MAZAGON DOCKS AND THE LEANDER FRIGATE PROJECT
Until the 19th century, Mazagon Docks (MDL) used to build wooden hulled warships for the British Navy. In 1929, the 18 gun frigate "Tigris" and the 6-gun schooner "Shannon" were launched from MDL. As steel hulls gradually replaced wooden hulls, warship building in Bombay declined. The last warship to be built by MDL was the 80 gun ship "Madras", (renamed "Meanee"), in 1848.
Meanwhile the British Peninsular and Orient Company, (P&O) started a passenger ship service in 1842 from Suez to the Indian peninsula, initially to and from Calcutta and later to and from Bombay. This was the first of P&O's three main imperial routes - the others being to the Far East and Australia.
In 1914, P&O acquired the British India Steam Navigation Company (BISN) which was managed by Mackinnon Machenzie of Calcutta. This `P&O Group' became the main operator for India's coastal passenger traffic. Its services linked India with the Persian Gulf, the Far East and East and South Africa. Mazagon Docks Ltd (MDL) at Bombay and Garden Reach Workshops (GRW) at Calcutta were developed by the P&O Group to maintain their ships in Indian waters. For many years, the P&O Group held a controlling interest in the Mogul Line. After Independence, from the early 1950's onwards, MDL, GRW and the other small construction yards started meeting the nation's need for small vessels and harbour craft.
During the Second World War, an urgent need had arisen to build merchant ships in India to replace Britain's wartime losses. The Scindia Steam Navigation company was given a site at Visakhapatnam. The first Indian built merchant ship was launched in 1948. In due course this yard was taken over by the Government and renamed Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL).
In 1956, the P&O group offered to sell MDL to the Government of India. The Planning Commission's reaction to this offer in July 1956 was "the demand for ships of 4000 GRT and below, especially for new ships, and the demand for old harbour craft are so small that it would not be advantageous for Government to consider taking over Mazagon Docks merely for the construction of smaller vessels" (Material from MDL).
In 1957, Mr Krishna Menon became the Defence Minister. He was determined that India should be self reliant for its basic defence requirements like tanks, warships and aircraft. It was clear that HSL would be overloaded if given the task of warship building and that only MDL and/or GRW could build large warships. He appointed a committee to look into MDL's capabilities and limitations, with a view to build frigate sized warships in India.
After protracted negotiations under Mr Krishna Menon's forceful leadership, the Government of India in a package deal purchased MDL and GRW for 12.1 million pounds (approx Rs. 3.85 crores) on 19 April 1960. The package deal provided for part of the payment to be adjusted towards repairs of P&O Group ships after take over.
In November 1960, Government approved in principle that three Leander class frigates should be built in India. Soon thereafter, MDL submitted a preliminary report on the facilities required to modernise MDL for building frigates.
MDL was a 35 acre site, needing extensive modernisation and expansion before it could build frigates. On its northern boundary was Kasara Basin, a low lying, neglected wharf belonging to the Bombay Port Trust, and occupied mostly by fishing vessels which rested on mud at low water. On MDL's southern boundary was the jeep assembly plant of Mahindra and Mahindra, on lease from the P&O Group since 1949 until 1962. Under Mr Krishna Menon's nudging, Mahindras vacated the South Yard in 1962 and the Bombay Port Trust leased Kasara Basin to MDL in 1963.
MDL had two medium size dry docks - one for seagoing ships and one for harbour craft - and a number of slipways which could accommodate coasters and lighters up to 150 tons. Though MDL's primary activity was ship repair, it did not have any alongside berths. Repairs had perforce to be undertaken in Bombay Port Trust berths.
After receiving MDL's preliminary report on its requirement for additional facilities, the Government retained the British firm of Shri Alexander Gibbs and Partners (who were also consultants for the Expansion Scheme of Bombay Naval Dockyard) to advise and prepare plans for expanding MDL's facilities, both for ship repair and ship construction. Keeping in view the imminent construction of frigates, their major recommendations were:
-Convert the Kasara tidal basin into an impounded wet basin for fitting out three to four ships at a time after they had been launched.
- Construction of the first long slipway on the south side of MDL, together with ancillary fittings like cranes etc.
- Creation of fitting out berths, fitting out shops, prefabrication shops, etc.
By end 1963, the plan for impounding the Kasara Basin had been approved and the construction had started of the 450 foot slipway in the South Yard. however, since the collaboration for the Frigate Project was still under discussion, the final layout of the yard and the siting of shops were kept pending the finalisation of the frigate building contract.
By 1968 most of the civil works for MDL's modernisation had been completed. The Kasara Basin was flooded on 23 Aug 1968 in time for NILGIRI, the first frigate launched on 23 October 1968, to be towed into the new impounded wet basin and secured alongside for fitting out.
Immediately after Goa was liberated, the Government of India directed MDL to take over responsibility for the Estaleiros Navais de Goa (Goa Shipyard) on 19 December 1961. In April 1962, Goa Shipyard Ltd (GSL) was leased to MDL. This lease was terminated on 30 September 1967 and GSL made a subsidiary of MDL. GSL undertook ship repair, built barges and fishing trawlers to start with and started building warships in the 1980's.
From 1963 onwards, the Navy started off-loading its ships to MDL for major refits, involving overhauls of boilers and extensive hull renewal. By this time, the first Warship Overseeing Teams had been appointed.
SELECTION OF SHIPBUILDERS FOR COLLABORATION
On 25 November 1960, Government approved in principle that three Leander Class Frigates should be built in India. MDL submitted a preliminary report on the civil works, machinery and equipment required to undertake this project. At this stage, Government deputed a team of three senior naval officers to Britain to discuss with the Admiralty, the collaborating shipbuilders and the armament suppliers, the steps to be taken for building the first modern major war vessel in India. The team was to submit a project report and recommendations on the arrangements to be made by NHQ and by MDL to execute the project expeditiously and economically. The three officers were Captain (L) KR Ramnath, the Director of Stores Production (Navy), Captain (E) BP Sinha, the Director of Naval Construction and Captain (E) CL Bhandari, the Managing Director of MDL. This teams discussions and recommendations laid the foundation of the subsequent negotiations which culminated in 1964.
The overall framework of collaboration emerged as follows:
(a) The Admiralty, as the owners of the Leander design, would:
- provide guidance drawings to the shipbuilder
- authorise the supply of working drawings to MDL
- vet the line plans produced by the shipbuilder
- keep the shipbuilder and NHQ informed of all modifica tions and Alterations & Additions envisaged by the Admiralty for their own Leanders during construction
- inspect all machinery and equipment ordered, on payment of agency charges
- supply armament and Admiralty items on the usual Government to Government contract
- advise on the terms of collaboration and the contract with the shipbuilder
- train Indian naval and civilian personnel in overseeing and testing and tuning of armament
- provide security clearances
(b) The Shipbuilder's responsibilities would be :-
- supply of main machinery and boilers. The main engines to be built in India under license from the English Electric Company
- ordering of special 'B' quality steel and sections required for the Leander
- ordering of auxiliary machinery and equipment required for the ship, subject to the usual conditions of inviting multiple tenders where appropriate or proof of economical prices from nominated contractors
- assistance to Mazagon Dock with technical personnel, on terms to be negotiated, to ensure completion of the ship according to programme
- assistance in training of personnel from the Mazagon Dock in their yard in the United Kingdom
- provision of facilities to the Indian Naval Overseeing Team for training in their Shipyard
- supply of shipbuilding stores, advice and active collaboration as regards suitability and necessary modifications to indigenously produced stores and equipment to be incorporated in the ship
- to seek and provide the necessary guarantees for machinery and equipment built on sub-contract and for the general performance of the ship as a whole
- to arrange for ordering, packing and despatching of all machinery, equipment and stores, according to a phased programme to fit in with the construction programme in India
(c) The armament supplier would supply the weapons and associated control systems.
Summary of the Team's Report and Recommendations
`As a result of our discussions with the various departments of the Admiralty, Messrs Yarrow and Co, M/S Vickers Armstrong Ltd. and other parties in the United Kingdom, we have reached the conclusion that the construction of Leander Class Ships in Mazagon Dock in collaboration with Shipbuilder/Shipbuilders is a feasible proposition.
`The immediate requirement for undertaking this project is to begin the construction of the slipway and pre-fabrication shop in Mazagon Dock and to conclude a collaboration agreement, so that the forward planning, examination of building drawings, investigations in regard to indigenous materials and the like can proceed. It is estimated that two years would be necessary to provide the additional facilities in Mazagon Dock, but the keel can be laid as soon as the slipway and the pre-fabrication shop are ready. The cost of the additional facilities is estimated at Rs 2.25 crores and the detailed project report is being prepared by Sir Alexander Gibbs & Partners.
`The Leander is the most modern warship of its class under construction in the United Kingdom. The design is a proven one and its construction is well established. We consider that the specifications of the ship to be built in Mazagon Dock must generally conform to the existing Leander. There is no scope for any major alterations, particularly in respect of armament and speed. It was stated by the Admiralty that a slight sacrifice of speed has been deliberately accepted in order to improve the sea-keeping qualities, put in a much greater amount of sophisticated equipment such as a helicopter, improve the endurance, reduce maintenance problems and ensure a longer useful life than a faster ship of the same displacement. It is obvious that to obtain greater speed for the same displacement, the machinery would take up much greater weight and space, and this can only be done at the expense of equipment and endurance.
`To complete this project economically, efficiently and in good time and to produce ships of a high standard, the closest co-operation would be necessary between Naval Headquarters, Admiralty, Mazagon Dock and the collaborating firm/firms in the United Kingdom. In this respect, we consider that the co-operative attitude of the British Admiralty and the interest shown by two well established firms, namely Vickers and Yarrows, promises well for the project. Both these firms are deeply conscious of their world wide repute and appear to be anxious to ensure the success of the project in keeping with their reputation.
`We consider that there is considerable scope for incorporating indigenously produced equipment and materials in the ships to be built in India. We estimate the Rupee element of the first ship to be about 50% of the total cost. This will progressively increase for the second and the subsequent ships. In this respect, we feel that a great deal can be learnt from the experience of Australia and Canada. Australia has achieved considerable progress in manufacturing turbines, boilers, gearing, guns and armament for the Type 12 Frigates being built in Australia.
`In order to ensure the efficient maintenance and operation of the advanced mechanical and electrical equipment fitted in these vessels, the Training Schools of the Indian Navy and the Naval Dockyard would have to be provided with proper shop equipment and facilities. Naval Headquarters would also have to take on the preparation of ship maintenance schedules, provision of Base and Depot spares and make arrangements for the commissioning and putting into service of these vessels.
`Naval Headquarters would also be required to set up an organisation for undertaking most of the functions of the Admiralty vis-a-vis a private shipbuilder in the United Kingdom. These can be summarised as Headquarters, Overseeing and the liaison in the United Kingdom. A number of technical personnel, both Naval and civilian, would have to be deputed abroad for specialised training in overseeing and fitting out of the equipment.
`The order of cost for the construction of a Leander Class Frigate in the United Kingdom is estimated to be 5.25 million pounds. The estimated cost of building the first ship in Mazagon Dock is Rs 8.5 crores, i.e., 20% above the U.K. cost. It is anticipated that the cost of the subsequent ships will decrease. The total cost of the project is estimated to be Rs 24.8 crores. The foreign exchange requirement is estimated at Rs 12.7 crores.
`The extension of facilities at Mazagon Dock by way of Capital improvements e.g. New Slipway, Prefabrication Shop, equipment and the like is estimated at Rs 2.25 crores, out of which Rs 65 lacs will be required in foreign exchange.
`Allowing 2 years from end 1961 for completion of work in Mazagon Dock, the first ship is expected to be available in end 1967, the remainder at 18 month intervals. The programme of 3 ships will thus extend to End 1970.
`The team recommends:-
- That approval be accorded to the construction of three Leander Class Ships at Mazagon Dock, Bombay in collaboration with Messrs Yarrow & Co Ltd, and Vickers Armstrong Ltd on terms to be negotiated. Messrs Vickers Armstrong Ltd have undertaken to forward technical proposals in collaboration with Messrs Yarrow & Co.
- That the Civil Engineering works, namely the construction of the slipway, pre-fabrication shop, fitting out basin and other works required in Mazagon Dock, Bombay, should be put in hand as soon as possible. The keel of the vessel cannot be laid till at least the slipway and the pre-fabrication shop is completed. It is obvious that the capital improvements of the facilities in Mazagon Dock will be of great benefit to the Yard and the country, quite apart from the Leander Project and these will be available in the future for other constructions.
