CHAPTER 16
The Navy's very first plan formulated after Independence in 1947 proposed to the Government the acquisition of four submarines. The plan did not specify in which year of the plan the submarines should be acquired. This was because of uncertainty in the source of supply and the difficulties anticipated in starting to operate submarines.
In 1948, due to budgetary constraints, the Navy was asked to recast its requirements. The Navy's 10 year plan 1948 - 1958 gave lesser priority to the Submarine Arm because it could not be created by 1958. In 1951, since large scale naval expansion could not be afforded, the Navy proposed a ship replacement programme instead of a ship acquisition programme. Submarines found no mention in this plan.
By 1956, Pakistan had joined CENTO and SEATO and was going to be given extensive naval assistance by America and Britain. The Navy had to propose the acquisition of ships to match Pakistan's acquisitions. No mention was made of submarines.
During all these years, there had been no progress on the acquisition of submarines. There were several weighty reasons:
(a) Until 1956, the Navy itself was fully stretched, personnelwise and budgetwise, in remedying the after-effects of the partition of the Royal Indian Navy. Ships and aircraft were being acquired and training, repair and logistic facilities were being set up ashore.
(b) After 1956, the Navy's efforts were primarily focussed on acquiring ships and aircraft to cope with the increased threat from Pakistan.
(c) The Navy found it exceedingly difficult to carry conviction, either in India or in Britain, that the Submarine Arm was a priority requirement. In the context of a non- violent, peace-loving member of the British Commonwealth whose over-riding priority was economic development, nobody was prepared to accept that India at all needed a patently offensive Submarine Arm.
However, the Navy kept a close watch on the design and development of post war submarines. France had developed the Daphne class. Holland had developed the Dolphin class. Britain had first developed the Porpoise class which had evolved into the Oberon class. The British Navy had increased the submerged endurance of some of its earlier World War II submarines by cutting the hull in two and inserting a midships section to provide an additional propulsion battery compartment. The American Navy had improved their conventional submarines by giving them "Greater Underwater Propulsion Power", which came to be known as the GUPPY conversion.
The Navy also kept a watch on the development of the Submarine Arms by the Commonwealth Navies. Both the Canadian and Australian Navies had taken British manned A and T class submarines on loan in which their personnel received on job training under British submariners. Both Canada and Australia were awaiting the finalising of the Oberon design before purchasing them.
By 1956, the feed back from the annual Commonwealth JET exercises indicated that the arrangements for participating Navies to share anti submarine exercise time with available British submarines were becoming inadequate for our ships. Defence Minister KrKrishna Menon wrote to the First Sea Lord, Admiral Mountbatten in May 1957 for "acquiring a target submarine service comprising the oldest and cheapest submarines, since it was not envisaged that India would need to employ them in war". (Roy Choudhary Page 37)
Because of the British Navy's extended commitments, reduced strength, procedural difficulties in loaning British naval personnel etc, the loan of a training submarine did not find favour. The Navy then accepted the British Navy's suggestion for providing India with increased anti submarine exercise time in Indian waters.
In 1958, the eight new British frigates of the naval replacement plan started arriving in India and the second hand British aircraft carrier had been purchased. The Navy re-started its case for a Submarine Arm.
In his book "Indian Navy's Submarine Arm," Admiral Chatterji states: (Page 36)
"A paper was submitted to the Government in 1959 for the acquisition of three operational submarines which would also naturally be available as target submarines for the anti submarine ships. Protracted discussions took place with the Government at various levels over years without much progress.
"The British were adamant in their views that submarines were sophisticated weapon systems which were difficult to operate, that the Indian Navy was still too young to venture into the submarine field, that submarines were accident prone, that the loss of a submarine at sea would lead to the loss of confidence in the Navy at Governmental and national level which would gravely impair the Navy's further development.
"Examples were quoted of the Australian and Canadian Navies which operated submarines on loan from the British Navy, manned by British personnel with a few junior officers and sailors as trainees.
"Having just attained independance, the thought of adding any warship to the Indian Navy commanded by a British officer and manned by British sailors was repugnant to Indian sentiments."
The Navy refined its line of argument. It impressed on the Government that every Navy worth its name had to have submarines. It took several years to train an officer in the operation of a submarine and give him sufficient experience to ensure that he would be competent to assume command of a submarine. The Navy urged that the Government accept the creation of the Submarine Arm in principle and allow the Navy to depute a few officers to Britain for training in submarines.
Early in 1962, the Government agreed to the deputation of personnel to Britain. The training of junior officers was accepted on the premise that intimate knowledge of submarines would help to increase the efficiency of our anti submarine ships. Since submarines were still viewed as "offensive" vessels, the Government made it clear that the approval to depute officers for submarine training did not in any way commit the Government to the acquisition of submarines.
Submarine Training With the British Navy
Commodore KS Subra Manian (then Lt Cdr) and later Commanding Officer of the Navy's first submarine KALVARI, recalls:
"We were trained along with British officers. After classroom training, we were attached to various British submarines for six months. During afloat training, we had to qualify practically as watchkeeping officers in a submarine. I started in HMS Porpoise then went to other submarines of the Porpoise class. Overall, the period of training was just under a year".
Captain MN Samant (then Lt Cdr) and later Commanding Officer of the Navy's third submarine KARANJ, recalls:
"There was no holding back on anything, except for classified matters such as their latest submarine sonars.
"Trainingwise, it was very much more instructive from the practical point of view, than later in Russia. In Russia they placed tremendous emphasis on the theoretical aspect, including the mathematical basis, but our actual sea time in Russian submarines was very very low as compared to the British Navy. The British Navy did not emphasise so much on the mathematical or theoretical aspects, but they made up for it by giving you 6 months of actual seatime in submarines. In addition, during our shore training, we went to sea in submarines almost 40% of the time".
