CHAPTER 4

THE RUSSIAN ACQUISITIONS 1965 TO 1971

Until the early 1950s, Russia found it difficult to understand how India could be independent while still remaining in the British Commonwealth. It viewed India's non alignment as tilted towards the Western "imperialist" bloc rather than towards the "socialist" bloc of Russia and China. When India refused to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan (preferring instead to sign a separate treaty giving up reparations) Russia began to understand India's independent foreign policy. After 1952, when it first exercised its veto in the Security Council, Russia's support of India's stand on Kashmir became firm and steadfast.

Until the early 1950's, all of India's core defence requirements like tanks, artillery, cruisers, destroyers and frigates, bombers and fighter aircraft were being acquired from Britain. In step with the better understanding of Indian policy, the Russians started making overtures to displace Britain as the prime source for India's defence needs. Mr PVR Rao (later Defence Secretary from 1962 to 1967) who was the Deputy High Com missioner in London recalls:

"I also recall Prime Minister Nehru's talk to senior Indian High Commission officials in 1952 "It is all very well that Russia and China are making many overtures to us, but with America and Britain also, you never know which way these things will turn. We should be equally distant from both, just to safeguard all our interests."

Prime Minister Nehru first visited Russia officially in 1955. The Russians offered their latest aircraft for the Air Force.

Air Chief Marshal Moolgavkar recalls:

"So the late Air Marshal Mookherjee, then Chief of the Air Staff, Air Cmde Arjan Singh, my humble self as a Gp Capt and a couple of others were made to form a team. We were briefed by Nehru before departure. If I recall right, Nehru said that during his visit to Moscow he felt a visible, positive change in the governance and the attitude and approach of the Soviet leadership compared to what he had known in the Stalin era. "But", he said, "we have to be careful, we are not very sure. So you go there and try whatever they offer you, except no intercontinental bombers".

In 1956, Mr Kruschev visited India. His forthright description of Kashmir as "the northernmost state of India", his offer to assist the development of Indian heavy industry and the Rupee-Ruble trade agreement laid the foundation for further Indo-Soviet political, economic and technical cooperation. During his visit, he openly suggested that Russia would be happy to meet the Navy's needs. Rear Admiral (then Cdr) Kirpal Singh was on Mr Krushchev's liaison staff. He recalls:

"During his visit, Krushchev made repeated offers to India to acquire more arms from Russia. He kept saying that the large ships like cruisers were sitting ducks because Russia had developed weapons which could destroy them in the open sea. He made a strong plea that India should get its ships from Russia".

The Navy did not respond, partly because it lacked the confidence to shed its dependence on the British Navy and partly because the Russian Navy had yet to develop vessels of the kind the Navy wanted.

In 1957, the Russian Defence Minister, Marshal Zhukov, visited India. In Cochin, Rear Admiral RD Katari, the Fleet Commander, invited him to a banquet on board the flagship. In his memoirs, "A Sailor Remembers" he recalls: (Page 83).

"From the moment Marshal Zhukov, stepped on board, he virtually impaled me against the centre-line capstan and demanded to know why we were acquiring an aircraft-carrier. Resisting the temptation to tell him that it was none of his business, I tried to explain to him the reasons which induced us to do so, but he could not, or would not, accept them.

"The discussion was obviously reaching a point of exasperation to both sides but the climax came when Zhukov made the provocative observation that we were buying the carrier at the behest of the British and to please them. That was too much to accept, and I was provoked into saying "Marshal Zhukov, you are a renowned military leader and one of Russia's heroes in the last war. I, therefore, consider it a great honour that you should have deigned to discuss military matters with humble me. But you must concede that I would advise my Government in a manner that I feel is best for my country and not at the behest of any foreign power". That, regrettably, brought the conversation to an abrupt halt. Zhukov marched straight to his place at the dinner table (the dinner itself was not quite ready to be served). The meal was a near silent affair with the silence of tension".

During Mr Krishna Menon's tenure as Defence Minister from 1957 to 1962, a landmark defence agreement was concluded for the supply of the latest Russian MIG 21 fighter aircraft to be followed by their progressive production in India.

After China's attack in 1962, India urgently needed aircraft, helicopters, tanks, arms and ammunition. Britain and America had limited themselves to supplying mainly weapons for the mountain divisions facing China and minor equipment. Russia's response was positive and they agreed to meet India's needs.