- That subject to the report being accepted by the Government, the next step of drawing up the contract with the collaborating firms should be tackled in two stages:-
(a) The contract be drawn up by the Ministry of Defence, Finance in consultation with Naval Headquarters and Mazagon Dock &
(b) The draft contract be discussed jointly with the Admiralty and the representatives of the collaborating firms. It is recommended that for this purpose representatives from Ministry of Defence, Finance, Naval Headquarters and Mazagon Dock visit U.K. to finalise the contract on the spot. The scope of modifications to the Leander to meet Indian requirements should also be finalised during this visit.
- That at every stage of progressing the case through the Governmental machinery, the need for quick decision be kept firmly in mind. We would like to place it on record that the whole project lasting over several years has to be executed in a phased programme and if there are administrative delays in financing, placing of contracts, giving approval for essentially required personnel, the whole project may be thrown out of gear and its completion date and ultimate cost may become unpredictable. In our discussions in U.K, it was made clear to us that in shipbuilding, a critical hump is reached after launch, when fitting out begins. If delays occur in fitting out, due to the equipment or personnel not being available at the appropriate stages of the fitting out, a vicious circle of deterioration of the equipment already installed begins at one end while new equipment is being fitted at the other end.
VICKERS/YARROW REPORT ON FACILITIES REQUIRED IN MDL
From the British side, a team of officials from Messrs Vickers Ltd and Messrs Yarrow Ltd conducted an extensive survey of the facilities available in India and produced, in 1962, their proposal to build Leander class frigates in Mazagon Docks.
FINAL TECHNICAL - ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF FRIGATE DESIGN OPTIONS
In mid 1962, a delegation was sent to make a final technical-economic assessment of the Vickers/Yarrow proposal vis-a-vis collaboration proposals subsequently received from Sweden and Holland. Rear Admiral (later Admiral) SM Nanda, who was Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, led this delegation.
Admiral Nanda recalls:
"The next consideration was the equipment that was going to go into the ships. Where was the equipment going to come from? The third consideration was what support could we expect for spare parts during the ship's life? What interaction could we have on the usage of the ships as well as the equipment and weapon systems fitted on the ships with the other Navies who were going to use these ships.
Swedish shipyard was very keen to assist us. However, I was informed that Sweden was not interested in this type of ship at all because the Swedish Navy's requirements were different - their environment was different, their seas were narrow and their area of operations very limited as far as their maritime boundaries were concerned. I felt that if their Navy was not interested, it was obvious that we could not depend on Sweden for lifetime support of the equipment and the weapon systems that were going to be fitted in the ship. Nor could we have interaction with them as to their experience or any problems that may arise in the operation or maintenance of these ships. The choice narrowed down to either UK or Holland.
"We found that Holland was getting their technical inputs from UK. The Leander, which was designed by UK, was going to be built under license in Holland with the designs which were going to be acquired from the United Kingdom. They were going to make certain changes and they were going to put in radars and associated equipment built in Holland in place of what was being fitted in the UK ships. Holland too, was extremely keen to collaborate and transfer technology to us.
"Then we visited UK and held discussion with Yarrow who were building a large number of Leanders for the British Royal Navy. After the Second World War, the Leander was the first standard, frigate-sized ship that the Royal Navy had designed and they were going to have several ships of this class. The UK too were very keen to help our frigate project.
"I came back and I recommended that we should negotiate with the United Kingdom, because it gave several advantages, in as much as the language problem was not there, which was going to be a problem, both with Sweden and with Holland. Secondly the equipment that was going to be used was British equipment, which we already had, because all ships of our Navy were of British origin. Thirdly that as the Royal Navy was going to acquire a number of these ships, we could depend on support for spare parts during the lifetime of the Leanders that we were going to have in our Navy. Overall, it was in the Navy's interest to collaborate with the UK, with whose Navy we could discuss problems experienced in operation, maintenance, indigenisation, modernisation and so on. This recommendation was finally accepted by the Government.
"There were a lot of questions raised in Parliament after this recommendation was made, as to why we had gone to the British. I was sent for by Defence Minister Chavan to explain to him the reasons why we were recommending the British option and not the Swedish option. The Defence Minister mentioned that there was a lot of lobbying by Swedish interests who were getting our MPs to ask a lot of questions on this particular project and he needed to be fully apprised of the situation as it existed. After I gave him all the reasons, he was satisfied, he was able to answer all the questions in Parliament and the British Leander Project was approved in association with Yarrow".
THE CHOICE OF THE FSA 34
LEANDER DESIGN AND
FINALISATION OF
AGREEMENTS IN 1964
In their earlier discussions since 1961, it had been agreed that the Admiralty would give India the FSA 29 Leander design which had already been introduced in the Royal Navy. During the intervening years, whilst discussions and negotiations were going on, the Admiralty had decided to introduce for their Navy, a modified design called the "FSA-34". In this design, the beam was broader by 2 feet (0.61m). It incorporated the latest equipment modifications and made provision for incorporating future modifications.
During the Defence Minister's visit to Britain in November 1964, the discussions on the Frigate Project covered three major aspects.
(a) The Choice Between the Earlier FSA 29 and Later FSA 34 Design.
The advice of the British MOD (Navy) and Vickers Armstrong (Shipbuilders) was that:
(i) The FSA 29 Leander design had been superseded by the FSA 34 Leander design. India should therefore go in for the latest FSA 34 design.
(ii) The time delay caused by the working drawings having to be redrawn would not exceed 12 months. Since MDL could only lay the keel in mid 1966, this delay would get absorbed. The cost difference would be about 200,000 pounds. The FSA 34 design gave both added stability and extra space.
(iii) Adoption of the FSA 34 design would make it easier to obtain the latest equipment and machinery being fitted in the British Navy's FSA 34 Leanders.
(b) Technical Assistance to be Rendered by the MOD (Navy) UK.
The scope of assistance would be incorporated in an inter-Governmental Memorandum of Agreement. This would cover the design fees of 50,000 pounds per ship for the hull and 20,000 pounds per ship for the main machinery to recover the costs incurred by the Admiralty for research, development and design of new equipment.
(c) Technical Aid Fees to be Paid to Vickers Armstrong (Shipbuilders).
This fee was for providing technical assistance to enable Mazagon Docks to construct three Leander Class frigates and included elements for "on the job" training of Indian personnel in the UK shipbuilding yard and for the Indian Frigate Project Organisation (IFPO) to be set up in the UK.
A credit agreement was signed under which the British Government agreed to provide a special loan of 4.7 million pounds to meet the external costs, during the first four years of the programme, for expansion of MDL's facilities to construct three Leander Class Frigates.
By end 1964, all the major aspects of the collaboration had been finalised. In addition to the technical aid fees, an annual amount 40,000 pounds was to be paid for the Indian Frigate Project Organisation in Newcastle, whose function was to liaise with the Lead Yard, Yarrow (Shipbuilders), who were to provide the basic working drawings for the construction of the first Leander in India.
The Memorandum of Agreement for the Leander Frigate Project, known as the "Blue Book", was signed on 22 December 1964, between the Government of India and Vickers Yarrow. The Blue Book covered three aspects:-
- Technical Aid, including the provision of basic technical drawings and the placing of 60 British technical and other personnel, from Senior Managers down to Foremen level, to assist MDL in the project.
- Supplies of major items from Vickers/Yarrows and
- Supplies of material from other United Kingdom suppliers.
This Memorandum became operative on 27 January 1965, when a parallel agreement was signed between the Government of India and the Ministry of Defence (Navy) UK. The agreement authorised Vickers/Yarrow to operate the agreements in the Blue Book. The parallel agreement related to the payment of design fees of
400,000 pounds to the Ministry of Defence (Navy) UK for the training of Indian personnel in Royal Navy Dockyards, the supply of Admiralty pattern items of stores and equipment, the scrutiny of quotations and the inspection of material and equipment on behalf of the Government of India.
The Government of India then placed an order on MDL for the construction of the first frigate. The salient features of the agreement with the MDL were:-
- The work was to be undertaken at cost plus a profit of 5% on the total cost of construction, provided that the profit to be allowed shall not exceed Rs. 140 lakhs.
- A Warship Overseeing Team was given the authority to monitor the work.
- Naval Headquarters was authorised to make deviations from specifications and any modification to accepted drawings.
- Strict quality control was to be exercised by the Director General Inspection (DGI) and the Warship Overseeing Team (WOT).
- The provisions of the Official Secrets Act were to be made applicable to safeguard security.
- Force Majeure clause was to be applied for unforeseen or untoward occurrence requiring revision of the date of delivery.
- The methodology of accounting and periodic payments for the work executed were spelt out and adequate provision made for advance payments.- Basin Trials, Sea Trials and Repeat Trials for the work performed on the hull, machinery, electrical installations and other equipment were provided for and the onus of rectification placed on MDL.
- A warranty clause made MDL responsible to make good any defects onboard detected within a period of twelve months after delivery.
After the frigate contract was signed, the Government appointed to MDL the two key persons who had been closely associated with the Frigate Project during the negotiations. Mr HC Sarin ICS was appointed Chairman MDL on 7 November 1964, in addition to his duties at Secretary Defence Production in the Ministry of Defence. Rear Admiral (later Admiral) SM Nanda, who had been associated with the project as Chief of Material in 1961/62 and as Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff in 1963/64, was appointed Managing Director MDL on 14 December 1964. Mr Sarin remained Chairman MDL for five years till 28 Sep 1969. Rear Admiral Nanda handed over to Rear Admiral BA Samson on 3 May 1966, who later also became Chairman MDL until he retired on 15 May 1973. This close association of the Ministry of Defence Production, NHQ and MDL and the long tenures of the top management were to prove invaluable for the timely and successful resolution of innumerable teething problems of the Frigate Project.
Whilst Naval Headquarters had the satisfaction of having signed for the latest available Leander design, the FSA 34, the first British Leander of the FSA 34 series was not expected to be commissioned in the Royal Navy before 1969. Expectedly, there was scepticism of whether MDL would be able to build in India a sophisticated warship as modern as what the British Navy would have.
The sceptics, both in India and abroad, had sound reasons. Those in Britain who had been building warships were well aware of the complexity of coordinating practically every aspect of naval architecture, marine engineering, electrical and electronic technologies. Those in India knew that the MDL faced several formidable challenges:
- The MDL's expansion scheme would have to be carried out fast enough to meet the cardinal dates of the frigate construction programme.
- At the same time, MDL's existing activities could not be slowed down. Ship repair and new construction work already contracted for had to be completed on time.
- MDL's traditional activity had been ship repair and building auxiliary vessels. This required a relatively lower order of skills than that required for warship building. MDL's workforce was not conversant with warship technologies. A massive training programme, both in India and abroad, was inescapable.
- The rigorous specifications of the materials and the equipment required for warship construction, so as to obtain absolute reliability during combat, were much higher than the equivalents commercially available in India. The range of materials required for warship building was not available in India. Moreover the small order quantities of the frigate project made it uneconomic for any Indian company to indigenise. Import substitution would therefore be a long drawn out process, entailing dependence on imports, with all its attendant delays.
- Though shipbuilding was basically assembly work, the standard of workmanship required, the special materials, the restricted space in which work had to be done and the volume of closely inter-related and inter-dependent activities would make time bound completion doubly difficult.
DELAYS IN CONSTRUCTION OF MDL FACILITIES
The basic facilities required to begin the Frigate Project started to fall behind from the outset. As mentioned earlier, the Government, while approving MDL's expansion scheme, had advised postponing the siting of the Plater & Assembly Shop (P&A Shop) until the type of warship to be built and the collaborators had been finalised. This delayed the construction of the P&A Shop. The civil works of the P&A Shop were completed only in 1967, well after the keel of the first frigate had been laid. The installation of machinery and the laying of the services in the P&A Shop continued throughout 1967 and 1968, until the first frigate was launched.
The construction of slipways in the South Yard was also delayed due to the unexpected soil conditions. The resultant re-planning upset the expansion schedule, which in turn delayed the installation of the cranes. At every step, there was some unforeseen difficulty or the other, resulting in revision of plans and compelling improvisation and innovation.
Admiral Samson, recalls:
"The Platers & Assembly Shop, the very basis for ship-building, was not ready, since that particular contractor had been unable to adhere to any schedule after several revisions. Thus the first plate for the future NILGIRI, could only be laid in the Machine Shop on May 16, 1966. This was just a simple steel plate on which a coconut was broken.
"When the three slipways in South Yard got ready, there were no cranes. When the contractor was finally given notice to quit, he promptly obtained an injunction against the work being carried out by anyone else. It is to the credit of the particular judge that we were able to vacate this injunction in an incredibly short time. Only thereafter could a new contractor be selected and engaged.
"The Platers & Assembly Shop, with all its internal facilities etc, virtually came into full being only after the first frigate was launched in October 1968. This one instance alone clearly shows how difficult it was for a young and inexperienced Yard to adhere to any kind of schedule, much less trying to complete the hull on the slipway, in what could be termed as in a reasonable amount of time.