Admiral VS Shekhawat (then Lt) and later Commanding Officer of submarine KARANJ in the 1971 War, recalls:
"Training started with an intensive three and a half month theoretical course in which all the technical aspects of submarine construction, engineering and electrical systems, diving and surfacing systems, submarine control, ventilation, salt water, fuel, fresh water, distilled water and other systems were covered. Practical instructions consisted of visits to old submarines secured alongside the jetty. There were instructional visits to the works of the suppliers of submarine batteries and to hyperbaric research laboratories to understand the effects of sea water pressure and underwater explosions on the human body.
"The training imparted was of a high order, compressed into a very short time frame and entailing long hours of study and practical work. Perhaps it did not go into as much detail as was to be our subsequent experience with Soviet training, but it was adequate for the trainees to form crews of British submarines and learn on the job.
"Our officers deputed to British submarines formed part of their crews for all practical purposes, kept watch independently, and gained invaluable experience and self confidence which was to stand them in good stead indeed when they later commissioned the Russian submarines.
"The attachments of our personnel was to all the classes of submarine then operating in the Royal Navy. Thus in a short period of time, Indian submarine personnel were exposed to several different types of submarines, with concepts of machinery design spanning more than twenty five years. This further helped in widening their perspective and experience.
"Indian officers and sailors, were always welcome as their presence relieved the strain of constant watch keeping at sea and in harbour. With our close familiarity with the Royal Navy at that time and the British origin of our surface ships, equipment, documentation and administrative set up, it was easy for our people to assimilate and absorb the training imparted and in general they were treated as equals, though with some restrictions on security matters.
"Indian personnel were particularly welcome because of their quick learning and special skills which enabled them to rectify difficult machinery defects and render the submarine operational. Brought up as they were in the older Indian ships with inadequate base support, shortage of spares and tools, the Indian sailor had developed fine skills in the art of improvisation and in making-do, allied with native ingenuity. No wonder they were popular on board with the masses of complex machinery in the highly confined spaces of the submarines."
Rear Admiral JMS Sodhi (then Lt) recalls:
"Submarine training in Britain was to the point. Even the escape training was only of three days duration. We used to do six weeks of sailing, followed by two weeks of rest and recreation. During sea training, in view of the shortage of RN officers on board, we were given maximum opportunity to do everything we could. In fact we got our independent watch keeping at sea very very quickly and to that extent we learnt a lot. The British Navy officers, being disinterested, gave us the opportunity to learn as much as we could.
"Even in their system of assessing officers, they were very free and frank. When we sailed in HMS Astute, the Captain SM came on board and told our Commanding Officer, who was aspiring to become a Commander, "In the next exercise, if you catch the other submarine, you will become a Commander. Otherwise you will not". For nearly 72 hours, we sat on watch on the sonar, trying to locate the other submarine but unfortunately we were caught by that submarine. The Captain SM very nicely came to the Wardroom and said "Sorry, Tim, you have to retire as a Lt Cdr". That was the end of the story. There was no heartburn".
Utilisation of British Trained Personnel Pending the Acquisition of Submarines from Russia
To ensure that the batches returning from Britain did not forget what they had learnt, arrangements were made for officers to be attached to British submarines during the JET exercise of 1964.
Approval to Commence Negotiations for Acquiring Submarines
After the military reverses in the border war with China in October 1962, a major defence review was initiated to remedy the inadequacies. This gave the Navy the opportunity to resubmit its case for the acquisition of submarines. In addition to the arguments used earlier, it was emphasised that China possessed submarines, some of which had sufficient range to operate in the Bay of Bengal. The Navy therefore needed to acquire submarines, not only for the earlier reasons, but also for employment in the Hunter-Killer role against Chinese submarines.
The new proposal put up in November 1962 asked for three submarines. The justification given was that to keep one submarine continuously on patrol in an area about 1500 miles from India, such as the Malacca Straits, three submarines would be required: one would be undergoing repairs or refit or resting the crew, the second in transit to and from the patrol area and the third actually on patrol.
Vice Admiral BS Soman was the Chief of the Naval Staff in 1963. Writing in the naval magazine Quarterdeck 1997, he recalled:
"A serious bone of contention with the Government was the acquisition of submarines. I was convinced that these were crucial for a balanced force, but Prime Minister Nehru and Admiral Mountbatten thought otherwise.
"After a lot of discussion, I was allowed to raise the matter with the Admiralty when I went to Britain in 1963. As expected, they turned it down - it was clear that the British would only sell us vessels which conformed to their Commonwealth Indian Ocean Defence Plan. This was not acceptable to the Navy and I recommended that we look elsewhere, suggesting that Russia might be a likely substitute.
"We found the Russians not only ready to sell, but to accept part of the payment in rupees. Thus it came about that the Russians got our custom and remained our major and reliable suppliers over the years."
During 1963 and 1964, in the expectation of assistance from Britain and America, there was considerable discussion to crystallise the requirements for what eventually became the 1964-1969 Defence Plan. As regards submarines, the Navy had four options before it:
(a) The older British submarines which the Admiralty had earlier offered. They were already 20 years old. Their remaining life was too short to make purchase worthwhile.
(b) Older American Fleet class submarines which after modernisation would have five years operational life. Politically, however, it was unlikely that America would give submarines to India.
(c) New British submarines of the Porpoise/Oberon class.
(d) New Russian F class submarines whose specifications were similar to those of the British Porpoise class and the American Fleet class. (Note : The Air Force had already turned to Russia in 1962 for the manufacture of the latest Russian MIG 21 fighter aircraft in India).
