the earlier Russian acquisitions, the Navy had prepared a detailed questionnaire regarding the new acquisitions and forwarded it to the Russian side.

The Russian side's answers to this questionnaire provided the basis for further detailed discussions. A Professional Delegation went to Russia in mid 1975. Its aim was to obtain detailed information:

(a) On the characteristics, performance data and exploitation of machinery and equipment of the ships and aircraft being acquired.

(b) For the timely establishment of support facilities for their refits, maintenance, logistics and training.

(c) On the feasibility of fitting indigenous communication equipment in the frigates.

(d) On the technical documentation and spares and the time frame for their supply.

(e) On the content and duration of training courses, availability of training equipment and simulators.

(f) On whether the Russian weapons and systems being acquired could be retrofitted in our older ships or into the frigates being constructed in India.

The delegations discussions proved extremely useful in the subsequent management of the new acquisitions.

Missile Coast Battery at Bombay

During 1974, a missile launcher and a fire control system had been removed from a non operational missile boat and fitted on a rotating platform cannibalised from an obsolete gun mounting. It was successfully test fired in 1975. Installation then commenced of a second similar launcher.

Fitment of Surface to Surface Missile System in TALWAR

In 1975, work commenced on the fitment in TALWAR of surface to surface missile launchers and a fire control system which had been removed from a non operational missile boat.

Commissioning in 1975

Three Landing Ships GHORPAD, KESARI and SHARDUL commissioned in 1975. The fourth and last of this class commissioned in January 1976.

DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1975

A RETROSPECT OF THE RUSSIAN ACQUISITION PROGRAMME

Could the Acquisition Have Been Managed Better

In the light of hindsight, there is force in the view that the Russian acquisition programme between 1965 and 1975 could have been managed better. There were strong pressures from the Material Branch to slow down the pace of acquisitions because the shortage of technical artificers and lack of repair facilities could not keep the acquisitions going. There were, also, other underlying causes.

To start with, there was the relaxed ambience of the early 1960's into which the Russian acquisitions were suddenly injected. Until 1966, the Navy's ships were entirely of British origin. Steam driven machinery and auxiliaries permitted virtually unlimited usage. Their machinery, weapons, sensors and other equipment were of almost the same technological vintage as ships in the British Navy. British naval feedback kept the Navy up to date with the problems encountered in the fields of operations, maintenance and logistics. Spares were readily available off the shelf, often through direct sourcing from the British Navy.

This picture changed after 1966. The vessels of various types procured from Russia were densely packed with equipment whose maintenance was governed by hours of usage. The Russian operating - maintenance - logistic procedures were designed to keep vessels ready for instant combat. This required strictly regulated usage backed up by an extensive maintenance infrastructure ashore. The repair and refit cycles were more closely spaced. All this required timely logistic support.

After the vessels arrived in India, it was found that the procurement of spares from Russia required strict conformance with an inflexible, time-consuming process which the Navy was neither used to nor could it comply with because of the paucity of spare part reference numbers, difficulties in preparing indents in the Russian language etc.

The submarines, when inducted, required stricter technical monitoring and stronger logistic support. They had their own unique maintenance and logistic requirements. Soon thereafter, the thin skinned, high speed missile boats arrived. They too had a novel support philosophy involving special to type base support and training complexes for the boats and their missiles.

In a very short space of time, all the existing maintenance and logistic facilities came under pressure. The number of items handled by the Logistics Organisation doubled and the rupee value of material used in the Naval Dockyard Bombay trebled. Cumulatively, the induction of large numbers of new types of ships and weapons and the new procedures requiring intensive usage-hour-based maintenance and instant logistics strained the prevailing system to its limits.

These stresses and strains were compounded by the inability of the Navy to perceive that the only way it could overcome the constraints of austere usage for which the equipment had been designed, was by indenting substantially more spares than what even the Russian side had recommended. As a result, the interaction between operational and technical compulsions, which should have been positive, became negative.

THE OPERATIONAL COMPULSION

As mentioned earlier, a major compulsion was the need to give sea time to every officer and sailor by rotating ships crews every year.

From the very outset, the Navy which was used to unrestricted usage of steam propelled ships blithely ignored the repercussions of not adhering to the limitations laid down regarding the operating hours of critical machinery like diesel engines and diesel generators. There is substance in the Russian view, which was stated to every Indian delegation which complained about the non availability of critical operational spares, that the shortage derived more from what, by Russian norms, was "excessive usage" and "beyond what the equipment was designed to do". The Indian Navy's dilemma was that it just could not countenance not giving every officer and sailor sea time. It was a mandatory prerequisite for their next promotion. The annual compulsion of taking new crews to sea and the inability to accept that Russian equipment would break down as soon as its design limits were exceeded led directly to "over exploitation". Subsequently, rather ironically, the Navy had to accept that time spent in ships which barely went to sea would have to be treated as sea time.