"As an instance of making-do and improvising with such equipment and machines that were available in the old Yard, the machining of the base plate for the twin 4.5 inch gun mounting is particularly interesting. The diameter of this machine was such that we seriously considered importing a very expensive machine from Italy just for this purpose. But its purchase would have meant foregoing import of other equally vital machinery and equipment. So we improvised with an existing machine in the Machine Shop that was over 100 years old. We raised the huge machine by a couple of feet, re-set it, and then machined the circular base plate. It was an extremely slow process and required much skill by the operator to achieve the required accuracy. But we did it and saved much foreign exchange. It speaks volumes for the ingenuity of the officers and men in the Machine Shop".
TRAINING IN BRITAIN FOR CONSTRUCTING FRIGATES
Vickers made the generous gesture of starting the training of Indian personnel from the Navy and from MDL even before the contract was signed in October 1964.
The skills required for warship building were vastly different to those for construction of merchant ships and totally different to those needed for ship repairs. There were over 35 warship building trades as against only 10 merchant shipbuilding trades. A complete re-orientation of training was therefore necessary.
MDL deputed a number of its senior and junior officers for training in the shipyards of Vickers and Yarrow, for periods ranging from six months to two years. A small body of about 150 workmen of all categories were also deputed to these shipyards to observe at first hand the techniques for building and fitting-out. When these officers and men returned to MDL, they in turn trained other officers and men while actually building the first frigate.
Lt Cdr (L) (later Captain) S Prabhala was in the first team who went to Vickers for training in early 1964. He recalls:
"Since Mazagon Dock did not have qualified people in all disciplines, some of us from the Navy were deputed to Mazagon Docks. On the Construction side we had Cdr AN Thukral, on the Engineering side we had Cdr YP Batra and on the Electrical side myself. There was a civilian counterpart to each of us from Mazagon Docks. On the Construction side it was Mr Choksi, on the Engineering side it was Mr Dom Menezes and Abraham and on the Electrical side it was Mr Kharas.
"Apart from two from each of these three disciplines, we also had people from the drawing office and also some from the foreman category of technicians for electrical, shipwright, engineering, plumbing and so on.
"The fact that Vickers wanted such a large number to come there for training, we realised later after we went there, was because ship building in the UK in those days was still an art rather than a science, in the sense that not much was planned in advance. People went by what they did in the past. There was'nt any formal training in the sense that this is the way you start building a ship, this is how you plan the procurement or this is how you proceed with the construction or the fitting out. We were just left to observe what they did. It we wanted any clarifications, we were told to ask questions from the people on the berth. What we could learn was entirely on the basis of how much curiosity and how much willingness to learn we displayed. This was an eye opener.
"It was really what you call `on the job training', you were just thrown into the works and you picked up whatever you could. There was no formal training, there was no formal planning system. From that aspect, it was not the best education for us because we had to do improvements ourselves. It was not as if we started with a good foundation and then we could improve upon that.
"The intention was that we should have people trained in all aspects of ship building. One of the important aspects was inspection. So while we, on behalf of Mazagon Dock, were getting trained in how to build ships, there were people from the Navy headed by Mr Dotiwala for hull construction, engineering and electrical. Mr Dotiwala, Cdr Sarkar and Lt MM Puri (Engineers) and Cdr Bhatnagar an Electrical Officer, formed the Warship Production Inspection Team. There wasn't any big team in Admiralty's design office in Bath, as far as I recollect, because we always had a liaison officer in Bath. Cdr Mohan Ram, a Constructor and Cdr Bose an Engineer and Cdr Badve came a little later, not in the period I was there, but it was for a much shorter period compared to the ship building training.
"There was no over all coordination of these activities. Basically we were seconded to the respective counterparts of the Admiralty. The warship inspection people, for instance, were being overall supervised by the Naval Adviser London. Being deputationists and being Mazagon Dock personnel, we were in contact with our own company in Bombay".
Admiral Samson recalls:
"From my discussions with those who came back from abroad after such training, it appeared to be of mixed value. Certainly they had the opportunity of watching a warship being constructed and observing the methods and systems obtaining in an experienced British yard. However, for obvious reasons, none of these persons were actually permitted to work on the warship being built. They could only watch what was happening. Watching a ship being built has limited value; there is indeed value but it is only by actually doing the job with one's own hands that one really learns.
"The three hundred odd personnel sent to the UK for training did not represent the total work force that would be involved in building a warship, which would probably be 1500 to 1800 men of all trades. The intention therefore was that this nucleus would, on their return from UK, train a selected work force in warship construction.
"It would seem on the face of it that these would be from those existing personnel with experience in different trades in the Yard. But there was a snag to this. Firstly most of our labour, except in certain technical skills, were not educated enough and would not have been able to either read the intricate working drawings or the various manuals, all of which were in English. Secondly, psychologically it is always difficult to change the thinking and attitude of people and their skills once they have got used to certain ways of thinking and doing things, even more so when they are illiterate. To change such thinking would have been a task fraught with delays, but more important, a wrong way of doing things - and we could not afford any delays, and certainly no mistakes.
"We were determined right from the beginning that every man working on the frigate, whether on the slipway, in the P&A Shop, the Machine Shop or any other shop must do the job in the correct way. Thanks to people like Shri Homi Sethna and Commander (later Commodore) A.N. Thukral who insisted on the highest standards from the very outset, we were able to ensure the right way of thinking amongst the work force on the frigate project - only one standard with no relaxation or deviation.
"In order to ensure this and to overcome the problems mentioned above, we recruited young men straight from school, having the basic knowledge of English and able to read and write. We put them to work and they learnt "on the job" very successfully.
"It was also essential that Managers, from the topmost down to the juniormost foremen/supervisor level, should themselves gain the confidence and knowledge so essential for building a warship. The Blue Book provided for the deputation to MDL of as many as 60 managers from Vickers and Yarrow for varying periods. These were to be in all disciplines - shipbuilding, designing, P&A Shop, welding, machine shop, everywhere. If MDL had asked for these British personnel, there would have been no objections from Government. But it was the united view of the top Managers and myself that if we really wanted to learn warship building, it was only by having not merely the responsibility but the authority as well and doing it onself. Without authority and responsibility we would not learn warship building and develop the confidence so essential for the future.
"And so it was decided, despite the misgivings in all quarters, including NHQ and especially our collaborators, Vickers and Yarrow, who had grave doubts about everything, that we would have only a limited number of highly skilled personnel from the UK, and that too only at the Foreman level. It is a matter of great satisfaction and pride that we never had more than four such personnel on loan from Britain at any one time, for periods varying from 3 months to 3 years. We owe to these British personnel much gratitude; they worked with their own hands and set an example to our own skilled personnel at all levels. Similarly, there cannot be enough appreciation to all our Managers and Supervisors concerned who were willing to shoulder such responsibility.
"In this way, the large majority of the personnel engaged on the Frigate Project on the slipways, in the Drawing Office and in the various shops were very successfully trained `on the job' as they built the first frigate, the NILGIRI".
TRAINING IN BRITAIN IN SHIP DESIGN.
Two officers, Lt Cdr (later Commodore) SC Bose (a marine engineer) and Lt (later Captain) Mohan Ram, (a naval constructor) were sent to the British Navy's Director General Ship Design Office at Bath to study the design philosophy of the Leander class frigates.
Commodore Bose recalls:-
"Naval Headquarters felt that it would not be proper to seek design assistance from the British MOD Navy every now and then while the ship was under construction in India using indigenous substitutes. And in any case, with the restructuring of the administration of the Royal Navy and the introduction of cost consciousness, they were not going to (unlike old times) reply to signals as before without charging for it quite heavily.
"To establish our own design set up, two officers were sent to work in MOD (Navy) UK, basically for acquiring the know-how of design and production of Leander class frigates. These two were Lt NS Mohan Ram, a Constructor officer and myself a Dagger Marine Engineer. Our job was to learn as much as possible about the design, about the modifications, about the various trials of the ship, how to conduct them, the acceptance standards etc. In other words, we would be given the know-how of construction, completion, trials of the ship and its operation in the Indian Navy.
"Whilst at Bath, I studied the reports of the Yarrow Admiralty Research and Development (YARD) leading to the finalisation of the design of the Leander class of ships and also the details of the background of the modifications which they subsequently adopted to their ships. I studied the test specifications and trials and test reports of a number of Leander class ships.
"Based on the Inspection and Trial Reports of these ships, I compiled a document of common faults that occur during construction, fitting out and installation of engineering machinery. This document subsequently proved to be very valuable to MDL, to our Overseeing Team and the ships officers who were standing by to commission the ship, in eliminating many of these faults.
"Incidentally, the number of installation defects we had in the first and second Leanders built by Mazagaon Docks were much less than in the Leanders built by British shipyards. We also compiled data sheets for the conduct of trials and the post trials analysis of the results. I also attended the sea trials of two Leander class frigates of the Royal Navy, an experience which we could never have got otherwise".
Captain Mohan Ram recalls:-
"I think somebody had made a security mistake in Bath. Because however much you may classify things, people will find out. I had some very unusual experiences. On arrival I was told "You are supposed to stick to the Leander Project Directorate; like a blinkered horse you should not look this way or that way. If you are found in some place where you are not supposed to be, you will be up for the high jump". They were very charming, very polite and very unpleasant at the same time. I got the message.
"But when one works in the Leander section of DG (Ships), one cannot but hear and see things. For example the drawing of the first Ikara conversion of the Leander was done by me because there was an easy-going Lt Cdr who liked his golf. When he found that here is a Indian Naval Constructor who was prepared to work long hours, he put me there and I did the complete layout of Ikara anti submarine missile. I also worked out the re-design of a Leander's helicopter deck and in so doing learnt how to design a helicopter deck. I pointed out to them we don't have to make the whole deck very strong. Let's find out which are the landing points of the helicopters wheels, that way we can save some weight. But the British made the whole flight deck of the same strength.
"In due course I suggested that I should visit all the specialist sections where the Leander frigates were being designed. They agreed. I went to the underwater shock section. I was able to study documents which in the normal course I would not have had the opportunity to do. I saw the damage stability calculations being done for various classes of warships. I learnt everything which was there connected with ships design and I came back with a gold mine of data. In those two years, I was like a sponge taking in information.
"Take a simple thing like galley equipment or laundry equipment. One would think a laundry equipment is easy, but when you start designing the laundry equipment in a ship, you must know what a tumbler drier is supposed to do. You must know what a press is supposed to do. I went through the files. I went through all the minuting. It was astonishing how many meetings the British had held on laundry equipment. How many meetings they had on the galley equipment. What problems they had with suppliers. In the British system, there is one person who knows all there is to know about ship's laundries. We didn't have a laundry section in Indian Navy. Similarly we didn't have an air-conditioning section in the Indian Navy. I made detailed notes and worked out a statement of requirements. By the time I came back, I probably had more information on the nitty gritty of the Leander design than any Royal Navy Officer.
"I must admit that in one aspect I got brainwashed by the British - that certain critical things have to be imported. One of them was air conditioning. In the Leander class frigate, air conditioning is very important. All the fire control systems and the entire Ops Room are dependant on efficient air conditioning. When I came back, NHQ wanted an indigenous air conditioning system. I put up a very learned note saying how important air conditioning was and why the air conditioning system had to be imported. I was sent for by the Secretary Defence Production, Mr HC Sarin. He went through my whole note and said, "You are a very clever fellow and a very stupid fellow. From this note I can see you know air conditioning inside out but I don't trust your judgment. If we can air condition five star hotels, we can air condition ships also. I am not clearing air conditioning for import. More than that, I am putting you as the project in-charge for air conditioning the NILGIRI". When I came out, I was very angry, I thought this decision might ruin the ship.
"After that, I had to sit down and design every single trunking. I learnt a lot and it was a joy to work with Voltas for air conditioning the NILGIRI. Of course there were a few places where a little moisture came out, some places got flooded and we had to put in additional drains, but the system as a whole came out beautifully. I learnt something then - that there is a wisdom which goes beyond knowledge. Mr Sarin had the wisdom. I only had the knowledge. One meets some people in the course of one's career who change one's complete mental thinking in half an hour. He opened my eyes that we Indians can do things. That pride of being Indian, I learnt from Mr Sarin".
CONTROLLER INDIAN FRIGATE PROJECT ORGANISATION(CONIFPO) IN UK
To implement the Frigate Project, a small Frigate Cell consisting of a British Naval Architect, with a team of draughtsmen and others from MDL, was set up in 1966, initially in Vickers at Newcastle, although Yarrow, the Lead Yard, was building the first British FSA 34 Leander in Glasgow. Details were fed from Glasgow to Newcastle, where the basic drawings were to be made and then forwarded to India in accordance with a predeterminded schedule.