Marshal Zhukov was not alone in his views on the Navy acquisition of an aircraft carrier. In 1963, India's ambassador in Moscow asked the Russian Defence Minister, Marshal Malinovsky, what sort of defence preparedness India needed against the Chinese threat. He replied that what India needed was a strong, mobile, Army, Navy and Air Force, well equipped with the latest weapons. Instead of a prestigious, overhauled, old British aircraft carrier (which he called the fifth leg of a dog and an easy target), India should go in for a submarine fleet to guard her long coastline. (Stalin to Gorbachov by TN Kaul Page 57).

The strategic defence review undertaken by India in 1963 viewed China as the primary threat. To cope with a combined threat from China and from Pakistan, the requirements of the Army, Navy and Air Force were quantified in the 1964-69 Defence Plan. The gist of the requirements were sent to America, Britain and Russia in advance of Defence Minister Chavan's visits to these countries in 1964.

Defence Minister Chavan's Delegation to Russia - 1964

In Russia, the Defence Minister's delegation were shown a submarine, a submarine depot ship, and small craft like a missile boat, a torpedo boat and a patrol boat.

The assessments of the naval members of the delegation were that while the submarines were suitable, the smaller craft might not be suitable during monsoon conditions. As regards missile boats, it was felt that even though their mobility made them very effective for coastal defence of ports, their acquisition should receive lower priority than the acquisition of submarines.

Mr RD Pradhan, IAS, was the Private Secretary of Defence Minister YB Chavan from 1962 to 1965. He accompanied the Defence Minister in 1964. In his memoirs "Debacle to Revival", he states: (Pages 211 et seq).

"The fact that the Defence Minister of India was visiting the Soviet Union, at that point of time, was itself of great political significance. Chavan had already visited the United States and was scheduled to visit the United Kingdom. It was known that India had not received the expected aid and assistance from the United States and it was clear that as far as the Indian Air Force was concerned, India would have to depend only on the Soviets. They had already agreed in principle to supply MIGs and also help to set up factories to manufacture MIG-21s in India.

"Knowing his closeness to Khrushchev, Chavan was conscious that the success of his mission greatly depended on his talks with Marshal Malinovsky.

"An unexpected result of the Soviet authorities' offer to meet India's defence requirements was the perceptible change in the attitude of our Army and Navy top brass towards Soviet-made equipment and armaments.

"Until that time, Soviet assistance was envisaged only for the Air Force for which Krishna Menon had worked hard and had come under political attack. By the time Chavan visited Moscow, the Indian Navy, which had refused so far to look for their requirements outside the United Kingdom, was receptive to a suggestion to at least consider the possibility of Soviet assistance. Till that time, right from top to bottom, the Navy appeared to be so strongly pro-British that no one could imagine acquiring anything outside the United Kingdom. It was fortunate that Rear Admiral SM Nanda, Deputy CNS, was a member of Chavan's earlier delegation to the United States. He knew where we stood vis-a-vis the Western countries and came to Moscow with an open mind.

"Chavan was looking forward excitedly to visiting the Naval Headquarters in Leningrad. The Soviets had promised to take us aboard one of their submarines.

"Just before we entered the submarine, the Naval Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Fleet in the Gulf of Leningrad told Chavan that it was perhaps for the first time in their naval history that foreign civilians were being invited to come aboard a Soviet submarine. Soon the submarine was racing away from the coast. Except for our unsteady feet we did not realise that the submarine was being subjected to tremendous pressure on the outside and we were rapidly going several hundred feet down. After two hours of cruising under water, during which we were given a demonstration of its maneuverability and the lethal power of its torpedoes, we returned to the port.

"Chavan's meeting with the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Nikita S Khrushchev had been fixed for 9 September 1964. After the usual courtesies, Chavan conveyed Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri's greetings to Khrushchev and talked about his impressions of the visit to Leningrad, Volgograd and Yalta. He elaborated on India's need to strengthen its defence efforts and thanked the Soviet Union for the positive response he had received. He placed before Chairman Khrushchev `the only issue' that had remained unresolved.

"Khrushchev spoke eloquently of the economic cooperation between the two countries. He regarded Bhilai as only a sample of fruitful Indo-Soviet cooperation that should be further expanded. He renewed the offer made by Marshal Malinovsky to give all the arms and equipment that India needed and added that according to his information, there was a gap between what had been offered by the State Committee and what Chavan wanted, regarding the period of credit. He had decided to be a good arbitrator and divide the difference exactly midway between the Soviet offer and Chavan's expectations!"