In view of the Navy's lack of familiarity with Russian naval hardware, the Navy recommended the acquisition of three Porpoise class submarines from Britain. Government accepted the Navy's recommendations in principle. Negotiations were started with the British Government for the acquisition of one second hand Porpoise class submarine to start with.
Discussions with Britain in 1963
In 1963, the British were experiencing economic difficulties and were considering reduction in their naval forces. The British Navy was not willing to spare one of their own Porpoise class submarines. However, British shipbuilders were willing and eager to build an Oberon class submarine for India. The Navy was agreeable to buy one new Oberon but sought deferred credit terms to cover the cost of the submarine, which at 1963 prices was working out to about Rs five crores - three crores for the submarine and two crores for the infrastructure. The British were unwilling to extend soft credit and India could not spare the foreign exchange.
By early 1964, the 1964-1969 Defence Plan had taken shape and the requirements therein had been indicated to America, Britain and Russia in preparation for the visit to these countries of delegations led by the Defence Minister. Commodore (later Admiral) SM Nanda was the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff at that time and represented the Navy in all three delegations.
Discussions in America-May 1964.
Admiral Nanda recalls:
"During these discussions, Mr Mc Namara reiterated that in the context of our problem with China, the Army and Air Force will have priority. He said "Your threat is from China. All your ships up to now have been from Britain. So you will have to go to Britain. As far as the US is concerned, the Navy has no priority." We came back empty handed."
Mr PVR Rao was the Defence Secretary from after the Chinese war in 1962 till after the Pakistan war of 1965 and accompanied the Defence Minister's delegation to America. He recalls:
"At the Ministry level, we did not broach naval supplies with the US at all. We knew it would be futile, because the US could not supply any naval ships without Congressional approval. We were extremely doubtful whether that approval would be forthcoming. The US was committed to Pakistan and under the law of the time, only Congress could approve the transfer of naval vessels. In fact even the transfer of the submarine GHAZI on loan to Pakistan was illegal under US law.
"We also had a very low priority for the Navy in 1965. After the 1962 battle, the first problem facing Indian defence planning was with regard to Pakistan and China, and China's Navy had a low role to play against India. The Army primarily, and to back up the Army, the Air Force, had priority."
American records are not yet available which could throw light on precisely why America declined India's request for submarines. The reasoning of "traditional supplier" appears odd because in that very same year 1964, Pakistan was given the submarine GHAZI on loan for a period of three years to start with. It is more likely that Congress would not have agreed to loan submarines to India because India was not a CENTO/SEATO ally of America, whereas Pakistan was. The American Administration may also have reconciled themselves to the Indian Navy turning to Russia as the Indian Air Force had done, in case the West was unable to meet its needs.
On the eve of the Defence Minister's delegation to Russia in September 1964, the position was:
- The British were not willing to spare a Porpoise class submarine. The shipbuilders were keen to build on Oberon but the British Government could not extend a soft credit of five million pounds for its construction.
- India was unable to spare this huge amount in foreign exchange for purchasing a submarine.
Under the circumstances, the delegation's task was to explore the availability of the Navy's requirements from Russia and the financial implications of doing so.
Discussions in Russia - September 1964
In Russia, the response to the Navy's requirements was positive. The Russians offered four of their new F class submarines, a submarine depot ship and other vessels.
Admiral Nanda recalls:
"Russia was keen to meet our requirements for ships and submarines. In Leningrad, we were taken to sea in a submarine and were quite impressed with what we saw. But Delhi had sent instructions not to sign for any naval equipment from Russia.
"When we came back, I got to know what had happened. It appeared that the instructions had come from the Government, who had been influenced by the British and the American Governments, that the Navy should not go in for Russian acquisitions. And so in 1964, we did not take the Russian submarines that were being offered to us."
Mr RD Pradhan, IAS, was the Private Secretary of Defence Minister YB Chavan from 1962 to 1965. He accompanied the Defence Minister in 1964. In his memoirs "Debacle to Revival", he states: (Pages 229 et seq).
"Lal Bahadur Shastri felt that before making any commitment to the Soviets, the Defence Minister should visit Britain to find out the attitude of the Britain Government. Apparently, the situation had become favourable with the advent of the Labour Party in 1964 under Prime Minister Harold Wilson".
Discussions in Britain-November 1964
Admiral Nanda recalls:
"In the UK, the Labour Government had just taken over and Mountbatten was the Chief of Defence Staff. A lot of discussion took place. Eventually the First Sea Lord, Sir Michael Pollock asked me over for a session at the Admiralty. He felt that the Labour Government may be more sympathetic to India and he might be forced to give us the Oberon class submarine and the Daring class destroyers we were asking for. So he said "The Royal Navy is being run down. I cannot give you Daring class destroyers. Please do not press for them. A 'T' class submarine is being returned to UK from Australia to be scrapped. Please accept this submarine".
"I had to say "Sorry, Sir, I cannot recommend this to my Defence Minister. You have got the infrastructure for the maintenance of your submarines. If you feel that this 'T' class submarine cannot be maintained by you, how do you expect us to maintain this T class submarine in India?" Then he said "Look the whole thing is that you have no experience of running submarines and if you want to learn driving, you don't go and buy a new car. You learn driving on an old car". So I said "Sir, I accept that also, that when you want to learn driving, you learn driving on an old car. But you don't go and buy an old car to learn driving. We have, as you know, been offered four brand new submarines from Russia. How do you expect my Defence Minister to stand up in Parliament and say that we have refused four brand new submarines from Russia, but we are going to take from Britain a submarine which is going to be scrapped? What I am prepared to recommend to my Minister is that we sign for an Oberon class submarine and that you agree to it. It will take you two to three years to build it. During that period you can loan us the old 'T' Class submarine on which we will train our crew and return the submarine back to you as soon as you give us the Oberon class submarine". But even to that he would not agree.