MDL had its own representative, Commodore (later Rear Admiral) HK Kapadia designated Controller Indian Frigate Project Organisation (CONIFPO,) at Newcastle. He had a team of technical and financial managers to liaise with the Admiralty, with Vickers and with Yarrow and negotiate purchase of equipment in Britain and to ensure its timely despatch to MDL in Bombay.
FRIGATE CELL/SECTION IN MDL
The set-up in MDL was also re-organised to cater to the Frigate Project. In 1966, a Frigate Cell was established with those who had returned from UK after training. Commander(E) YP Batra, as Planning Manager, Commander(C) AN Thukral, as Officer-in-Charge Frigate (Hull), Shri J Kharas, as Officer-in-Charge Frigate (Electrical), Shri Dom Menezes, as Officer-in-Charge Frigate (Engineering). This Cell was later re-designated 'Frigate Section' and was headed by Commander (E) (later Vice Admiral) BR Choudhury, Commander (L) (later Captain) S Prabhala, Commander (E) KM Acharya and Commander (E) T Deva in succession.
The Frigate Section, among other things, was responsible for producing from the basic drawings received from Vickers, the detailed working drawings required for practical implementation in the shops and on the slipways.
DELAYS IN STARTING CONSTRUCTION
After a ships hull has been fully fabricated, each compartment in the ship is marked off from detailed drawings to assist the location of equipment, as also the exact positioning of electrical cables, piping systems, ventilation systems, etc. After locating the position of all these systems in each and every compartment and after making minor adjustments wherever necessary, work begins to instal various systems and equipment.
For the NILGIRI, MDL had to manufacture and install 20 miles of ferrous and non-ferrous piping of varying sizes serving 61 systems. 180 miles of electrical cabling of different types and sizes had to be installed. Except the main machinery compartments, which were fitted with a forced air supply and exhaust systems, all compartments in the ship had to be provided with air conditioning. The length of air trunking involved was approximately two miles. Specialised equipment had to be installed in a pre-determinded sequence. This required detailed coordination. If one item or system was delayed, the sequence of the entire fitting out process was delayed.
By the end of 1966 it became abundantly clear that the information and drawings from the Frigate Cell in Newcastle were coming out far too late and without the detailed information that was essential to order the many hundreds and thousands of items of various kinds in adequate time to ensure that they were available when required. This began to seriously affect NILGIRI's construction schedule. MDL began falling back at the very outset and by mid 1967 was almost two years behind schedule in respect of information and drawings from the Frigate Cell in Newcastle. All MDL's complaints and appeals seemed to fall on deaf ears. By end June 1967 the situation had become alarming.
Admiral Samson recalls:
"In regard to the delays in provision of data and information from the UK, it was quite clear that Vickers were holding back. We fell well behind schedule. In June 1967, together with Chairman MDL cum Secretary Defence Production, Mr Harish Sarin, we went to England to have a discussion with the British Admiralty. I took the opportunity to complain about the lack of cooperation from Vickers. A meeting was set up in Vicker's House to discuss this. This meeting was acrimonious. There were very heated discussions and arguments. CONIFPO, Commodore Kapadia, was there with me and MDL's Shipbuilding Manager Mr Homi Sethna as well. The meeting was most unfruitful from our point of view.
"I had finally to inform Vickers that since we were not making any progress, I would have no option but to report to my Government and recommend the cancellation of this project. It was then that Vickers decided that we would carry on in a more cooperative manner.
"It was at this meeting that we decided to move the Frigate Cell from Vickers at Newcastle to Yarrows at Glasgow where the British Leander was being built and where our personnel were seeing how Yarrow was doing it.
"The scepticism in the British was interesting. When I went to meet Sir Leonard Redshaw, the Managing Director of Vickers at Glasgow, to discuss with him the progress in the supply of information, he told me bluntly that he never really expected India's frigate project to ever be completely successfully. He said that Vickers were collaborating with the Australians for building Battle Class destroyers, they had about 25 managers from Vickers there and Australia was still trying to build these Battle Class destroyers successfully. If they could not achieve it, how did India think she could? He said that Vickers were collaborating with the Spanish and nothing had happened there either. And nothing was going to happen in the Mazagon Docks either. I took strong exception to this and invited him to the launching of the first Leander on the 23 October 1968. He said he would come if it took place. But even if it did take place, he did not consider that we would ever be able complete fitting it out.
"After July 1967 the situation began to improve vastly. As our teams in MDL and in the UK gained experience and knowledge, we were able to get things moving satisfactorily, though we were unable to make up the time already lost. Looking back, I sometimes feel that because of the tardy information being given to our teams in the drawing office and to our representives abroad, we had willy-nilly to put in that much more extra effort to learn for ourselves. We learnt the hard way but it was we who ultimately gained".
AVAILABILITY OF MATERIAL REQUIRED FOR CONSTRUCTING FRIGATES
One of the major bottlenecks in the Frigate Project was the availability of material, machinery and equipment of the required standard and quality, at the right time and in the right quantities. In the end 1960's, India's industrial base was not sufficiently developed to produce the specialised equipment and material required in shipbuilding, much less in warship building. One had to rely largely on imports. Even in the case of imports, there was the problem of ordering long lead items like weapons, main propulsion and auxiliary machinery as much as three years in advance and then have it inspected, packed and shipped to MDL.
As for the steel plates, three types were required namely mild steel, 'B' quality steel and 'A' quality super-grip plates By the end of 1965 the Rourkela Division of Hindustan Steel had developed only mild steel. This was used in the first frigate, amounting to some 65%. The rest had to be imported. Action was later initiated to manufacture 'B' quality steel and, after considerable effort, Rourkela succeeded in 1967. The stringent tests carried out on the trial plates proved to be highly satisfactory. In addition, Hindustan Steel had also developed steel plates to specification BSS 1501-151. These plates were used for special purposes. By the time the second frigate was being built, 95% of the steel plate requirements were met indigenously.
Commodore Acharya recalls:
"I reported to Mazagon Docks in October 1966, to the Frigate Cell or Frigate Section. This was a combination of drawing office and design office. It was also initiating procurement action, making out the requisitions for items to be procured, mostly indigenous, because for whatever was needed to be imported, a request would go to CONIFPO in UK who would do all the paper work and get the items procured.
"It was a tremendously exciting experience. We were lucky to have a team of excellent personalities. Compared to my tenure later on in Mazagon Docks, this was a period of total interaction and no hang ups. For example, Mr Harish Sarin who was Secretary Defence Production would come to MDL's board room and find me waiting to see Admiral Samson who was then the Managing Director. He would know me by name and start talking to me about things happening on the ground. The team in the Ministry comprised Sarin and Podgy Nadkarni who was the Officer on Special Duty. In Mazagon Docks itself, we had quite a few luminaries in addition to Admiral Samson. Mr Dotiwala was the overseer. Mr Sethna was the ship building manager. Partly because it was a new venture and we were all very enthusiastic and partly because there was this interaction, we were able to overcome quite a few difficulties and bottlenecks.
"The technology transfer from Yarrow and Vickers was very poor. In fact Yarrow's own planning was virtually non-existent. Admittedly ours was not there either. We had expected some inputs from Yarrow but these were not coming through. A classic example was that which occurred a few months before launching the NILGIRI. From the drawing of the under water openings, I could count about 45 underwater valves. The method of procurement was that Yarrow, who were building the same Leander design ship and were a few months ahead of us, would pass on copies of their own requisitions, what they called copy orders, and that would indicate to us as to what was required to be ordered by us, which I would then either order locally or ask CONIFPO to procure. I found from these copy orders that we had ordered only 30 odd under water valves. So we sent a telex to Yarrow asking how did they manage for the remaining 15 or so valves? They said "Oh yes, we did not order them because we had them in stock". Can you imagine the consternation, a few months before NILGIRI's launch, that we had not even ordered the underwater valves totally as required! That is just an example. But basically, as we went along, we found that we had to learn quite a few things which even Yarrow could not teach us.
"We had also to willingly take on the task of indigenising as much as possible. The organisation in Delhi, initially called DDIMS, split into DWP and DPI(N). They again took a lot of initiative. Some of them were perhaps over ambitious. But it is a matter of record that even in the very first Leander we managed to have a large number of indigenous equipments and systems. I remember a gentleman coming from Yarrow and wondering whether India which, in their perception, was still in the bullock cart or cycle stage, would be able to manufacture equipment to warship requirements. We did successfully manage to indigenise a lot of medium to high technology equipment, which was of course a very desirable thing in the long run.
"As far as the Mazagon Docks own civilian work force was concerned, once again I know that later on they developed certain labour union problems and all that. But during my first period of six years, I have nothing but admiration for the way they put their shoulders to the wheel and proved that Mazagon Docks could build modern frigates".
CREATION OF DIRECTORATE OF LEANDER PROJECT IN NHQ
In 1968, Government sanctioned the new Directorate of Leander Project in NHQ to handle all aspects of design, to coordinate with Vickers and with Yarrow, to approve drawings and generally manage all the technical activity of the Leander Project from the NHQ end.
Commodore SC Bose recalls:-
"As the Deputy Director Engineering in the Directorate of Leander Project in Naval Headquarters, from 1969 to 1972, I was monitoring the first Leander's progress in Mazagon Docks with the help of the Warship Overseeing Team stationed in Bombay. I was helping in resolving the difficulties being faced, giving them guidance and also going to various industries to see the progress and the quality of the equipment being manufactured indigenously and granting deviation and concessions referred to us by the Production Inspectors. We organised Steering Committee meetings under the chairmanship of CNS, and represented NHQ in various coordination meetings under the chairmanship of the Joint Secretary (Public Sector) in the Department of Defence Production, who was also incharge of the Price Negotiating Committee. I also looked into the problems we may face during the various trials, during testing and tuning prior to manning and commissioning the ship and the various problems that the ship may encounter during Naval Service e.g. maintenance and subsequent operation, availability of fuel, lub oils, and other stores and Base and Depot spares with a view to advising timely provisioning action by the various organisations.
"To this end, it was felt that in addition to the various Indian teams engaged in the Leander Project, there should also be other units like an elaborate Inspection Organisation covering the Industries where naval items were being developed and produced, an on board Testing and Tuning Team, a Machinery Trial Unit (MTU) etc. The ship's commissioning crew could not be expected to have adequate knowledge of this class of ship, except to some extent of the Whitby class of ships, the Trishul and Talwar, which were nearest to it. So we took up a case with the Ministry of Defence to send selected officers, sailors and civilians to UK to train in various aspects of development and inspection of Naval machinery and equipment in British industries, in on board testing and tuning of weapon and electrical systems and with a Machinery Trials Unit to conduct harbour and sea trials. The proposal also included training of the officers and sailors of the commissioning crew who would be standing by the ship and operate the ship during harbour and sea trials themselves without any third party, unlike as in UK. By so doing, the ships crew would be acquiring a first hand feel of the ship and take her out to sea subsequently on commissioning without any trouble.
"All this was achieved very successfully. I recall a remark by Sir Eric Issac, the Managing Director of Vickers, who was invited to be present on board when the first Leander was undergoing sea trials. On completion of the six hours Full Power Trial, followed by the Full Astern Trials, with all machinery being operated remotely, there was nothing except a puff of black smoke from the funnel when the engines were moved from Full Ahead-Stop-Full Astern in rapid movement, giving a shock to the boilers. Sir Eric expressed surprise at our achievement to Admiral Samson, the Managing Director of Mazagon Docks, who was also on board the ship. He said that the 20 specialists who had been nominated by the Royal Navy and Vickers/Yarrow and kept ready in UK to fly to India to help us in the trials and commissioning of the ship on receiving an SOS message, would feel frustrated at having missed a chance to visit India. I thought this was a very significant remark by a traditionally conservative British peer.
"We, in the Leander Project, kept in view the operational aspects of the ship with regard to D 787 items and other newly introduced stores consequent on the use of indigenous substitutes. We also pruned the well established list of spares and fittings. Till that time, all steam ships carried turbine lifting gear on board. This consisted of a large number of heavy parts which cannot be used when a ship is at sea. With present day communication facilities, this gear could be sent to a ship in a matter of three days, along with Dockyard specialists. We, therefore, deleted these items from the shipboard list and had only four sets, one each for the two Dockyards, east and west, one for MDL and the other for BHEL Bhopal where turbines were made. The PSOs appreciated our proposal and approved it
Captain Mohan Ram recalls:-
"The Directorate of Leander Project in 1969/1970 was very exciting. I had excellent colleagues. On the electrical side there were Commanders Baxi and Ganesh, on the engineering side there was Commander Bose. We did the very first composite layouts of compartments like the galley, the electronic warfare office, the electronic warfare equipment room etc. We did the complete air conditioning of the NILGIRI.