Admiral Nanda recalls:

"Before the party finished, about five or six Russian Admirals got around me and said "Admiral Nanda, tell us what is wrong with our ships ?" Now I didn't know about these instructions from our Government. So I said "Nothing wrong". They thought that I was not telling them the truth. So they said "We are signing tommorow for the Army equipment and for the Air Force equipment but not for any naval equipment. You are the Naval member of the team. You must have advised your Minister against the purchase of naval equipment". I had to think very fast as to what could have gone wrong. I said "This has happened again. Obviously the Army and Air Force have taken all the money and there is no money left for the Navy. I am sure the same thing happens with you. You too must be finding it difficult to get money for your Navy. We are told that against China, our problem is on our land frontier and not at sea. Therefore as far as our Navy is concerned, it has a very low priority".

"When we came back, I got to know what had happened. The instructions had come from the Government, under instructions from our Prime Minister, who had been influenced by the British and the American Governments, that we should not go to the Russians. And so in 1964, we did not take the Russian ships and submarines that were being offered to us".

Defence Minister Chavan's Delegation to Britain - 1964

In his book, Mr Pradhan states: (Page 229 et seq).

"On Chavan's return from Moscow in mid September, where he had been assured of a supply of frigates and even submarines if India so desired, there was rethinking in the Navy. Until that time, Britain had been the sole supplier of naval equipment.

"Lal Bahadur Shastri felt that before making any commitment to the Soviets, the Defence Minister should visit Britain to find out the attitude of the British Government. Apparently, the situation had become favourable with the advent of the Labour Party in 1964 under Prime Minister Harold Wilson. Chavan was not too enthusiastic since he had formed his own assessment. He had witnessed the close coordination between the USA and the UK on the quantum and scope of military assistance. During his discussions in Washington, he had been told that they would not consider military assistance in the naval field. However he reluctantly agreed to visit London and make an effort, especially when Mountbatten urged him to do so, since acquiring naval craft from the USSR would have far-reaching implications for the age-old relationship between the British and the Indian navies.

"The previous Conservative Party government had indicated its willingness to collaborate in the financing of three Leander class frigates. India wanted Daring class destroyers. Denis Healey, the Defence Secretary explained to Chavan their difficulty in offering any sizeable assistance since Britain was facing a serious balance of payments crisis. The new Labour Government was making a fresh assessment of its defence requirements and was not in a position to make a firm commitment. So far as the Indian Navy's requirements for the Daring class destroyers were concerned, he bluntly said no. Instead, they could make an offer of older destroyers which were eventually to be phased out in the British Navy. In the case of the `Oberon" type submarine, Chavan was told not to make even a formal request.

"During our stay in London, Lord Mountbatten monitored the talks closely. I guess he suggested that Chavan make one last effort to appeal to the old links between UK and India, to see if Harold Wilson and his government would relent on assistance to India.

"The communique issued at the end of the talks papered over the failure. It emphasized the British ministers' awareness of the fact that Britain had in the past been the main supplier of military equipment to the Indian defence forces. Their anxiety at India's recent efforts to cast her net further afield for defence supplies was subtly referred to. The last paragraph of the communique reaffirmed the importance which they (the Indian and British Ministers) attach "to the closest possible cooperation between the services' and expressed the hope that within the spirit of the Commonwealth partnership, close liaison would continue to be maintained between them. It was clear that while Britain could or could not assist, India was not expected to seek help elsewhere".

There were two basic reasons why Britain was unable meet the Indian Navy's needs for destroyers and submarines. These were:

(b) India's needs were immediate and building new destroyers would take too long.

To meet India's desire to acquire the latest submarines rather than learn on old ones, the British agreed to re-examine whether they could provide deferred credit to build a new Oberon class submarine in Britain. Till it was ready, India could take an older submarine on loan to meet immediate needs.

Reluctance to Switch to Russian Acquisitions

In his book "The Indian Navy's Submarine Arm", Admiral Chatterji states: (Page 42)

"The Navy was reluctant to go in for Soviet ships/submarines on several counts. All ships and craft of the Navy were of British origin. Spares held in ships and depots were for the British ships. There was much commonality of equipment between various ships originating in the same country which minimise the holdings of spare-part inventories. The dockyards and shore maintenance facilities were geared up for looking after British ships. All officers and large percentage of men had received their technical training, and in many cases initial training also, in the UK and were very familiar with British equipment and the philosophy and routine for their operation and maintenance. There were no language problems for training Indian personnel in the UK on ships/submarines and in their training establishments".