"As the First Sea Lord, he felt that his job was to see that the British Navy did not lose any ships and submarines. His job was to see that it remained strong. He did not want his Navy to be cut down by handing over ships and submarines to India which he, at that time, felt he could ill afford to give".
Mr PVR Rao, the Defence Secretary, accompanied Mr Chavan's delegation to Britain. He recalls:
"In England, our main effort was to get some money - deferred credit - on soft terms. The difference between India's naval demands and what the British were prepared to give was substantial. Even Lord Mountbatten, who was Chief of Defence Staff at that time, could not prevail with the Admiralty, though he pleaded India's cause better than even India did. He even told the First Sea Lord that India may be driven to seek help from the USSR. But the First Sea Lord was adamant that he could not spare an Oberon submarine.
"Our Navy was still keen on the Oberon class submarine and the probability of obtaining it was hard to die. The Admiralty were building this new class of submarines. They had just given an order for three submarines and India wanted one of those submarines. The British Admiralty said "No, we have got only three submarines on order, they are absolutely necessary for us, we cannot release any of them". They were prepared to give us older submarines, which our Navy refused to take.
"The British Prime Minister Harold Wilson remarked, half humorously, to Mr Chavan; "I did not know that submarines could climb the Himalayas".
To avoid a distruption in the naval relationship, the British agreed to reconsider whether they could find ways and means to give India deferred credit for building a new Oberon class submarine in a British shipyard.
After the conference in Bandung in Indonesia in 1955, when the principles of Panchsheel were formally accepted, relations between India and Indonesia had steadily deteriorated. The predominant Communist Party of Indonesia had close links with Communist China and the Soviet Union. Between 1958 and 1965, the Soviet Union gave Indonesia a substantial naval fleet. Indonesia wanted to rename the Indian Ocean as the Indonesian Ocean and intrusions were observed in the Nicobar Islands, the nearest of which was only 90 nautical miles from the northern tip of Sumatra.
Mr K Subrahmanyam was Deputy Secretary Budget and Planning in the Ministry of Defence in 1964 and 1965. He recalls:
"In March 1965, the British told us that they will not be able to give us deferred credit for building an Oberon class submarine.
"In early April, there was a meeting of the Secretaries Committee in which the activities of the Indonesian Navy around the Andaman and Nicobar Islands were discussed. The Navy stressed the need for maintaining a naval presence there to deal with the situation. On the basis of that discussion, the Navy prepared a draft paper in which it described the situation around the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and recommended that we again approach the United States, Britain and Russia for naval vessels.
"I felt this was not the right approach. I pointed out that going back to the Americans, British and Russians was not going to give us any additional benefits because:
(a) The Americans had told us that they will not give us naval equipment and
(b) The British had already told us they couldn't give us credit for building the Oberon class submarine.
"Therefore the best course was not to delay any further, but to accept the Russian offer which had been pending since August 1964. Mr Chavan agreed. Naval Headquarters were asked to put up definite proposals for acquisition of Russian ships and submarines."
The Navy's Hesitance to Switch Over to Russian Acquisitions
There is no doubt that Naval Headquarters had grave reservations about going in for Russian acquisitions. Indeed, the Navy appears to have been almost apologetic. Admiral Kohli, who was the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff in 1965, states in his book:
"Having tried both the USA and UK and drawn a blank from both countries, we had no alternative but to go to the Soviet Union. This decision was taken after the most careful consideration as it would mean going to the Communist camp for the first time. We are often blamed by spokesmen from Western countries, more particularly the USA, for going to Russia - but they are not aware that a first approach to their country had drawn a blank."
In 1965, the agreement was signed for the acquisition of Russian ships and submarines. Admiral Kohli, then Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, headed the Naval team of this delegation. In his book, he states :
"The first submarine was to be ready at the end of 1967. The Soviets undertook to train two complete submarine crews in their naval base at Vladivostok on the Pacific Coast. Our crews began their training in July 1966. Credits were made available by the Soviet Union and the payments were to be made in Rupees. The price of each submarine was around 3 crores."
Admiral Mountbatten, visited the National Defence College after he retired as the British Chief of the Defence Staff. He deplored "The short sightedness of the British Government who, by declining a deferred credit of a measly five million pounds for building an Oberon class submarine, forced the Indian Navy to acquire its requirements from Russia, thereby limiting the British warship industry's market to meeting the needs only of the Leander Frigate Project."
Selection of Crew and Pre Deputation Russian Language Training
Captain MN Samant recalls:
"Selection of a submarine crew is critical in that it requires high medical and psychological fitness standards. In those days we had to screen 7 to 8 volunteers before we had one man. Then we wanted to get experienced persons, who would stay longer in the service and yet we wanted to induct junior persons, so that they could be trained to gradually take the place of the experienced ones".
All personnel selected to undergo training in Russia were given three months of Russian language training in Bombay.
Commodore KS Subra Manian recalls:
"The USSR Navy at that time consisted mainly of conscripts who spent three years in service and then went out, unless they were retained for any reason. They were all raw recruits and they were trained for a specific job. Our sailors and officers who went there had been in the service for a number of years, about eight to ten years. They were all experienced in their particular trades. Now the trade structures of the Soviet Navy and of our Navy were not quite compatible. They trained each sailor for a specific job and he only concentrated on that. Our sailor was trained to do multifarious duties.