"I also did the collapsible hangar, which the Royal Navy did not have. We needed a hangar which could collapse like an accordion, so that when the helicopter was landing, the hangar would be closed and when the helicopter was parked, the hangar would be open. Nobody had done this in a ship of NILGIRI's size. We got a company called Dominion Aluminum Fabricating Company of Canada to do the collapsible hangar in NILGIRI.
"It was a very interesting time because we were learning on the job. And stupid mistakes used to happen also. I went to Mazagon Docks for an inspection of the helicopter landing deck. The Alouette is a three wheel helicopter, the front wheel is in the middle. The helicopter guide platforms were welded as per the original British design for the British Westland Wasp, which was a four wheel helicopter. When I went and asked the Naval Air Staff. "Why didn't you tell us earlier"? I got no reply. To rectify that mistake, we had to change the whole insulation and the wiring. We did a lot of foolish things. But we were learning all the time.
"In those four of five years, Mazagon Docks and the Navy learnt so much. I think the future of the Navy was laid in the Frigate Project. For the first time we were getting into the nitty gritty of building warships and this really culminated when the Navy put the big Seaking helicopter in TARAGIRI with a bigger extendable hangar. It was something quite phenomenal, something to be proud of".
THE FIRST FRIGATE - INS NILGIRI
INS NILGIRI's keel was formally laid on 15 October 1966. Inspite of all the problems, MDL bravely invited the Prime Minister to launch the NILGIRI on 23 October 1968-barely two months after the Kasara Basin was expected to be impounded.
Then MDL encountered a problem of another kind - Labour.
Admiral Samson recalls:-
"The Management had been having discussions with the Trade Union Committee on the terms and conditions for the next three years. The Union made major demands and the Management too had made their own offer. There was very hard bargaining and progress was being made.
"Then suddenly, just 15 days before NILGIRI's launching, the Union gave a statutory two weeks notice to go on strike on the grounds that the Management was being totally non-cooperative in respect of their demands. In effect, on 22 October all workmen would proceed on strike.
"The launching of a major vessel is a very delicate affair, the preparation for which commences several days in advance step by step, but the 24 hours before the actual moment of launching are the most tricky. A couple of hundred men had been trained individually and collectively for their specific tasks on the slipway. Each task had to be carried out at the exact moment and correctly; any mistake could spell disaster. The strike notice had virtually put a pistol to our heads, knowing full well that the launch might have to be cancelled without the help of trained personnel, who could not be replaced overnight.
"I then asked the MDL Managers whether they could launch the vessel without the workmen. At first they were most unhappy to take such a major risk. Mr. Homi Sethna, Commander Thukral and Mr. Victor Franklin finally agreed that they would have a try, after I told them that I would bring in as many men as possible from the Navy, who could be trained during the two weeks remaining prior to the launching.
"I then recalled the Union Committee and informed them that I would give them one more opportunity to reconsider their decision. They stated that they were not prepared to withdraw their notice. Thereupon I informed them that on the day when the ship was being launched, not one single worker from Mazagon Dock was to be anywhere near the Yard to create any problems. This launching involved the defence of the country and nothing and no one would be permitted to compromise it. I added that any agreements/concessions made so far in respect of their demands stood automatically cancelled.
"A short while later I was asked to rejoin them, when they informed me that for the sake of the country they had decided to withdraw their strike notice. It had been a calculated risk but it worked, and in the event, the launching went off very successfully".
On 23 October 1968 Mrs Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India, applied kum-kum on the frigate's stem and launched the NILGIRI.
After a ship reaches an advanced stage of fitting-out, the equipment is tried and tested in `Basin Trials'. Each and every system in the ship is thoroughly tested to the satisfaction of the Navy's Warship Overseeing Team and any adjustments required are undertaken.
After that the ship is put to sea for 'Builder's Sea Trials', also known as 'Contractor's Sea Trials'. On completion of each trial, specific items of machinery are `opened up' for inspection, defects put right and again tried at sea. This process goes on until everything is satisfactory, after which the machinery is finally `boxed up'.
The Final Acceptance Trials extend over a nine month period. Tests are designed to withstand severe conditions, more rigorous than what the ship would normally experience at sea. After successful Acceptance Trials, the ship is handed over to the Navy.
Admiral Samson recalls:-
"The Navy was as pleasantly surprised as we were at the timely completion of NILGIRI's Contractor's Sea Trials (CSTs). It resulted in great relief and joy all round. An interesting feature was that the ship's company, which had been standing by the ship, operated the vessel during the CSTs but being responsible to Mazagon Dock and not to NHQ. The ship remained with Mazagon Dock till 2 June, 1972".
The time taken from keel laying to launching of the first frigate came to two years, but for the fitting-out of the ship, the basin trials, the sea trials and up to the commissioning, the period extended to another 3 years and 8 months. In warship building, the fitting out is always time consuming. Nevertheless, a total 5 1/2 years from keel-lying to delivery was long, because of the teething problems.
INS NILGIRI was commissioned on 3 June 1972 by Mrs Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India. There were 35 Leanders afloat in other Navies at the time. NILGIRI was the 36th Leander. Apart from the British Navy, the Dutch, Australian and New Zealand Navies also had Leander design frigates.
CHANGES IN SENSORS AND WEAPONS TO IMPROVE CAPABILITY
In the first instance, the Government had ordered only one frigate to be constructed. There was delay in placing the order for the second and third frigates because India was going through a foreign exchange crisis. The special credit of 4.7 million pounds could not be stretched to include the foreign exchange requirements beyond the first frigate. The rupee was devalued in June 1966 and the Government had to resort to annual plans from 1966 to 1969. Eventually in early 1968, Government placed an order on MDL to build two more frigates. This was six months later than the original plan for commencement of the second Leander, which eventually began in May 1968.
Receiving orders piece-meal was one of the handicaps that MDL had to accept. The advantage of MDL ordering economic quantities on its suppliers had to be sacrificed. The Dutch who built the Leanders in their yards at Amsterdam and Flushing, constructed six ships of the series almost simultaneously, all of which were commissioned between March 1967 and May 1968.
Naval Headquarters took advantage of the delay in NILGIRI to improve the sensors and the AIO for the subsequent Leanders.
There were several schools of thought at that time about the desirability of changing equipment from ship to ship. MDL felt that by avoiding changes, ships could be delivered quicker and cheaper. NHQ felt that if we continued to build a series of ships with obsolescent sensors, weapons and equipment, they would not meet the staff requirement. And from the view point of indigenisation, it was not cost effective to indigenise obsolescent technology.
Commodore Acharya recalls:-
"We in MDL fought quite a battle with Naval Headquarters, requesting them to place orders for at least three identical Leanders at a time. But they were already under pressure, perhaps from the Staff Branch, to change over radars and fire control systems. The second frigate in fact was already being contemplated with different weapon control equipment. This was not an easy task of integration. We were still learning how to build the first frigate, correcting mistakes and filling in gaps in information. Hopefully we would have learnt on the first frigate, improved the way of working for the second frigate and really become efficient in the modern way of warship construction, by the time we finished the third frigate. That was a better way of going about it rather than a scramble for so called improvements in fire power or capability.
"I remember mentioning this to then Chief of Material, Admiral Kulkarni, "Is it not better that we have three ships or six ships of the same identical design? This would not only mean that we could build them faster, cheaper and more efficiently, but also be more cost effective for operating and maintaining these ships. We would have identity of spares and operating experience". But NHQ's imperatives in those days were different from what we in MDL thought. Certainly as a ship builder, we would have preferred if not six, at least three of them as identical ships. I also remember saying that in case the balloon goes up, is it not better for the Navy to be able to put out six ships rather than have one ship, no matter how highly sophisticated and full of fire power it might be, because it is numbers that matter. The Leanders were by no means obsolete. I remember Admiral Nanda saying "What will I tell my young officers when they ask me why are we building these obsolete Leanders?"
Captain Prabhala recalls:-
The British fire control systems in NILGIRI were MRS 3 for the 4.5 inch guns and MRS 8 with CRBFD for the 40/60 guns. The search and navigation radars were 993 and 978. Vickers were willing to transfer the technology for the 4.5" and MRS 3. Around that time, we found that the company SIGNAAL in Holland, which supplied the fire control equipment and the radars for the Dutch Navy's Leanders, had superior equipment, superior in the sense they were already using digital electronics as opposed to the analogue electronics of the British systems. The Navy therefore, felt that if we go in for the indigenous manufacture of the analogue MRS 3 and MRS 8, we will be stuck with them for the next several years. Why should we make outdated analogue systems when digital electronics were already coming into vogue? If we were going to make anything indigenously, we should start with something technologically more up to date than the obsolescent analogue British systems then available.
"Then we found that if we were to fit the Signaal equipment, the ship would require some modifications in the hull and in the structure, related only to these equipments and not to a wholesale change of design. Therefore, we needed somebody to supply us the modified shipbuilding drawings to enable us to fit the Dutch Signaal radars and fire control in a broad beam Leander and for that we tied up with NEVESBU, the Dutch Warship Design Bureau. The Dutch fire control and radar equipment were then licensed for manufacture to Bharat Electronics, which was the only Indian company at that time which had some experience of manufacturing radars and electronic equipment for the Defence Services".
INTERACTION WITH THE NETHERLAND WARSHIP DESIGN BUREAU (NEVESBU)
Two officers were sent to NEVESBU. Commander (L) (later Rear Admiral) JJ Baxi was one of them. He recalls:-
"We were there for 18 months. Cdr (later Rear Admiral) Ranjit Whig of the Constructor Branch was my colleague. The most important thing we learnt was that once the Dutch gave us a commitment on transfer of technology, they did not withhold any single little bit of information from us. Secondly, they taught us new methods of doing a layout drawing, the systems drawing, the preliminary planning data and final planning data, what is called spatial working drawing and installation working drawings. What was most emphasised was that when a ship is built in Holland, even the final bill of material is computerised so that the shipyard is given all the ordering material from the Design Bureau. In our case, unfortunately, because we started with the British tradition of the DG Ships at Bath, we have never been able to implement this. In our case, only the preliminary and the concept design are being done in Naval Headquarters and the final working drawings are prepared by the shipyard. Not only does this lead to lack of standardisation but it leads to enormous infructuous work and expenditure, which could be avoided if we really had a component system of drawing.
"What the Dutch, the Japanese and the Americans are doing is that after the preliminary design, the people who design and work on the detailed drawings, installation working drawings and the special drawings are such experts that the last bit of lining, detail, fasteners, doors everything, is actually set up in that drawing phase. Nothing is left to chance or imagination. There is such a perfect system of dovetailing that even three parts of a ship built in three different shipyards, can be connected together in a single shipyard and you will be able to have a ship in one third the time. Unfortunately, in our case what we learn, we never do. I regret to say that it is a failure on our part. We have never been able to implement this in our Design Organisation. This is the most important thing which we have to mention in the history of the Leander Project".
Commodore Kulin Lohana (later Director General of Naval Design) recalls:-
"The Navy sent its team to the Netherlands Design Bureau, Nevesbu, to be involved with the design changes. They came back and helped Mazagon Docks to modify the workshop drawings. In fact a large number of them were already modified by the Navy's Design Cell with the help of our people. I think that reduced the fear of the MDL to some extent and also made the task of change over that much easier. Also, this exercise was the first step in building up the confidence in MDL to not just take the drawings received from the UK and implement them, but to generate new sets of drawings as the workshop drawings, based on a conceptual detailed design given by somebody else. We saw its ultimate application in the construction of the Project 16, GODAVARI class frigates, where the NHQ's Directorate General of Naval Design produced the detailed design and the MDL translated them into working drawings, consistent with the specifications".
Eventually, HIMGIRI and the subsequent Leanders were fitted with the following Signaal equipment:
- The VM 45 fire control system for the 4.5" gun.
- Two VM 44 fire control systems for two sided Seacat anti aircraft guided missile launchers.
- Long range Air Warning Radar LW 04, Surface Warning Radar DA 05 and Navigation Radar ZW 06.
- DS 22 Display Systems in the Operations Room. This system was still under development by Signaal and the Indian Navy was the first customer for it.
Similarly the British Sonar 184 was replaced by the later Sonar 184 M.
THE SECOND FRIGATE - INS HIMGIRI
HIMGIRI's keel was laid on 4 November 1968. She was launched on 6 May 1970. MDL had been able to reduce the time between keel laying and launch from 25 months to 18 months. The fitting-out however was considerably delayed due to the late arrival of major items, both from abroad and India.
The machinery installation was completed in December 1973, Basin Trials were successfully completed in January 1974 and the Contractor's Sea Trials commenced on 6 April 1974. At the preliminary full power trials, the temperature of the gear box bearings was found to be rising above acceptable limits. The gear box was the first to have been made in India to the Swiss MAAG design. After detailed examination, Naval Headquarters, in consultation with Swiss designers, decided to modify the bearings and check the alignment of the turbines. The Repeat Contractor's Sea Trials in September 1974 were successful, and HIMGIRI commissioned on 23 November 1974.