The basic question now became whether or not to switch over from British to Russian acquisitions. Several objections had to be overcome. The Navy's entire administrative, training, maintenance, logistic, technical, operational and tactical procedures and systems were wholely based on those of the British Navy. All naval personnel were familiar with these aspects in the English language. Changing over to the Russian system would entail enormous change. There was considerable diffidence whether the Navy would be able to manage so extensive a change.

There was apprehension also of severance of feedback, both technical and tactical, regarding the existing British acquisitions.

Last but not least, there was the anti Russian mindset of an English speaking naval officer corps trained by the British Navy, whose impressions of Russia derived solely from what was published in England and America who were engaged in a Cold War against Russia.

There were prolonged discussions on all the implications. Even though by early 1965 it was clear that only Russia was agreeable to meet the Navy's immediate needs, the Navy remained reluctant to sever connections with the British Navy.

The Decision to Acquire Russian Vessels - 1965

In 1965, Mr K Subrahmanyam was the Deputy Secretary Budget and Planning in the Ministry of Defence. He recalls:

"In early April, there was a meeting of the Secretary's Committee in which the activities of the Indonesians around the Andamans and Nicobars were discussed. The Navy stressed the need for maintaining a naval presence there to deal with this situation. On the basis of that discussion, the Navy prepared a draft paper in which it recommended that we again approach the United States, UK and Russia for naval vessels. This paper was passed through the Defence Minister who approved it and then it went to the External Affairs Minister and the Finance Minister. It came back by the end of April/early May, by which time the Rann of Kutch operations had started."

"During the Kutch incident, we found that we did not get enough sympathy from the West. In spite of our pointing out to the Americans that the use of Patton tanks was a violation of the assurances given to India by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, the Americans remained unmoved".

"When the Navy's original paper was converted into a Cabinet Paper and came back to the Ministry of Defence, I happened to see it. I went through the file and felt that this was not the right approach. So I wrote a note pointing out that going back to the Americans, British and Russians was not going to give us any additional benefits because":

(b) The British had already told us that they couldn't give a credit for the Oberon class submarine.

Therefore the best course was not to delay any further but to accept the Russian offer which had been pending since August 1964.

"Mr Chavan read that note and said that he fully agreed and that is the course India should pursue. Once Mr Chavan gave that decision, the file was sent back to Naval Headquarters asking them to put up definite proposals for acquisition of Soviet ships and submarines."

With the Navy's primary concern having now become the defence of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and in view of the concern voiced by the Indian Delegation in August 1964 regarding the operability in monsoon conditions of the small ships then offered, the Russian side now offered the larger Petya class anti submarine vessels and Landing Ships.

Mr Subrahmanyam accompanied the delegation to Russia in August 1965. He recalls:

"The discussions with the Soviets were very tough. Our side put them through rigorous questioning on every aspect. At the end of it, the Russians themselves said that they were now glad that they were going to give ships to the Indians. They were confident that these ships would get looked after better and would also be more effective than those they had sold to the Indonesians and the Egyptians."

On 1 September 65, the Delegation signed an agreement for:

- Four submarines

- Five Petya Class anti submarine vessels

- A submarine depot ship. It could support submarines at anchorages in the A&N Islands, distant from the main base. And until facilities were set up ashore, it could also assist in the maintenance and repairs of submarine and Petya equipment, recharge submarine propulsion batteries, prepare submarine torpedoes, impart combat training on simulators to submarine and Petya sonar operators and to attack teams on submarine and anti submarine tactics.

- Two Polish built medium size landing ships of Russian design to carry men and material to the A&N Islands.

- Five small 90 ton patrol boats for the Custom Department's anti smuggling patrols in the A&N Islands.

(b) A Russian Design Team to visit India and prepare a Project Report for setting up a new Naval Dockyard in Visakhapatnam, together with a Naval Base, a Submarine Base, a Submarine Headquarters and an Integrated Training Establishment for the ships and submarines being acquired.

(c) The Russian side to consider the construction in India of 500 ton patrol craft based on the specifications handed over by the Indian side.

Security of Information Regarding Russian Equipment

In view of the Cold War between the West and Russia, the Russian side was especially concerned that information regarding the capabilities and limitations of the equipment being supplied to India should not leak to the West. Assurances regarding security of information had already been conveyed to the Russian side by the other two services.

In 1965, the Russian side desired that no undue publicity be given to the naval acquisitions. The Navy enforced, thereafter, very strict security of information in Visakhapatnam.

Over the years, this unavoidable restriction led to three unforeseen and unfortunate results:

(a) The "need to know" criteria effectively prevented the dissemination of knowledge of Russian equipment in the remainder of the Navy.