"One of my first headaches on arrival there was to draw up a syllabus for training our sailors and to convince the Soviets that their system is not compatible with ours and cannot work. I had a lot of problems on this subject. However we managed to draw up a syllabus, not only for ourselves but for subsequent batches also. We did evolve some sort of a compromise to make sure that our sailors got the right sort of training.
"As far as comparing the two systems of training is concerned, there is good in both systems. We adopted the best of both".
Capt MN Samant recalls:
"We tried to make the Soviets understand that none of our crew had come directly from universities and schools. We were career officers and crew having 12 to 15 years of service, including almost one year's practical experience in submarines and three months training with British Navy. We told them that what we wanted was a concept of type training, as against the basic training which they were trying to impart. That had the desired effect. From the second batch onwards, we were able to reduce the training time from 18 months to 15 months. And for the third and fourth, we were able to reduce it further.
"Another point noticed was the Soviet's pride. To try out a submarine's weapon systems, especially after a new submarine is commissioned, we require a target vessel. The Soviets felt very awkward. They said that "After the Second World War, we feel very hurt if any foreign ship fires at a Soviet vessel!" It actually took time to convince them that unless they proved the weapon system, it will not be possible for us to accept their vessels. That too had the desired effect".
Admiral VS Shekhawat recalls:
"The Russians believed in a lot of class room instruction and it was very very thorough. I felt that for us the best was a combination of the two, not the very short duration that the British did, nor the prolonged duration that the Russians believed in. Eventually we arrived at our own training duration somewhat between the two, but leaning more towards the Russian side in thoroughness of class room instructions, diagrams and so on. I think that has suited us better than the British system might have done. Of course the British system probably is more cost effective because of less time spent on training. But the safety aspect has also to be borne in mind as well as the educational background and aptitude of the trainees. We have been fortunate in being able to operate in considerable safety over all these very many years as a result of the practices that we followed".
Vice Admiral (then Lt) RN Ganesh had joined the Submarine Arm after training in Britain had ceased. He was later to be the first Commanding Officer of the nuclear propelled submarine CHAKRA. His recollections of training in Russia were, in some respects, different from those who had earlier been trained in Britain:
"Our instructors impressed us with their technical knowledge and we did benefit greatly from the training. We developed the habit of learning our equipment thoroughly, of being able to run and maintain our own equipment, irrespective of branch. This technical knowledge of one's own equipment stood us in very good stead. On the more general front, the Soviets were not generally very forthcoming on tactical doctrine.
"There was undoubtedly a kind of cultural divide among the Indians themselves. Those who had undergone training with the British Navy, were more reluctant to accept the Soviet instructors in that role and very often assumed a kind of superior attitude. By and large, they were slightly derisive in their approach to the Soviets. This was largely a spin off of our totally Western reading habits. The Western perception of the Soviets had somehow got grafted on our way of thinking.
"The training, in my view, was excellent for the type of sailor that the Indian is. He likes to be told in detail, he likes to know exactly what he was to do. Methodical, systematic and thorough that is the essence of Soviet training. Perhaps it did not leave too much room for initiative in the sense that everyone carried a notebook indicating what he was supposed to do when there was a fire, when there was flooding and so on. But all these things did help in maintaining a very strict organisation. This was happily blended, I think with those of British experience. In the end, we did get a happy blend of thorough Soviet basic training but with the experience of those who had been trained in Britain.
Rear Admiral JMS Sodhi recalls:
"The training was slow but it was absolutely thorough, it was very good and the practical training was excellent. It was far better than the British training. The Russians told us that the many orders and procedures might seem very silly to you, but please remember that "It is written in the blood of comrades gone by". So please do not ignore them. I found their advice to be very correct.
"We found that because of the Russian system of conscript training, they had many safety features on their submarine. That meant that no single fault could create a crisis in a submarine. There had to be a series of faults, only then could an accident occur. In fact, even in the propulsion system, there were seven alternative modes of propulsion. So six or seven modes had to break down before the submarine was completely immobilised".
Rear Admiral (then Lt) SC Anand underwent his initial submarine training in Russia. He recalls:
"It was only when we were finishing the training that we realised how valuable the training was. Because as we went along, we found our knowledge of specific actions to be carried out on board a submarine, specific activities, drills, procedures became that much more thorough. We realised how important it was to know the specifics of any action rather than knowing it only theoretically. The only reason we did not know very much about this type of training was that in our surface navy, emphasis on this kind of practical training was not to be found.
"We were also impressed with the knowledge of the Russian Instructors, as well as the other sailors who guided us during our first steps in the submarine. We wanted to emulate the example being set by those instructors, the thoroughness of their knowledge, and their total command over the subject they were teaching."
Submarine Infrastructure Facilities
The 1965 agreement with Russia not only covered the delivery of ships and submarines, but also the creation of a modern Dockyard at Visakhapatnam, along with a submarine base and training school.
The basic infrastructure required for the Submarine Arm was a submarine base, a submarine training establishment, submarine maintenance and repair workshops, facilities to charge the submarine propulsion batteries and the high pressure air bottles and facilities for blowing the ballast tanks and preparing submarine torpedoes.
Since the new Dockyard would take several years to come up, interim arrangements were made for the Base Repair Workshop in Visakhapatnam to be expanded.
The Induction of the Submarines
After commissioning, each submarine did a three month combat work up in the Baltic before departing for India. Since the Suez Canal was closed, the maiden voyages were around the Cape of Good Hope. The first two submarines were escorted by Indian naval ships, the latter two came on their own. The first four submarines arrived between July 1968 and May 1970 and were based in Visakhapatnam .