On the plus side, HIMGIRI got better radars, sonars, AIO and fire control equipment and two Seacat guided missile launchers. Design changes were also made in the communication systems and the layout of mess decks to improve habitability in tropical conditions.
Captain Prabhala recalls:-
"As to whether this bold decision that was taken was right, now with hindsight one can say 'Yes it was right". But I myself, being a shipbuilder in those days, was of the strong view that the primary task should be to learn how to build ships fast, quick and at the lowest cost. And I was advocating the view that if the equipment fit changes with every ship, some design changes would be involved, some proving of the new systems would be involved, which would only delay the construction programme. It would also add to the maintenance problems. Therefore, at least for a range of three ships, let us freeze the equipment package before we think of changing the equipment.
"If the indigenisation programme and the improvements which were taking place, either in the Royal Navy or in the Dutch Navy, were to be incorporated in the ship building programme, it was a balance of advantage which somebody had to decide. I think with hindsight, we can now say that it was a right decision. It enabled us to understand that if you want to take out a piece of equipment and put another piece of equipment in its place, what are all the changes from the electrical side, from the hull side, from the ship side that we had to take care of. Therefore certain capabilities were built up in the design departments, with the result that later on, when we wanted to replace the 4.5 inch gun with a missile, or take out some electronic warfare equipment and put in some Italian equipment, we were able to take it in our stride.
"In other words, if we had not made the changes, we could certainly have built the ships faster. But the simultaneous learning curve in different aspects of ship design and ship construction then would have taken longer. Between the two, I think the advantage lay, as I said with hindsight, in the course we had taken
THE THIRD FRIGATE - INS UDAYGIRI
Since orders for the second and third frigates had been received together, MDL seized the opportunity to build them faster than the first frigate. The fabrication work on the third frigate, scheduled to commence in January 1970, started in April 1970 due to late receipt of steel from Hindustan Steel Ltd.
In 1969-70 there had been an acute shortage of steel. MDL had been able to carry on production without serious dislocation as its earlier orders for steel had materialised. By 1970-71 however, the fall in steel production adversely affected MDL's work. The interval between keel laying and launching increased to 25 months. The main machinery which should have arrived at the time of the ship's launching in October 1972, was actually received in May 1974, thereby further delaying the ships commissioning till 18 February 1976.
THE FOURTH FRIGATE - INS DUNAGIRI
The fourth Leander was launched on 9 March 1974. She was on the slipway for only 14 months as compared to 18 to 25 months for the second and third frigates respectively. Fitting out was affected by delays in receipt of indigenous as well as imported equipment. The main engines and gear boxes were received in May 1975. Basin trials were carried out in October 1976 and sea trials completed satisfactorily in November/December, 1976. The final inspection of hull, weapons, radio compartments and systems was completed in early 1977. DUNAGIRI commissioned on 5 May 1977.
The time between keel laying and launching had been reduced to 14 months. The time from launching to delivery had been reduced to 38 months - the shortest period yet achieved. Nevertheless, the total of 58 months from start of production was still too long by world standards. On the other hand, the range of equipment being indigenously produced for the first time by Indian industry was impressive: main boilers, main turbines, main gearing, main circulators, turbines for turbo alternators, diesel alternators, stern tube bushes, heat exchangers, radar and fire control equipment, data processing computers, air conditioning and refrigeration machinery, broadcast equipment, telephone and teleprinter equipment, main and auxiliary switch boards, complex system valves, fire detection sensors and a host of other minor equipment. By the time the fourth Leander had been built, considerable confidence had built up at all levels.
IMPROVEMENTS OF ANTI SUBMARINE
CAPABILITY IN THE FIFTH AND SIXTH LEANDERS
In 1972 and 1973, as operating experience was gained with the NILGIRI and the Seaking anti submarine, dunking sonar helicopters, and in view of the continuing acquisition by Pakistan of modern submarines from France, it became clear that future Leanders would require greater anti submarine capability.
Naval Headquarters initiated studies in early 1973 to improve the anti submarine capability of the 5th and 6th Leanders. These changes crystallised in mid 1973. The major changes envisaged embarking the heavy Seaking helicopter and improving the anti submarine sonars and weapons.
Seaking Helicopter
In 1966, the Canadian Navy had pioneered the operation of a Seaking helicopter from the deck of a frigate. This entailed designing a Bear Trap Haul-down and Traversing system for moving the heavy helicopter on the small flight deck, providing a large hangar and strengthening the flight deck to bear the weight of a heavy helicopter. All these changes would affect the ships overall design, stability and seakeeping qualities.
To meet the conflicting requirement of a large hangar and a long clear flight deck, the hangar would have to be telescopic. Extra flight deck space aft could only be made available by removing the anti submarine Mortar and the Variable Depth Sonar wells.
Anti Submarine Sonars and Weapons.
The changes envisaged in the ships sonars and anti submarine weapons were:-
(a) The British Mortar MK 10 anti submarine weapon fitted aft would be replaced by the Swedish Bofors SR 375 Twin Rocket Launcher with its integral magazine and hoist, all fitted forward in the bows.
(b) Two sided twin Torpedo Tube Launchers would be fitted to fire the latest Italian A-244 homing torpedoes being acquired as successors to the obsolescent British Mk 44 torpedoes.
(c) British Graseby's 184 SS (solid state) search sonar would be fitted in lieu of the earlier valve version Sonar 184 M in the preceding three Leanders.
(d) French Thomson-CSF solid state search and attack sonar Diodon would be fitted in lieu of the earlier valve version attack Sonar 170 M in the first four Leanders.
(e) British Graseby's Sonar GI 738 Under Water Telephone would be fitted in lieu of the earlier Sonar 182.
(f) India's Electronic Commission would produce the ASW fire control computer to control the new SR 375 Rocket Launcher and the deck launched A 244 torpedoes.
(g) The latest available Italian electronic warfare equipment would be fitted.
All the above design modifications and changes were discussed with individual equipment suppliers in Canada, Sweden, Britain and Italy in 1974. By 1975, all the changes had been finalised.
Changes in Design
Rear Admiral Baxi recalls:
"When I came back to NHQ in 1973, NHQ had decided that the design of the fifth frigate will be given to DGND and not to DLP. As DDLP, I realised that we really did not have much to do, because if the design was being done by DGND, what was going to be DLP's role? In those days, DGND had come up with a design for a new weapon package.
"In the meanwhile, I went into the technical feasibility of DGND's design to see whether a large anti submarine helicopter like a Seaking could operate from a Leander. I distinctly remember we consulted some Admiralty Fleet Orders and then invited the DGND, who had earlier given an opinion that this was not feasible, to discussions with DLP. When I went into it, it was on a limited presumption that the Mortar Mark 10 was required and that it could never be removed. Then we came up with the idea that if the mortar well was covered up, the overhead space would be just enough for a Seaking to operate from there. The anti submarine mortar could be replaced by another type of forward throwing rocket launcher like the Swedish SR 375. Then I worked day and night so that no one else would come to know what we were doing. Between Constructor Capt Choudhary who was in the Directorate of Leander Project and myself, we did all the initial design work, showing the new flight deck, showing the new helicopter and showing the new weapon package which was involved. This was the most creative time of my life as a designer.
"We actually came up with a new design concept. We gave a presentation to the Chief of the Naval Staff and he accepted our design. Dr Roy Choudhary was the SA to RM and he also accepted that our design will work. Even Mr Parmanandan, who had by then become the DGND, was gracious enough to accept that operating a Seaking helicopter from a frigate was feasible. Finally the design was accepted. That is how we in DLP came back into the design of TARAGIRI. Thereafter this led to a very healthy competition between DGND and DLP. Cdr (later Captain) Mohan Ram and Lt Cdr (later Captain) Subaya, who were the two best young naval constructors which the Navy had, joined DGND. They said "If an electrical officer like Baxi can design a frigate with one Seaking helicopter, why can't we come up with a larger and better hull which can fly two Seaking helicopters?
"By that time the Directorate of Combat Policy and Tactics had suggested that Soviet weapon systems be integrated into the next design. Not only were they cheaper and more cost effective but it would enable standardisation of missile inventory. I distinctly remember that I was opposed to that idea, thinking that we will not be able to carry out the interfaces. But ultimately, history and posterity had proved that this was the right decision and we became the first Navy in the world to succeed in designing a hybrid ship, the GODAVARI of Project 16, having a mix of Soviet and Western sensors and weapon systems".
THE FIFTH FRIGATE - INS TARAGIRI
These design changes delayed the commencement of construction, which should have started immediately after the launching of the fourth frigate. Production could commence only in April 1975. The keel was laid six months later and the ship was launched on 25 October 1976. Thereafter there was a major setback in fitting-out because of a delay of one year in receipt of the main engines. This created its own chain of delays. Contractor's Sea Trials commenced in April 1979. During trials, internal vibrations were observed in the main turbines. After the defects were rectified, repeat sea trials were satisfactorily completed in December 1979, and TARAGIRI was commissioned on 16 May 1980. Whilst the time from keel laying to launch had been only 12 months, the least period so far, the time taken from launching to commissioning was 43 months, much more than the time taken for any of its predecessors.
THE SIXTH FRIGATE - INS VINDHYAGIRI
VINDHYAGIRI was identical with TARAGIRI. Construction commenced on 5 July 1976. Her keel was laid on 5 November 1976, and she was launched on 12 November 1977 after a period of 12 months, the same time as was taken for the TARAGIRI. She commissioned on 8 July 1981, having taken 44 months from launch to delivery.
THE INDIGENISATION OF LEANDER CLASS FRIGATES
In 1955, the Directorate of Stores Production (Navy) had been set up under Naval Headquarters. In December 1956, it was transferred to the Ministry of Defence under the Controller General of Defence Production as part of the Director General Inspection. Its designation was changed to Directorate of Development and Inspection (Marine Stores), DDI(MS). By 1965, it had been able to:-
(a) Develop new items (including modifications to commercially available items).
(b) Establish and purchase indigenous items thereby saving foreign exchange.
The major handicaps that had been encountered were:-
(a) The reluctance of the private sector to manufacture for the Navy the small quantities of stores which had no general market in the country.
(b) The failure of the trade to keep up the supply of stores according to agreed specifications. Though the samples and the first one or two supplies were satisfactory, subsequent supplies were of inferior quality and failed to conform to original specifications.
(c) The procedure by which DGS&D had perforce to obtain supplies from the most economical source, sometimes at the expense of quality.
By the time the Leander Project got under way in the mid 1960's, the field work of the preceding ten years proved to be invaluable for the indigenisation of Leander equipment.
Commodore (E) SC Bose recalls:-
"Systematic indigenisation of naval stores and material started in 1956 when a department was created by Captain (later Rear Admiral) Daya Shanker who was the Controller General Defence Production (CGDP). A new directorate in Naval Headquarters started functioning with Capt (later Rear Admiral) CL Bhandari as the Director and Commander (later Commodore) BC Chatterji, as Deputy Director and other Staff Officers. There were two inspectorates. The one in Calcutta was manned by then Lt (later Commodore) KC Chatterji. The one in Bombay was manned by me. We had two tasks. One was to locate sources for the indigenisation of stores items. The other was to scrutinise the Naval Stores specifications and select the item susceptible for indigenisation. So this was a new outlook, a new philosophy in 1956. Later on, the Inspection Organisation under Director General of Inspection (DGI) grew, particularly with the Leander project which was our basic requirement. There were two branches. The Directorate of Warship Projects (DWP) looked after the engineering items. The Directorate of Production and Inspection, DPI (Navy), looked after the common user Naval Store items, Electrical and Electronic items and machinery spares".
As part of the Leander Frigate Project, a Study Group on Indigenisation was set up in Delhi to function in close consultation with MDL for locating capacity for indigenous manufacture. In 1966, Commander (later Admiral) JG Nadkarni, was appointed as Officer on Special Duty in the Department of Defence Production.
Admiral Nadkarni recalls :-
"The agreement was for:-
(a) The transfer of the Leander design by the MOD UK (because they were holders of the Leander design).
(b) All the Lead Yard services and other technical help by VICKERS and YARROW and
(c) Overseeing by the British Ministry of Defence (Navy).
"The agreement stipulated that at least for the first ship, we were obliged to buy a number of equipments from Vickers, including the 4.5" gun turret, the boilers, the main turbines and certain other equipment. It was obligated that we buy at least for the first ship and, if we require, we could buy these for the second and third ships also, but it was obligatory only for the first ship. This was the general agreement. All this of course had happened before I joined the Ministry in 1966.
"After I joined, for the next two and half years I was intimately connected not just with the Leander Project, but with the entire management of Mazagon Docks and the Garden Reach Workshops to start off with, and later on with the revival of the Goa Shipyard which took place in 1967.