(b) The annual transfers of officers and men into and out of Russian ships to give them "sea time" did not give enough time for meaningful understanding of the Russian concepts for operation and maintenance of equipment, of spares provisioning and indenting, and of technical documentation.

(c) Foreign warships and foreign naval visitors were not permitted to visit Visakhapatnam. The Western powers suspected that a Russian naval base was being set up. The presence of Russian guarantee specialists compounded this misconception. In Western naval and military magazines, Visakhapatnam had a red star over it, implying that it was a support facility for Russian naval ships deployed in the Indian Ocean.

1966

Indian Technical Delegation to Russia

The first Russian acquisitions to arrive in India were the Landing Ships. Both the LSTs sailed back through the Suez Canal and were based in Visakhapatnam. They commenced ferrying construction material, equipment and stores to the A&N Islands immediately after arrival.

After seeing the first LST, it was realised that before the construction of the submarines and Petyas became too advanced, every effort should be made to try and modify them to suit Indian hot and humid climatic conditions.

The outcome of discussions was that the Russian side were unable to make any major modifications as the vessels were already under construction. The Russian side stated that the experience of Russian submarines operating in the tropics was sufficient to dispel Indian apprehensions. However the Russian side would welcome the Indian Navy's feedback of operations in the tropics to help improve design. (Note: Typical of the officer corps mindsets in those early years, the efforts of guarantee specialists to make notes and send feedback to the Russian factories of equipment performance in Indian conditions was viewed as spying).

Discussions were also held on numerous technical issues like equivalence of fuels, oils, lubricants and paints, de-rating of machinery performance due to tropical conditions, supply of drawings, standardisation of engines, stowage and preservation of ammunition, manufacturing details of submarine batteries, tropicalisation etc.

Two problem areas became clearly discernible during this first technical interaction in 1966. These were to recur repeatedly in subsequent years. These were the "Indenting of Spares" and the supply of "Repair Technical Documentation" in English. The Russian side explained in detail how the Russian Navy's system worked and the Indian side tried to determine how best the Russian spares replenishment procedure could be dovetailed into the British naval procedure prevailing in the Indian Navy. From the very outset, these two problem areas - one logistic and the other technical-became vexatious. They remained so for the next ten years.

1967

Russian Naval Staff Delegation to India

In 1967, a Russian delegation headed by a submariner Admiral visited Visakhapatnam. The delegation gave detailed advice on setting up the interim facilities for:

(a) A submarine base, submarine headquarters, submarine exercise areas, communications with submarines at sea, submarine rescue procedure in case of accident etc.

(b) The maintenance of one submarine and two Petyas until the submarine depot ship arrived in 1969.

(d) The training of subsequent submarine and Petya crews in India.

(e) The annual de-preservation and re-preservation of the growing volume of machinery, equipment, spares and stores which had already started arriving from Russia.

Interim Repair Facilities.

Since the new Naval Dockyard would take several years to come up, it was decided to meet interim requirements by expanding the existing Base Repair Workshop.

Commissionings in 1967

The five patrol boats were loaded on to Russian heavy lift merchant ships, off-loaded in Visakhapatnam and commissioned in February and March 1967.

The first submarine, KALVARI was commissioned in the Baltic in December 1967. After the 1967 Arab Israel war, the Suez Canal had closed. The frigate TALWAR was sent to the Baltic to escort KALVARI back to India via the Cape of Good Hope. KALVARI arrived in Visakhapatnam in July 1968.

Revival of Interest in Russian Missile Boats

Russia had given missile boats to the Indonesian and Egyptian navies in the early 1960s.

The Russian side had first shown the missile boats to the Defence Minister's Delegation in August 1964. At that time, the Navy had shown no interest in these boats, mainly because no Western Navy had such boats and it was not clear how useful they would be in rough weather.

After the 1965 war, two major considerations led to the Navy's acquisition of missile boats from the Soviet Union. The main one was that these boats could deter hit and run raids on the Saurashtra coast of the type that Pakistan Navy had so successfully done at Dwarka.

In his book Admiral Kohli states: (page 41)

"At one time, intelligence had suggested that the Pakistan Navy was considering the acquisition of missile fitted frigates. In order to forestall the dangers of a missile attack by Pakistan on Bombay, I had, on one of my visits to Russia, enquired from Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov whether they had a mobile missile battery which could be deployed for the defence of Bombay. He replied in the negative. He was later able to persuade the Indian Navy that for the defence of Bombay and other major ports, the small Osa class of missile boats would be ideal. Their mere presence would prove a great deterrent to the enemy embarking on an attack."