After arrival, the submarines:
(a) Participated in anti submarine exercises with ships, Alizes and Seakings and helped them to evaluate anti submarine sonars and sonobuoys.
(b) Undertook operational patrols.
(c) Helped train the fresh inductees into the submarine service.
In 1971, an agreement was signed for four improved Russian submarines of the same class. The improvements were the result of experience gained by us in operating the submarines in Indian tropical conditions:
(a) Design of equipment and machinery to cater for higher ambient air temperature, sea water temperature and relative humidity parameters.
(b) Improved active and passive sonar sets and the requirement of a long range passive sonar.
(c) Improved version of radar with better power output and an extra PPI to be fitted in the Chart House.
(d) Improved version of SHF/DF set with better presentation.
(e) Improvements in the layout of the control room.
(f) Improved arrangements on equipment and machinery to ensure a higher degree of silence.
(g) Improvements to Main diesels, HP air compressors, Refrigeration plant, Ventilation system, etc.
(h) Provisioning of a frequency analyser and a cavitation meter.
During the 1971 war KURSURA and KARANJ operated in the Arabian Sea. KHANDERI operated in the Boy of Bengal. Their activities have been described in the chapters on the 1971 war.
KALVARI remained in Visakhapatnam to continue training of fresh inductees for the next lot of four submarines.
Basing of Submarines in Bombay
After the 1971 war, it was decided to base the four new submarines in Bombay and create the minimum essential support, maintenance and repair facilities.
These four submarines arrived in Bombay between January 1974 and May 1975. Until their shore facilities were set up, they were supported by the submarine depot ship AMBA, which had been moved from Visakhapatnam to Bombay.
After arrival, these submarines participated in anti submarine exercises, evaluations and operational patrols as the earlier submarines had done. They were saved however from having to expend precious motoring hours in transits between the East and West coasts, which had been unavoidable for the earlier four submarines based in Visakhapatnam.
From the outset, the tight delivery schedule of the submarines created problems. By 1969, personnel shortages began to cause concern. Several measures were taken to remedy these shortages.
Analysis indicated that a major cause of the shortage in intake was the large number of rejects in the psychological tests and the general lack of confidence in the procedures for selection. It was decided:
(a) To do away with psychological and mechanical response test; only the recompression chamber (RCC) test was to continue.
(b) Sailors rejected in the earlier psychological tests were to be retested for suitability in the RCC test at Submarine Headquarters.
(c) The incentives and benefits of service in submarine were to be widely disseminated and followed up by liaison visits of submarine officers to ships and establishments.
To make service in the Submarine Cadre attractive, special benefits were sanctioned. These were Submarine Allowance, Submarine Pay, Submarine Rations, Special Submarine Clothing and Hardlying Money at full rates.
(a) Government sanctioned a special scale of rations for sailors serving on board submarines. This included special items of pre-cooked foods for issue when submerged when normal cooking would not be possible.
(b) Ready to Eat Meals. Large scale trials of ready-to-eat meals, manufactured at the Defence Food Research Laboratory Mysore and the Accelerated Freeze Dried Unit Delhi, were undertaken on board KALVARI. The trials were found to be quite satisfactory. After effecting further improvements, the DFRL Mysore commenced bulk production. These meals, however, never became popular.
(c) Special Rations. The special scale of rations, which was earlier admissible to sailors when submarines were submerged, was now authorised for both officers and sailors, both when submerged and on surface, except when they were not messed on board.
(d) Emergency Ration Scales for Submarines. Government authorised an emergency ration scale for personnel on board submarines, comprising boiled sweets/milk toffees, fruit bar, mango flakes, pumpkin halwa, refined seedless dates and sweet biscuits.
Standard Submarine Ration Scale
(e) Based on the recommendations of the Defence Institute of Physiology and Allied Sciences (DIPAS), a revised standard ration scale for submarine personnel was promulgated. The scale provided a greater variety of substitutes for issue in lieu of basic items. It also provided for issue of ready-to-eat meals whenever, either for operational or other reasons, cooking on board was not possible. However, since colorific value of the revised scale was much lower, it directly impinged on the variety of the menus and caused consternation amongst submarine personnel.
(f) To overcome the limited facilities and space on board submarines, an experimental Catering Unit was established ashore to issue cleaned, chopped and ready to cook provisions to submarines prior to their sailing.
The Submarine Depot Ship AMBA had commissioned in 1968 and had been based in Visakhapatnam. Between 1969 and 1971, AMBA supported the submarines operating on the West Coast. In the 1971 war, AMBA was deployed to patrol off the Lakshadweep Islands, across the sea lane between East and West Pakistan.
With the arrival of VELA at Bombay in early 74, AMBA's base was changed from Visakhapatnam to Bombay. From early 1974 onwards, AMBA was commanded by a CO who had commissioned a submarine in Russia. He was well aware of what submariners expected from their depot ship. In the following months, AMBA ably fulfilled her designed role as a Depot Ship:
(a) The submarines used to berth alongside and the crews were billeted on board AMBA.
(b) Operational and technical needs were met by AMBA's Heads of Department who were experienced submariners.
(c) Since the Torpedo Preparation Shop had not yet been set up in Bombay, the periodic preparation and change round of torpedoes was done by AMBA, just as she was designed to do.
(d) To conserve submarine engine/machinery hours, AMBA provided all the power supplies.
Submarine Rescue Vessel - NISTAR
The submarine Rescue Vessel NISTAR commissioned in 1971 and was based at Visakhapatnam. She conducted the diving operation on the Pakistan Navy submarine GHAZI, which sank outside Visakhapatnam harbour in December 1971.