THE TECHNICAL COMPULSIONS

From the very outset, it was known that:

(a) The new Dockyard at Visakhapatnam would take several years to come up.

(b) The rudimentary Base Repair Organisation at Visakhapatnam was not, and could not be, equipped to cope with the day to day maintenance, annual refit, biennial refit and six yearly refit workload of four submarines, five Petyas, two landing ships etc.

The only salvation was to concentrate the experience of the officers and men trained in Russia, utilise the workshop facilities in the submarine depot ship and avail of the expertise of the Russian guarantee specialists which came with each new acquisition. In the event, for diverse reasons, none of these resources were effectively dovetailed. To save on training costs, the experienced personnel of the first few vessels were sent back to Russia to commission the subsequent vessels, much to the detriment of vessels so deprived. The submarine depot ship was deployed to support the submarines operating from Bombay. Since Bombay did not have the appropriate shore supply, the depot ship's generators soon ran out of operating hours. Efforts focussed on getting the depot ship itself back into shape, so that it could be used to help maintain the Petyas and submarines. And as regards utilising the services of the Russian guarantee specialists, the difficulties of interacting in the Russian language and the fierce pride in "not being technically dependent on the Russians" constrained meaningful interaction.

RETROSPECT

Despite all these vexatious problems, the transition from British to Russian acquisitions did manage to succeed, slowly and tortuously to begin with and eventually beyond everybody's expectations. Indeed, there is substance in the view that it was in these painful years that the solid foundations were laid for future interaction. After the initial resentment at the temerity of Indian crews to decline the weekly political lectures and the persistent questions of Indian officers and artificers seeking to know more and more about their equipment, the Russian Training Centres realised that they were dealing with persons who were not only intelligent and professional but also diligent and innovative.

This professional respect began to over-arch the complex mindsets and inhibitions of each side, firstly at the Training Centre level and then at the Soviet Fleet level, when the Russians saw how confidently and competently the crews they had trained sailed their vessels back to India, which none of the previous Navies trained by them had done. On the Indian side, as soon as the crews commissioned their ships and submarines, they realised how invaluable the thoroughness of their Russian training had been.

As mutual respect increased at the local fleet level, it percolated upwards to Moscow and got reflected in the greater candour, width and depth of interaction with naval delegations to Moscow.

A remarkable achievement of these high level interactions in Moscow was that each successive acquisition was an improvement on its predecessor - the second lot of VELA class submarines were better than the KALVARI class; the second lot of Petyas were better than the KAMORTA class; the second lot of extended range missile boats were better than the earlier lot and the second lot of GHORPAD class LSTs were better than the earlier GHARIAL class.

Much of the credit for this achievement must go to the tenacity and dexterity with which successive CNS', VCNS' and COMs pursued the briefs prepared for them by the eager Commanders in NHQ's professional directorates. The latter were keeping abreast of the latest developments in the Western navies via the Leander and Corvette Projects and also of the latest developments in the Russian Navy via the international naval compendium known as Jane's Fighting Ships. The Russians realised this and were good humoured enough to occasionally remark in jest that "India should acquire one from the West and give it to us and very soon Russia would give India something better."

A substantial share of the credit for the success of Indo Russian naval cooperation must go to the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations and its much maligned departments - the General Engineering Department (GED) and the General Technical Department (GTD). Their enormous patience and tolerance was able to bridge the Indian side's inability to understand the inertia of the centrally planned, totally Government owned and controlled, Russian industrial system.

An equally great, if not greater, share of credit must go to the Indian Ministries of Defence and Finance (Defence). Their agility in negotiations and the painstaking discussions with their counterparts in the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations belies the widespread naval belief that the Navy was treated like a stepchild. The Navy's incredible technological leap frog in just ten years after 1965 would not have been possible without the whole-hearted support of these two institutions.

But the largest share of credit for laying a sound foundation for Indo - Russian naval cooperation belongs to Admiral Gorshkov. He intervened adroitly at every impasse. His calibrated release of larger, better and more modern ships, submarines and aircraft were not only in step with the larger objectives of Indo - Russian political, economic and defence cooperation but also in step with his growing confidence that the Indian Navy would confidently cope with whatever Russia gave. His confidence, and indeed that of the entire Russian establishment, soared after the spectacular success of the missile boat attacks on Karachi harbour during the 1971 war. These attacks not only brought glory to the efficacy of Russian weapons when properly exploited; they also validated Russian confidence in Indian professional competence.

It was this confidence and mutual respect which flowered in the years that followed to produce the elegant guided missile corvettes of the KHUKRI class and sleek destroyers like DELHI and MYSORE.

In retrospect, despite all the procedural limitations of each side, the absorption of the Russian acquisitions was as monumental an achievement as the Leander Programme and the 1971 war.