The second consideration was the pressure from the Navy's young gunnery specialists to acquire missiles. Russia had already supplied missile boats to Indonesia and to Egypt. In June 1967, during the 6 day Arab Israeli War, an Egyptian missile boat sank an Israeli frigate, the EILATH, at a range well beyond the frigate's own guns. Navies all over the world woke up with a start to the effectiveness of this new Russian weapon - the surface to surface, anti ship, homing missile - which enabled a small boat to sink a ship several times its size within a matter of minutes. At one stroke, this new weapon altered the centuries old concept of prolonged gun battles between opposing warships.

The significant characteristics of the boat were an extremely thin skinned 200 ton hull, propelled by very high power engines to give a high speed of 34 knots. Being small, the boat had a very small radar cross section. Its sophisticated radar was more advanced than any other known radar - it enabled the missile boat, with its low radar reflectivity, to detect a larger ship well before the latter was even aware of its presence, to fire its missiles and to speed away faster than any other ship. The Russian naval architects had deliberately designed these characteristics, so as to give the small boats this advantage against much larger American naval ships attempting to attack the Russian coast. Basically, the boats were designed for, and had limited endurance for, only coastal operations.

In December 1967, Vice Adm Krishnan took over from Vice Admiral Kohli as the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff. In his book "No Way But Surrender", Admiral Krishnan states: (Page 3 et seq)

"To me, the acquisition of these missile boats had become an obsession. The CNS, Admiral Chatterji, was a forward looking man and it was easy to convince him that we must, under every circumstance, buy at least six boats.

"When Admiral Gorshkov, the five star Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy visited Delhi, we included in our discussions the question of acquiring the improved version, OSA class, missile boats for the Indian Navy. (The improved class was fitted with four missiles instead of two).These discussions gave an indication that the original offer was still open and that three boats was the minimum for a viable attack unit".

1968

The Visakhapatnam Project

In January 1968, the Navy received the Report prepared by the Russian Design Bureau on the Visakhapatnam Project. After the Report had been studied, Russian specialists arrived to clarify queries. After detailed discussions, an Inter Governmental Agreement was signed on setting up a new Naval Dockyard, a Naval Base, a Submarine Base and an Integrated Type Training Establishment for the four submarines, five Petyas, submarine depot ship, landing ships and patrol boats which had been contracted for in 1965.

To maximise indigenous content, it was agreed that a sizeable proportion of the designing effort would be undertaken in India and that a large proportion of equipment and machinery would be of indigenous origin. Later, this was to become one of the many factors which delayed the completion of the project by several years, because technically equivalent indigenous machinery was not always available.

The Missile Boats

In his book Admiral Krishnan states: (ibid)

"We decided that we should press for the purchase of eight such boats. There followed the intense activity of preparing the ground for selling the idea to the Government. Fortunately, our Defence Minister, Mr Jagjivan Ram had taken kindly to the idea of our acquiring these boats. We got Cabinet approval for further negotiations with the Soviet Government".

Submarine Rescue Vessel. In 1968, Government approved the acquisition of a submarine rescue vessel.

Commissionings in 1968.

Two Petyas, KAMORTA and KADMATT, the submarine KHANDERI and the submarine depot ship AMBA were commissioned in December 1968. The Petyas sailed for home from Vladivostok. KHANDERI and AMBA returned via the Cape of Good Hope.

By this time, the Russian Navy had come to realise that the Indians were diligent learners and professionally far more confident than the navies they had earlier helped to train.

1969

Acquisition of Missile Boats

In January 1969, a delegation went to Moscow to discuss and finalise the acquisition of missile boats. Visits were arranged to the Russian naval base at Baku in the Caspian Sea to go to sea in a missile boat and visit a submarine rescue vessel. The Delegation signed an agreement for the acquisition of a squadron of missile boats and Technical Positions for storing and preparing their liquid fuelled missiles.

In his book Admiral Krishnan states: (ibid)

"A team consisting of the Additional Secretary, a gunnery specialist (Note: the author was the gunnery specialist) and some technical officers and myself proceeded to Moscow.We returned from Moscow after a successful mission. At Naval Headquarters, the operational staff were jubilant and wanted to name this secret project as `November Kilo', after my initials.However I vetoed this in favour of `Alpha Kilo', the initials of Admiral AK Chatterji. We plunged into a hectic programme of selection of personnel to proceed to the Soviet Union for training and manning the eight boats, their base facilities and the 'Technical Positions' which stored and prepared the missiles."