From 1972 onwards, NISTAR helped train divers to meet the Navy's urgent need for Deep Divers and Clearance Divers.
Submarine Training School - SATAVAHANA
The Submarine Training School, which formed part of the Integrated Type Training Establishment for the Russian acquisitions, was commissioned as INS SATAVAHANA in December 1974.
Six Yearly Refits of Submarines
The delays in the completion of the Naval Dockyard at Visakhapatnam began to delay the commencement of six-yearly refits of submarines. To ensure that the safety of submarines was not prejudiced, detailed discussions were held with the Russian side. It was decided that the refit of the first submarine KALVARI would be carried out in Russia and that of the second submarine KHANDERI in Visakhapatnam. Dockyard personnel proceeded to Russia to acquire first hand experience of how these repairs were done.
Indigenous Submarine Batteries
In 1973, Standard Batteries of Bombay went into collaboration with Tudor, the Swedish battery manufacturers, to produce submarine batteries indigenously. After the initial teething troubles had been overcome, these batteries proved far superior in Indian conditions than the performance of the imported batteries.
In 1975:
(a) Sanction was accorded for submarine battery charging facilities at Bombay.
(b) The Escape Training Facility was commissioned as part of INS SATAVAHANA in Visakhapatnam.
(c) A full fledged medical organisation was sanctioned to provide cover for submarine rescue operations.
(d) A new scale of Submarine Pay was sanctioned.
(e) The Third Symposium on Underwater Medicine was held at Bombay. It focussed on the problems associated with underwater medicine that had come to notice since 1969.
(f) Ready-to-eat pack rations were supplied to the Base Victualling Yards for supply to submarines.
Six-Yearly Refits of Submarines
KALVARI returned to Visakhapatnam in 1976 with no defects. Her guarantee specialists returned to Russia earlier than scheduled. It provided a benchmark of a high quality refit to the personnel in Visakhapatnam who had commenced the six yearly repairs of the second submarine KHANDERI in mid 1976.
The actual experience with KHANDERI was beset with delays due to lack of expertise, shortage of spares and the low productivity of the Dockyard. Progressively, as expertise built up and the Dockyard facilities developed, it became possible to become self sufficient for submarine refits. Spares however always remained a problem.
In subsequent years, six yearly refits were carried out both in Visakhapatnam and in Russia. This helped to mitigate the problems of bunching which was a result of four submarine being acquired in 1968-1969 and another four in 1973-1974.
Indigenous Submarine Construction
In 1981, almost fourteen years after the initial dialogue with HDW of Germany, Kockums of Sweden, Vickers of Britain, DCN of France and Nevesbu of Holland, a contract was signed with HDW of Germany for four submarines - two to be built in Germany and two in Mazagon Docks, Bombay. These four submarines, called SSKs, entered service between 1986 and 1994.
Acquisition of Improved Russian Submarines
Between 1986 and 1990, eight improved Russian submarines of the Kilo class were acquired. These submarines were quieter, had better sonar and used indigenously produced submarine propulsion batteries.
The Submarine Arm Pictorial History, published in 1992, states:
"Seeing the advent of nuclear propulsion in submarines of other navies, a study was undertaken by BARC to study a nuclear propulsion package for naval ships and submarines. A stage arose when it became necessary to train serving personnel in this very important area of propulsion technology.
"An agreement was concluded with the Soviet Union and a team of officers under the supervision of Vice Admiral MK Roy was formed to steer the project. After a rigorous selection procedure, the first batch of the nuclear submarine crews, under the command of Captain S Daniel commenced their training in the USSR. The training was, perhaps, the most thorough and taxing course that any of the Indian submariners, most of whom had over a decade of submarining behind them, had ever undergone. They absorbed the new technology with professional aplomb."
Vice Admiral Roy's book, "War in the Indian Ocean", states: (Page 114 et seq)
"Nuclear propulsion in India was first mooted in 1967 when a naval officer and a BARC scientist prepared a feasibility report. A more detailed report was prepared in 1971 as the Committee of Secretaries felt that R&D on nuclear propulsion technology was inescapable if India was not to be left too far behind by the end of the century, when atomic energy would be a major source for both propulsion and energy requirements. A small nucleus of engineers were located in BARC as early as 1978.
"The offer by the Soviet authorities of a `nuclear-powered submarine fleet' for the Indian Navy was made by Marshal Ogarkov during his visit to India in April 1981. The Soviets offered to arrange a two years' training programme for Indian naval personnel, lease one nuclear submarine for five years for practical training and to render technical assistance for creating maintenance facilities in India for nuclear powered submarines. He added that the sale as also assistance for designing and constructing nuclear-powered submarines could be taken up later. This offer was reiterated by the Defence Minister, Marshal Ustinov.
"It was in this context that the former President, R Venkataraman, stated in his book "My Presidential Years" that: (Pages 74, 75)
"On September 14, Admiral Roy, Vice Chief of the Eastern Naval Command conveyed to me the pleasant news that the Government had finally decided to take the first nuclear propelled submarine from the Soviet Union on lease, as purchase would entail acceptance of NPT conditions. The idea of acquiring a nuclear-propelled submarine was floated by me as Defence Minister and after months of bargaining the Soviets agreed. A training programme was arranged for Indian sailors. I had visited the trainees in Leningrad and Riga. I was also happy that the lease amount charged by the Soviet Union was fairly reasonable. The nuclear propelled submarine had the advantage of remaining under water which was not possible for the conventional submarines. It was also proposed at that time that a second nuclear propelled submarine would be built in India. The Atomic Energy were confident of producing an atomic power pack for the submarine".