"In India we had two very important offices. Along with building warships in India, we had also envisaged manufacturing a large amount of equipment which went into the Leander. That was the main idea behind the whole project, that it should be indigenised. For this we had the office of Commodore Paradkar, Director Warship Project (DWP) under the Ministry of Defence, whose main objective was to try and bring to fruition the trials of indigenous equipment and be the conduit or the prime mover for bringing about collaboration in India between the foreign manufacturer and the Indian manufacturer.
"That period, 1966 to 1968, under the very able and dynamic leadership of Mr HC Sarin was one of the most productive periods as far as indigenisation of Leander equipment in India was concerned. In just two years, we brought about a large number of agreements which have benefited the Indian Navy subsequently.
"For example an agreement for the manufacture of boilers was brought about between the ACC Vickers Babcock and the Naval Dockyard Bombay. To this date, the Naval Dockyard manufactures boilers for the frigates.
"An agreement for the manufacture of main turbines was brought about between English Electric Company and BHEL. Mr Sarin incidentally was extremely dynamic and pragmatic about all these things. If a particular manufacturer refused to collaborate or refused to come to India, he had no hesitation in going to somebody else.
"For example the main switch boards of the Leanders in UK were manufactured by Cromptons, who refused to collaborate or come to India. There was another manufacturer called Whip and Bourne who also had manufactured switch boards for other ships of the Royal Navy. We invited them and they had no hesitation in coming to India. An agreement was brought about between Whip and Bourne and AEI of India and switch boards have been manufactured here since then.
"Similarly for air conditioning we went to Carrier Air Conditioning who brought about an agreement between themselves and Voltas.
"The main gearing for example was David Brown's. David Brown refused to come to India for the main gearing, so we went in search of somebody else. We found a very famous company MAAG of Switzerland who had no hesitation, not only to come to India and collaborate, but also in designing a totally different main gearing for the Leanders. So to this day we have only NILGIRI with the David Brown main gearing. The frigates from HIMGIRI onwards have the MAAG design main gearing for the main turbines.
"The final culmination of this process was the landmark agreement between the Signal Apparaten of Holland and Bharat Electricals of Bangalore for manufacturing a whole range of radar equipment as well as the AIO equipment. That was a very major step forward and I think we have benefited a great deal from that. After that, all the radars of the Leanders have been manufactured by BEL. In this way, it was really a most productive period as far as the indigenisation of Leander equipment was concerned.
"I am sorry to say that the same dynamism and the same innovation somehow was not shown after Mr Sarin left. Our subsequent progressive indigenisation, to my mind, has not been as impressive as it was in those two early years of the Leander project.
"In Naval Headquarters, we set up a cell initially called DDLP. He was a part of the Directorate of Naval Construction. He was called Deputy Director (Leander Project). Subsequent to that, a completely new directorate was formed called the Directorate of Leander Project. In due course that became Directorate of Warship Projects. But initially it was headed by only a Commander. Subsequently a full fledged Director looked after the Naval Headquarters part of the Leander Project.
"The Naval Headquarters part basically consisted of approving various indigenisation substitutes or playing a part in the indigenisation process. Of course, the whole thing was like a team. Naval Headquarters, being the users, were part of the team.
"Another organisation which was setup was the Warship Overseeing Team. As the warship was being built, we had overseers making sure that it was being built to the correct specification and certifying the various parts of the ship being built.
"The Government also had formed a Steering Committee for the Indigenisation of the Frigate Project, with the Chief of the Naval Staff as the Chairman, with representatives from the Department of Defence Production, Naval Headquarters and MDL. Various manufacturers were invited to come and explain and suggest measures to overcome their difficulties. They were encouraged to freely interact in the common endeavor to indigenise warship building to the maximum extent possible".
Admiral Samson recalls:-
"Today looking back, it is quite extraordinary the degree to which indigenisation was achieved. For instance, we are now accepting, without demur, the Main Gearing being manufactured by Walchandnagar in collaboration with MAAG of Switzerland. And yet in 1966, when this was first suggested, there was horror. The very idea of a highly sophisticated piece of equipment like the main gearing being manufactured, way out in the middle of nowhere, some 60 to 70 miles outside Poona, in what was originally a sugar factory in a little village, was unbelievable to most. And yet it did succeed.
"Another item which was the subject of much controversy was the air conditioning of the ship which was necessary primarily for the electronic equipment and computers. Voltas offered to do this and the Admiralty were aghast that we should install air conditioning manufactured locally. There was much skepticism in all quarters but we prevailed and we succeeded, even though we had teething problems.
"Fibreglass for lining the ship internally came from Fibreglass Pilkington in Bombay - what problems we had to ensure that we got the right kind of fibreglass suitable for Indian sea-air conditions but we eventually succeeded.
"60 Cycle Generators came from Jyoti in Ahmedabad, the turbines from BHEL, the main boilers from Naval Dockyard and later the fire control and surveillance radars from BEL in Bangalore.
"There were enormous problem, aggravated to some extent by doubts and lack of confidence, but we won through. What is important is that it created the kind of confidence and experience, both in the Service and specially in Indian Industry who, having succeeded in producing equipment of such high specifications for the Navy, were emboldened to go in for higher technology.
Captain Prabhala recalls:-
So far as the indigenisation programme is concerned, it came about even when I was in the UK with Vickers for training. In the last six months of our training, it was realised that we would need a full fledged team in the UK for equipment procurement, for liaison with the Admiralty for the supply of drawings, for liaison with the shipyards for the supply of working drawings and all that. Therefore an office called CONIFPO (Controller Indian Frigate Project) was established, with Cmde Kapadia as the head of the CONIFPO. We were already in touch with all the major equipment manufacturers, whether it was David Brown for the gearing, or Yarrows for the boilers, or English Electric for the turbines, or Vickers for the MRS3 fire control system and so on, with the idea that we should simultaneously seek transfer of technology for the indigenous manufacture of the equipment, while the construction of the frigate goes on in Mazagon Docks.
"In these technology transfers for the equipment, the role of the Admiralty was limited. It was only to the extent that they would express no objection to it, meaning that if we wanted to make the gearing and let us say the gearing was the design of David Brown, David Brown naturally would not be able to transfer the technology unless the Admiralty gave the OK to it. So to that extent, we got the no objection certificate from Admiralty and we got the Admiralty to inform all the major manufacturers that we were interested in local manufacture in India with the help of these companies.
"The success of the indigenisation effort in building the Leanders and the machinery that came into existence with it, the organisation of DWP initially and the organisation of the DPI Navy later gave us the confidence that we can go ahead more boldly with procurement of equipment from indigenous resources. For instance, the communication equipment, ICS 3, for the Leanders was imported from the UK but we were able to get Bharat Electronics to develop it - whether it was the UHF transreceiver or the CCS equipment and the Versatile Console System - to a degree which the other two services did not indigenise. The naval constructors also rose to the occasion and came out with improved designs of the Leanders like the TARAGIRI and the Project 16, GODAVARI class frigates.
"This commitment to indigenisation, the willingness to experiment and the willingness to suffer the consequences by way of delays, by way of equipment still undergoing trials, even though the ship is complete is a tremendous plus point with the Navy. Of all the three services, the Navy had this risk taking ability, it had the internal organisational mechanisms to initiate major indigenous programs, and it had the ability to coax, persuade and control the indigenous manufacturers to also rise to the occasion. It was a tremendous experience.
"There was only one occasion when, to my mind, the Navy erred. That was in their impatience to go in for more and more indigenisation and feeling that Bharat Electronics was not responding fast enough, the Department of Electronics came forward and said that they could develop the Computer Aided Action Information System (CAAIS). The Navy, without realising that an equipment or a system for shipboard use is not something that can come out of a Government office or a laboratory, placed too much faith in that Department. It took some time for the Navy to extricate itself from that.
Commodore Acharya recalls:-
When I was in Mazagon Dock and Capt Paradkar was DWP, the main problem in indigenisation was the reluctance by NHQ to accept any change in design i.e. of a readily available Indian equipment as against the British equipment as fitted in British Leanders. This reluctance stemmed from the fact that the Naval Design Group was not strong enough. It had not really taken root at that time. There was a fear that the difference in design might have unseen or unknown consequences in performance. A typical example was that of 50 or 60 cycle AC working. For quite some time, people were not sure what would happen if we simply bought a 50 cycle commercial motor and attached it to a pump and made it run on 60 cycles AC. To this day I do not know what the answer is. Some electrical people said it will run too fast. Some people said it will run too slow. Some people said it will over-heat. The point I am trying to make is that at that point in time, the DGND did not exist. To some extent, one could understand the fear or reluctance of the Navy to boldly accept a commercial design or the available design.
"By the time I was appointed DWP, the Directorate had handed over the electrical part of indigenisation to DPI(N) and kept for itself the engineering and hull items. I knew how hard Commodore Paradkar had worked for DWP. This had been his baby. During his time, he had one or two excellent deputies, among them the late Cdr Dilip Bhandari who, as we were doing in Mazagon Docks, had the enthusiasm and willingness to take risks. They had initiated a number of major projects for indigenisation starting off mainly with the major items ranging from main turbines, main gearing, auxiliary turbines, air conditioning machinery to underwater valves. All these were already well established. During my tenure as DWP, I had no occasion to improve upon these because by that time the indigenisation emphasis was shifting towards indigenisation of radars and weapon systems.
"As regards the design changes in the equipment fit for the later Leanders, we were also talking about gas turbine propulsion at that time, so whatever was already set in motion had just to be continued. We therefore devoted more attention to the inspection at manufacturer's works rather than initiating any fresh indigenisation processes.
"In my own tenure as DWP, whilst nothing new was initiated by me, there was no major change in the attitudes between NHQ and DWP. NHQ would gladly approve an indigenous design proposed by DWP, provided somehow DWP could confirm and prove to NHQ that the indigenous design was totally capable. Short of having a trial ship solely at DWP's disposal and with enough time available for installing it, trying it out for one year and surviving underwater explosion or whatever, there was no other way of really satisfying the Navy. On the other hand, Mazagon Docks was forever pleading to have the items cleared by the due date. We found that some of the lead times indicated by Mazagon Docks were too inflated. This tussle continued for a long time. I remember making perhaps an unfair allegation that "Only DWP seems to be interested in indigenising. Neither Naval Headquarters nor Mazagon Dock would like it. They would rather have a free hand to import everything". In retrospect, this was not a very fair statement because each side had its own limitations".
Captain Lohana recalls:-
"There was an agreement with the MOD Navy UK for supplying drawings and specifications of the equipment, as well as details of the pattern number stores. These became the basis for DWP and DPI (Navy) to interact with Indian industry to motivate them to develop these products and guide them in the development in terms of inputs and drawings. A large number of these were either evolved to replace the existing ones or indigenised by way of reverse engineering.
"Here, I would draw a distinction between indigenisation and indigenous substitution. Indigenisation is when an identical product is developed to replace the existing imported item, whereas indigenous substitution occurs when a piece of equipment performs the same function to the same or higher performance criteria as the substituted equipment without being identical in appearance to the earlier one.
"These two directorates, DWP and DPI(N), who had slowly set up their outfits all over India to interact with industry to develop items as well as to inspect them and test them before acceptance, were highly motivated by the personal umbrella of Mr MM Sen the then Secretary Defence Production. Unfortunately, as things normally go in life, over the years these became kind of routine jobs and the basic motivation was lost.
Commodore S.C. Bose recalls:-
We had the Department of Defence Production, Ministry of Defence, working hand in hand with Naval Headquarters and Mazagon Docks Ltd towards indigenisation. In retrospect, I would say this was the best and most systematic indigenisation effort the Navy ever had. And taking the totality into account, it was possibly the best in the country at that time.
"While the main engines of the first ship were imported, the second ship's set of main engines were made by BHEL in Bhopal, using the same English Electric drawings made in FPS System by converting the measurements to the Metric System, which had been adopted in India and in which Bhopal's machines were set. We also developed an indigenous version of Allen's steam auxiliaries with Jyoti of Baroda and BHEL Bhopal. A steam test rig was set up in Bhopal, financed by the Navy, to give these machine a test run under steam before accepting the machinery for installation on board.
"A special weldable steel, known as Ship Building Quality Steel or Lloyd's grade A/B is used in shipbuilding. These steels were not manufactured in India till then. We had the blessings of the Ministry of Steel to undertake the project at Rourkela Steel Plant and they did a fairly successful job, though it did not meet the specification to 100%. This steel was considered acceptable under deviation and used in constructing the second Leander. Subsequently, of course, it was found that imported steel was of quicker delivery and cheaper, and was used. Having established an indigenous source of manufacture of shipbuilding quality steel, we could always revert to it whenever necessary.