Training of Crews in India.

As soon as the first two Petyas, KAMORTA and KADMATT arrived in Visakhapatnam, they started being used as "floating classrooms" so as to minimise the duration of training in Russia of the subsequent crews.

The crews of KAVARATTI and KATCHALL, the fourth and fifth Petyas, which had been trained in Visakhapatnam, were deputed to Russia for just 6 weeks to take over the ships and sail them back to India. The Russians were impressed with their efficiency and professional knowledge, considering that they had neither received any training in Vladivostok nor had adequate training facilities been set up in Visakhapatnam.

Commissionings in 1969

The last three Petyas KILTAN, KAVARATTI and KATCHALL, and the last two submarines KARANJ and KURSURA commissioned in end 1969.

The last of these commissionings completed the acquisition programme of the ships and submarines contracted for in 1965.

1970

The Induction of the Missile Boats

During 1970 and 1971, extensive infrastructure was set up at Bombay. The headquarters of the Missile Boat Squadron was set up temporarily in INS TRATA in South Bombay as `TRATA II', which was later to become INS AGNIBAHU. The Technical Position was set up temporarily in a secluded World War 2 camp known as Cheetah Camp near Mankhurd in north Bombay. Siting boards were finalised for locating the permanent Technical Positions.

No consensus could be found on how best to protect the thin skinned hulls from the rapid bottom fouling and corrosion which affected all ships hulls in tropical waters. One view was that they should not be left in the water until actually required to go to sea - they should be hauled up on slipways and stowed on concrete hards. Since these hards would be both expensive and time consuming to construct, and would also entail dredging, the idea had to be given up. Eventually, they were berthed in the Wet Basin of the Naval Dockyard Bombay. And the bottom fouling, which over time had begun to seriously reduce their speed by as much as 10 knots, was removed just before the commencement of the war in 1971.

Personnel completed their training in Russia in March 1970, and acceptance trials of the boats started in mid 1970. To conserve their machinery, the boats were lightened and loaded on to heavy lift merchant ships and transported to India. Since unloading the boats required a 200 ton crane and the only such crane in India at that time was in Calcutta, all the boats were unloaded at Calcutta, depreserved and prepared for being towed all the way from Calcutta, around Ceylon to Bombay. This towing task was given to whichever ship was conveniently available for towing at the time that a boat was ready for tow.

Repair and Refit Facilities

In 1968, it had been agreed that till the new Dockyard was ready in the mid 1970s, the Base Repair Workshop in Visakhapatnam would be expanded to provide the minimum essential facilities for carrying out normal maintenance and annual repairs.

By mid 1970, an enormous backlog of problems had built up, caused by defects in the functioning of equipment, lack of spares and technical documentation and inadequacy of repair facilities ashore. With increasing slippage also being anticipated in the completion of the Dockyard and with major periodic refits becoming due from 1970 onwards, concern began to mount.

In 1970, the Russian side sent a Technical Delegation to resolve the problems caused by snags experienced in operating the Russian acquisitions, inadequate availability of essential oils and lubricants, non-availability of essential spares, difficulty in obtaining vital technical data and drawings, practical difficulty experienced in identification of spare parts, and the delays in the construction of the Naval Dockyard. Interim solutions were agreed upon.

1971

Acquisition of More Petyas and Submarines

In mid 1971, it was decided to acquire five more Petyas and four more submarines because the series production of these vessels in Russia was coming to an end. The Navy wanted these acquisitions to incorporate the additions and alterations which had been identified for improving their performance. A delegation went to Moscow to discuss these issues and also discuss how to cope with the major refits of the earlier vessels, since the new Dockyard was delayed.

Technical discussions were held with the designers to increase the endurance of equipment by augmenting air-conditioning capacity, improve the performance of equipment and incorporate the improvements considered necessary in the light of experience gained in operating in tropical conditions. The Russian side agreed to supply three Petyas ex stock of 1968/1969 vintage and to build two new Petyas. In both cases, the modifications suggested by the Indian side would be incorporated to the maximum extent possible.

In the case of the submarines, all four would be newly built, be fitted with the latest available equipment and incorporate all the modifications which the Indian side had suggested.

In view of the Petyas and submarines being fitted with new types of equipment, it was agreed that all the repair facilities being created in the Naval Dockyard, Visakhapatnam would be augmented.