Lease of Russian Nuclear Submarine
In 1988, a nuclear submarine was leased from the Russian Navy. It was commanded and manned by Indian naval personnel and commissioned as CHAKRA. She was returned to Russia in 1991.
During this three year lease period, the Navy was able to better understand:
(a) Nuclear submarine culture and the practical aspects of handling nuclear power plants afloat.
(b) The tactical benefits of underwater launched anti-ship missiles.
(c) Anti submarine operations against nuclear submarines.
Very Low Frequency Communications with Submarines at Sea
Whereas a submarine on the surface can transmit and receive wireless messages just like a ship can, submerged submarines can only receive wireless messages on Very Low Frequency (VLF). VLF transmitters require huge antennae suspended high above the ground.
The initial discussions were solely with the Russian side, from whom the submarines had been acquired. Inquiries with western manufacturers indicated that better technology might be available from America. Parallel discussions were therefore pursued, both with Russia and with America.
Between 1979 and 1984, modalities were worked out for American company in collaboration with an Indian company to assume responsibility for the detailed design, manufacture, site installation and commissioning of the VLF transmitting station.
During the same period, the Defence Research and Development Organisation designed the antennae to be fitted in the submarine for receiving VLF transmissions.
Installation of the VLF Transmitter commenced in 1987. Trials completed in 1989. On 20 Oct 90, the VLF Transmitting Station was commissioned as INS KATTABOMAN.
If one corelates the justifications for setting up the Submarine Arm with events as they transpired during the decade 1965-1975, it becomes evident, as is usually the case with most new acquisitions, that either it takes considerable time for expectations to become reality or that expectations mutate as experience is gained. The following examples are illustrative.
Examples of Expectations that Did Not Materialise
The first expectation was that acquiring submarines would enhance the anti submarine effectiveness of our surface ships. Commodore KS Subra Manian recalls:
"As far as the anti submarine CASEXs and interaction with the surface forces were concerned, my experience has been that there has not been enough interaction. There was a feeling of smugness in our sursurface Navy as far as submarines were concerned. They had not really realised what exactly submarines are capable of, in spite of umpteen exercises, major and minor, proving that practically on every occasion a submarine can operate practically undetected in the face of combined opposition, in the face of unbroken sonar fronts, random patrolling and what have you. They still haven't realised. So I would say, very regretfully, that there has been insufficient interaction or appreciation of the potential of a submarine by the surfacface Navy."
The second expectation was that in a war, submarines could be used offensively. The section on submarine operations during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war clearly indicates why this expectatiation did not translate into reality.
Examples of Utilisation Not Foreseen But Which Proved Invaluable
If submarines had not been available, it would not have been possible to undertake the following evaluations in the unusual hydrological conditions which prevail in Indian waters:
(a) Carry out comparative evaluations of the MRASW Atlantic aircraft in 1969.
(b) Systematically pinpoint and rectify the shortcomings in the Seakings dunking sonar after the 1971 war.
(c) Evaluate, modify and progressively improve the indigenously designed and produced sonars for ships.
(d) Carry out comparative evaluations of American and French dunking sonars for the later Seakings.
(e) Evolve anti submarine tactics appropriate to our own hydrological conditions and our unique mix of Russian and Western anti submarine ships, submarines, aircraft and helicopters.
Under Utilisation of Submarine Depot Ship AMBA
In hindsight, it is interesting to note that some of the facilities which the submarine depot ship had could not be utilised. These were stated to be:
(a) "Cater for the annual refits for four submarines and limited repairs for the Petyas. Workshops are provided for electrical, electronic, torpedo, weapon and machinery repairs. Fitted with a 150 ton bow lift crane for lifting the stern of a submarine for effecting underwater repairs to the propeller or the rudder."
Since AMBA was supporting the submarines on the West Coast from 1969 onwards, she could not help in the annual refits of the Patyas.
(b) "Training facilities are provided for torpedo firing, sonar, communications etc."
Most of these facilities were similar to those which were later to be installed in SATAVAHANA. Yet both submarines and Petya pre-occupations prevented the full utilisation of these trainers.
One reason for the under-utilisation of the submarine depot ship was the difference in perceptions. The Submarine Arm felt that the submarine depot ship should be exclusively earmarked for the submarines. The Navy felt that the depot ship's capabilities could be better utilised in general fleet ship functions, in addition to providing technical support to the submarines. These perceptions never reconciled. AMBA did however fully justify its role when from 1974 onwards it extended support to the VELA class submarines in Bombay.
In retrospect, the growth of the Navy's Submarine Arm was phenomenal. Very few navies have acquired four submarines in three years after the start of a Submarine Arm. Even fewer navies have successfully built their own submarines in twenty five years after starting a Submarine Arm.
In the short span of 30 years from the time that submarine training first started in Britain in 1962, till the time CHAKRA was returned to Russia in 1991, the Navy saw the submarine fleet grow to 20 submarines - 16 Russian conventional ocean going submarines, 4 German conventional Hunter Killer SSK submarines (of which two were under construction in India).
This unprecedented achievement was only possible because of:
(a) The enthusiasm, dedication and professionalism of the young officers and sailors who started the Submarine Arm.
(b) The thorough and rigorous submarine training imparted by the British and Russian Navies and the assistance extended by their Governments.
(c) The determination and tenacity of the officers and men in the technical organisations to somehow keep the submarines going until the maintenance and refit facilities were set up in the new Naval Dockyard in Visakhakhakhapatnam.
(d) The genernerous and forthright technical assistance extended by the Russian and German Navies.
(e) The sagacious handling of all the Submarine Arm acquisitions by the Ministries of Defence and Finance Defence despite the Navy's over-stretched budget.