"The boilers of the first Leander were erected in the Naval Dockyard Bombay. A new boiler shop was created and the boilers, with drums, tubes, mountings etc from Babcock and Wilcox of Renfrew were erected. Being very heavy and bulky, these boilers were put on trailers in the Naval Dockyard Bombay and shifted to Mazagon Dock for installation on board.
"The development of the main shafting was attempted at the Heavy Engineering Corporation (HEC) Ranchi. But HEC was experiencing serious administrative problems. As such the project did not finally succeed. They met the specifications in 50% of the items. They could have had 100% success had they carefully followed our instructions of cropping the ends of the forgings before rolling the shafts. In order to achieve good quality forgings for turbine rotors for the Navy and for Power Houses, HEC initiated action for procurement and installation of a Vacuum Degassing Plant and a 6000 ton press. Unfortunately on installation these valuable plants were lying idle due to lack of initiative, and rotor forgings were being imported by BHEL and other turbine manufacturers.
"The main gear cases, a very critical piece of machinery, were also indigenised. In the first Leander, we used imported David Brown gearing but for the second Leander we went in for ones to be produced at Walchand Nagar near Pune, under collaboration with MAAG Gearwheel Co of Zurich. (Note: Since 1966, Swiss MAAG gearing had already been fitted and was working satisfactorily in Canadian Navy frigates which were similar to the Leanders). Here again we faced many problems in conversion of CGS into FPS systems, as the terminals had to be in the FPS system to match with the turbines and shafting while the internals imported from MAAG were in CGS system. I must say that the Directorate of Leander Project(DLP), Directorate of Marine Engineering(DME) and the Directorate of Warship Projects(DWP) under the Ministry of Defence Production burnt midnight candles in Walchand Nagar in checking every dimension and the manufacturing tolerances, meeting both FPS and CGS system of the terminal components. It was a success in one shot.
"We had set up a Test Rig using a redundant cruising turbine of a Khukri class frigate for back to back test under actual steam and give both the gear wheels overspeed and overload runs of the kind it would experience in a ship for maximum exploitation. We believe that such trials were done only in Canada and in Switzerland. There were continuous trials for 72 hours. The trials runs went on as scheduled except for one incident when one set of bearings failed. We immediately knew what it was due to. The representative of MAAG Gearwheel, a renowned designer, was present at the trials. We all agreed with the corrective actions and continued with the trials. I don't think such a bold step would be taken anywhere, to introduce into service a gear case which was never tried earlier. We have been very lucky that the propulsion system with a changed component gave no problem of noise or vibration in any mode.
"We developed all the gun-metal valves and fittings indigenously. Similar indigenous developments or substitutes were found for electrical fittings, items of domestic and hotel services nature etc".
REMINISCENCES OF THE LEANDER FRIGATE PROJECT
Captain Prabhala, later Chairman and Managing Director of Bharat Electronics Ltd, recalls:-
"As to overall impressions and overall conclusions from my six and half years with Mazagon Docks, I think the leadership provided by Mr HC Sarin, Secretary Defence Production, was of immense value. The team we had then in the Ministry of Defence Production, Mr Sarin, Secretary, Mr MM Sen as the Joint Secretary, Mr Vinod Pandey as Deputy Secretary was absolutely wonderful. At the start I was only a Lt Cdr, then I became a Commander. The ease of access I had with these people, the quick decisions that were taken and the freedom that one had in many things, I think, today is very difficult to obtain.
"On the question of indigenisation, the amount of freedom I had was unprecedented. Almost as a one man team, I could shoot off letters to the prospective Indian companies which were operating in similar areas of products and say that look we have this requirement, we have this British company which is willing to transfer the technology, will you two get together and come out with a proposal, whether it was the switch boards, whether it was the motors. I have already talked about the fire control and the radar. It was an exhilerating period because there was complete freedom to do the best that you could and no hurdles were thrown in your way.
"I would also like to mention the generosity of the Admiralty. In the UK, lots of small fittings are supplied to the shipbuilders by small companies. These companies are so small that they do not have the ability or the infrastructure for any technology transfer. In any case, the items are simple and they do not require any elaborate technology transfer, either for training or their personnel coming to India to help initiating manufacture. So we were able to insist upon the Admiralty that these are all Admiralty Pattern items, you would have a set of drawings as the AHSP authority and you must give us those drawings so that we in turn could give these drawings to our manufacturers and get them made. I remember that soon after we started the construction in Mazagon Docks, a combined delegation of Admiralty and ship building people came to MDL and this was the point which we strongly made. The Admiralty agreed that this was important to us and they gave us the drawings.
"Again I have to say that Mr Sarin played a very important role in this because he went to the UK with Admiral Samson. With the CONIFPOs help, there were a series of meetings in UK and Mr Sarin made the point that "Look you may think that all this means that there will be less that Mazagon Docks will buy from the UK, but please remember that for certain things like the Gyro Compass and similar critical equipment, we have no other option except to import them from you. If we are able to indigenise and therefore afford more ships, you will have more business for the bits and pieces for which we inevitably have to come to you. Therefore in the long run, you will not be a loser". He was able to make this argument so effectively that as a result we got a lot of help from the Admiralty, they backed us when we had differences with Yarrows".
Rear Admiral Baxi, also later Chairman and Managing Director of Bharat Electronics Ltd, recalls:-
There were several organic elements which contributed to the success of the Frigate Project:
(a) First and foremost, amongst the three services, the Indian Navy has shown the greatest determination to be self sufficient and self reliant. And this was by a genre of people over generations, not merely by one individual.
(b) Secondly Naval Headquarters did not renounce its technical responsibilities. We had already created a Directorate of Warship Projects (DWP) and a DPI (Navy). These two organisations, although they were under the DGI, were charged with the task of developing indigenous manufacturers. The officers who were sent to the Department of Defence Production were seagoing naval officers, who were on deputation. They were not seconded to become part of the permanent cadre of DGI.
(c) Thirdly, the Directorate of Leander Project (DLP) was created within Naval Headquarters. This ensured complete product management. The design aspects, the coordination with the Lead Yard, the approval of the drawings and all the complete technical activity regarding ship building was handled in-house within NHQ itself.
(d) Fourthly, the Directorate General of Naval Design (DGND) was created within Naval Headquarters. Prior to that, Naval Design was being handled by a Deputy Director Naval Design in charge of ship building, a part of the Directorate of Naval Construction. By creating DGND, we got an agency, manned by officers on deputation, responsible for modernisation and indigenisation, under the direct control of Naval Headquarters, which slowly started to build up complete design and project management skills in-house, within the Navy.
(e) Fifthly because the civilian Corps of Naval Constructor officers all went away to the United States and the United Kingdom, except for three civilians Mr Parmanandan, Mr Dhumal and Mr Dotiwala, from Cmde Garg's time onwards, the Navy started inducting naval constructors in uniform. So the uniformed constructors became a highly specialised cadre, capable of handling all aspects of naval architecture, ship design and ship construction.
"Similarly on the Mazagon Docks side, the Navy sent some of their best officers and best brains to go into shipbuilding. The best naval technical officers were placed at the disposal of Mazagon Docks to be able to build the first frigate.
"This total involvement of Naval Headquarters in ship design, ship construction, development, inspection and testing, whereby NHQ was itself the vendor and was also the customer, led to a pragmatic approach by NHQ whenever confronted with compromises in the design process.
"Unfortunately, in the Army and the Air Force, exactly the reverse happened. Because there was DRDO and there was DGI, most of the time they treated these two organisations as if they were the vendors and the Army Headquarters or the Air Headquarters were the customers. Because they themselves did not have any design or construction responsibility, they tended to treat the designer or Indian industry at that stage at par with their corresponding designer in the world market. In that mindset, if I get an MIG 21 from the world market, I want a MIG 21 from HAL. This was never possible and never feasible. And because there was no involvement on the part of the service, they were not able to succeed.
"Whereas in our case, first of all, progressive indigenisation was done. The goal and ambition were limited. The first ship was made totally from sub systems imported from UK. The second ship had partial indigenisation, in the sense that whatever systems were available within the country or could be developed were utilised. The remaining systems were imported. And so on.
"One of the most important things which strengthened the confidence of Naval Headquarters was the transition from the first frigate to the second frigate. This was handled with a great degree of success by Naval Headquarters. I myself was the Officer in Charge of the Indian Naval Design Team at NEVESBU, the shipyard which would redesign the ship for us. At the NHQ end, the Directorate of Leander Project (DLP) was handling this. Somehow as a historical happenstance, we had the right partner in NEVESBU, we got the right amount of engineering support, the right drawings, the right type of documentation and the right Indian naval constructors, electrical officers and engineers. All of them were transferring technology within the service. That was the most important thing which created the impact.
"Then naturally the next corollary was that we re-designed the fifth Leander, the TARAGIRI, with one Seaking helicopter. Then we went on to the seventh frigate, the GODAVARI which again was designed by naval officers, with two Seaking helicopters. The Director Combat Policy and Tactics (DCPT), was the one who actually did the concept designing and asked why can't we have two Seaking helicopters on board? Right from top level decision makers like DCPT and DNP, down to a Lieutenant in the naval architecture branch, everybody learnt to take technological and professional decisions. A complete, integral, decision making process built up within the confines of NHQ.
"This is the one and only reason why, other than the Atomic Energy Commission and the Space Organisation later on, Naval Headquarters is the only service in this country which had truly succeeded in indigenisation. If you see the ingredients of Space and Atomic Energy, it is exactly the same story as Naval Headquarters. Space and Atomic Energy had nobody to fall back upon. They were the designers, they were the ones who formulated the concepts, they were the ones who did the designs, they ultimately had to see that their rocket fired and so a large amount of in-house work had to be done in developing systems, sub systems, concepts in design. These are the three services who you can be proud of, who have done true indigenisation i.e. Naval Headquarters, ISRO, and Department of Atomic Energy. In my opinion, this is the crux of the matter.
"I have always maintained that nothing succeeds like success. The indigenisation of the propulsion system, the main machinery, the auxiliaries, the switchboards, the cables, the fire control systems, including those which were manufactured by Bharat Electronics under license from SIGNAAL, all gave NHQ a lot of confidence. This confidence, of having succeeded with a concept and the feeling that we can do it, led to the design of the TARAGIRI and the subsequent design of GODAVARI and then, of Project 25, Project 25 Alpha and Project 16 Alpha, Project 15 and the Navy has never looked back. The ingredients of why NHQ succeeded, which NHQ actually implemented, are not being replicated by many organisations in this country".
THE LEANDER FRIGATE PROJECT IN RETROSPECT
The Leander Frigate Project, which commenced with the construction of the NILGIRI on 23 October 1966, completed with the commissioning of the VINDHYAGIRI on 8 July 1981. During these fifteen years, six frigates were delivered, an average of 30 months per ship. By the time of the 6th Leander, the indigenous content of bought out equipment had risen to 70%.
From every point of view, the Leander Frigate Project was a monumental achievement. The boldness of the naval decision makers, the enthusiasm, perseverance and dedication of the implementers in MDL, in the Ministry of Defence Production and in the Navy, the assistance by the British Admiralty, by the British shipbuilding collaborators, Vickers and Yarrow, by the Dutch Design Bureau NEVESBU, all of these were essential ingredients of success. Most valuable of all was the close and informal interaction between personages as high as the Secretary Defence Production and his team in the Ministry of Defence and Defence Finance with the bright young naval officers of the Leander Project. The elders trusted the youngsters to do what they thought was best. Likewise, the astounding success of indigenisation was a direct result of the high powered Indigenisation Committee's free, frank and helpful interaction with Indian Industry through DWP and DPI(N).
The enormous self confidence gained in this project by the Navy's weapon planners, the naval architects and the shipbuilder laid the foundation for the more audaciously designed warships that later emerged from Indian shipyards.
The table below shows the gradual diversification in combat systems from the first Leander to the sixth Leander. Equally significant changes were effected in the engineering and electrical machinery of these six ships.
| NILGIRI (First Leander | HIMGIRI, UDAYGIRI DUNAGIRI 2nd, 3rd and 4th Leanders) | TARAGIRI VINDHYAGIRI(5th and 6th Leanders) | |
| Surface to Air Missile Launchers and Fire Control Fire Control | British | Dutch | Dutch |
| Gun Mounting | British | Dutch | Dutch |
| Ship Launched Anti-Submarine Torpedoes | Italian | ||
| Anti Submarine Weapon | British | British | Swedish |
| Anti Submarine Helicopter | French Alouette with British Torpedoes | Indian Alouette with British Torpedoes | British SEAKING with Italian Torpedoes |
| Close Range AA Guns | 20 MM Oerlikon (ex stock) | 20 MM Oerlikon (ex stock) | 20 MM Oerlikon (ex stock) |
| Radars | Dutch | Dutch | British |
| Sonars | British | British | British and French |
| Action Information system | British | Dutch | Dutch |
| Electronic Warfare | British | British | Italian |