As regards coping with the foreseeable backlog of major periodic refits, the most that could be achieved was a consensus on expediting the completion of the new workshops and phasing out the forthcoming refits to avoid bunching.

The Induction of the Missile Boats

Until early in 1971, a number of boats were towed, one at a time, by a variety of towing ships, using the conventional towing hawser -anchor cable method of towing large ships at sea. Unfortunately, these time-tested methods had not been designed to tow thin skinned boats, whose towing bollards were welded to equally thin decks and whose anchors and anchor chains were light in weight and where the space on the foxle could not accommodate all the men required to pass and slip the heavy, all weather, towing gear. The Russians had fitted a necklace, which went all the way around the hull, and which was kept above the water by brackets welded to the hull. This eased the stress on the thin skinned hull, but the cumbersome heaviness of the conventional towing gear still remained a serious problem.

In early 1971, two training ships, KISTNA and TIR, were nominated for towing duties. (Note: The author was the Commanding Officer of TIR). TIR, on her way up to Calcutta, encountered KISTNA on her way down from Madras. KISTNA's tow had parted in heavy weather and her anchor cable, piled up on the bottom of the sea, was being laboriously hauled up manually. It was clear that some solution had to be found for this seamanship problem. On arrival at Calcutta, TIR scoured the merchant navy's ship chandler market and found that large size nylon hawsers were available, which merchant ships were using as berthing hawsers. Each such nylon hawser cost over Rs one lakh. TIR managed to persuade Headquarters`Western Naval Command to sanction two such hawsers for towing two boats to Bombay.

TIR set off from Calcutta one day, using nylon hawsers to tow the last two of the eight boats simultaneously, one on each quarter. Fortuitiously, the Squadron Commander of the missile boats was embarked in one of the boats under tow. An article in the naval magazine Quarterdeck 1996 recounts the subsequent events on passage to Bombay:

The nylon tow from Sandheads to Visakhapatnam was uneventful and trouble free despite inclement weather. The nylon floated on water and was therefore easily grappled by the men on the missile boat's foxle. As speed was slowly and steadily increased, the nylon rope stretched and became bar taut like a steel wire rope. Lt Cdr (later Vice Admiral) SK Chand, TIR's XO, was able to provide Cdr (later Commodore) BB Yadav and his missile boat crews with hot meals and even medical supplies by sliding them along the tow ropes to and fro. Soon a telephone line was passed the same way for round the clock two-way communication. Every morning at 0800 hrs Cdr Yadav would come up on the line and say "Allah be praised for another incident free night". Both missile boats kept their engines and machinery switched off to conserve running hours.

"In Visakhapatnam, one boat was detached and the tow was to be continued with Cdr Yadav's boat. Both ships agreed that it would be worthwhile determining the maximum safe towing speed with this nylon arrangement. Careful precautions were taken to pad both ends of the towing nylon which might chafe with the towing fairleads and bullring. This was because once the nylon was bar taut, chafing instantly caused individual nylon strands to part and continued chafing would part all the strands. These precautions proved their worth. Ten to twelve knots were made good from Visakhapatnam to Cochin. All non-watchkeeping officers of TIR were put into an organised watch system on the quarterdeck to keep an eye on the tow. This paid rich dividends as they were able to take timely action to avoid chafing of the rope.

"As a result of the steady confidence now built up in towing by nylon, it was agreed that we should try and do better but safely. With the confident seamanship and alertness of both towing ship and towed missile boat crews, it became possible to achieve a towing speed of 16 knots. This speed was nearly the maximum that TIR's reciprocating steam engines could do. With repeated drills and good seamanship the boat could be taken in tow and slipped in minutes. The engine room crews of both ships became eager to determine if we could safely achieve even higher speeds, because by now the tactical possibilities of using nylons to tow missile boats during combat were becoming increasingly apparent. On the last night before entering Bombay, TIR doing full power, towed the missile boat at 17 knots without any adverse effects on the shaft locking arrangements of the missile boat.

"After securing alongside, TIR handed over to the C-in-C, a two foot length of six inch nylon rope with the formal report on the towing speed achieved and recommending that, not only that all remaining boats be towed by nylon ropes from Calcutta, but also that the towing of missile boats using nylong ropes be now accepted as a practical proposition during war.

"Later that year, the missile boats led by Cdr Yadav were to achieve spectacular results in their missile attacks on Karachi".

All eight boats arrived in Bombay by mid 1971.

The submarine rescue vessel NISTAR arrived in Visakhapatnam in the autumn of 1971.