In the post independance Indian Navy, ship design made a modest beginning in 1962 with the setting up of a small Design Cell within the Directorate of Naval Construction (DNC). By 1965, this cell had expanded to become the DNC's "Central Design Organisation (CDO)".

Mr Parmanandan recalls:-

"There was a bid from Mazagon Dock and from the Ministry of Defence Production to take over the Design Organisation. Some senior naval officers asked me "Wouldn't you feel more comfortable working in a Public Sector Enterprise"? My answer was simple. "If the Navy is not directly involved in ship design, its building and its commissioning, we will meet the same fate as a Defence Production Unit, where the hardware is made and the Services are not accepting it, because the services are not deeply involved right from day one. The Navy's involvement should be right from the Staff Requirement, which should be refined by the Material Branch as regards our own capability. The Staff Branch and the Material Branch should work hand in hand till the design is frozen and then it can be given for production.

"The second advantage is that the design period may be four years. Till the design is frozen, the shipyard does not know what to do. We can overlap the three year design period plus the production at every stage and ensure that we get the best out of the ship at the time of commissioning".

By 1968, this Design Organisation had successfully designed and handed over to the Navy numerous auxiliary vessels: 200 ton water boat AMBUDA (1966), 500 HP Tug BALSHIL (1966), Hopper Barges SEVAK and SAHAYAK (1967), Bucket Dredger NIKARAKSHA (1967), and Victualling Barges PANKAJ and AMRIT (1967/68).

Under construction were Landing Craft Utility (LCU's Mk1), an Ocean Going Tug (GAJ), Avcat Tankers (PURAK and POSHAK), HSD Tankers, 150 men Ferry Craft, Harbour Cargo Boats and diverse types of pontoons.

At the design stage were Oilers, Tugs, Ammunition and Water Barges and Diving and Water Boats. In 1966, the Design Organisation had also assisted in the construction of the new Fleet Tanker DEEPAK in Germany.

A list of Naval Yardcraft and by whom they were built during the period 1966 to 1975 is given in the table at the end of this chapter.

On 23rd October 1968, the Prime Minister, Mrs.Indira Gandhi, launched INS NILGIRI, the first of the Leander class frigates built at Mazagon Docks in Bombay. Having herself laid the keel in October 1966, Mrs Gandhi seems to have intuitively sensed the very long gestation time of naval construction. On her return to Delhi, the Prime Minister directed that urgent consideration be given to strengthen the Naval Design Office to work out the designs of future naval construction like frigates, submarines and smaller fast craft, suggested that all forms of future marine propulsion be considered, including nuclear propulsion, and stressed the need for both the ship designers and the ship builders to coordinate closely and in good time. This remarkable perspicacity of the Prime Minister was to prove momentous in the ensuing Defence Plan.

Captain Lohana recalls:-

The Corps of Naval Constructors within the Navy was thought of and created sometime in 1951-52, when three civilian officers, Mr Parmanandan, Mr Dotiwala and Mr Dhumal were recruited. The first uniformed constructor, the late Commodore VP Garg, who was already in UK to be trained as an Engineer Officer, was asked to stay behind and convert as a Naval Constructor. This certainly was the foresight of the Naval planners that one day the Navy will need to have Naval Architects who understand ship design and would help to maintain ships better. In the long run, it came as a blessing when we decided to design and build our own ships.

In the initial stages, there was debate whether constructors should be a civilian cadre or in uniform. NHQ decided that they should be in uniform so that the Navy will have a hold over them, whereas civilians might leave as and when they liked. Secondly, some senior people in the Ministry did foresee that this small group of 18, which was sanctioned in the first instance, was not a sufficiently viable cadre in terms of giving adequate career prospects. So to make sure that there were adequate career prospects, they were made a part of the Engineering Branch as far as sanctions were concerned. Thus it became a kind of a separate fourth specialisation of the Engineering Branch, like Marine Engineering, Air Engineering, Ordnance Engineering and Naval Construction. To what extent this proved beneficial in the long run is a matter of debate.

The Directorate of Naval Construction expanded as the Soviet acquisitions and the Leander Project came. At the commencement of the Leander programme, a Frigate Project Cell was also created within DNC, under a DDFP. Then as the Soviet acquisition programme came, since the DNC was the single point authority in Naval Headquarters for dealing with all ship acquisition contracts and new construction contracts, the Soviet acquisition work was entrusted to me when I returned from training in the Soviet Union. Since there was no separate sanction, I was held under the sanction of the DDFP(C) and tackled both the Frigate Project work, as well as the work connected with the Soviet Acquisitions which later on went off to other directorates, DAP, DLP and so on. Thus the DNC was the parent directorate for the present Directorate of Naval Design, the Directorate of Leander Project, as well as the Directorate of Acquisition Project. It is now called the Directorate of the Naval Architecture, which is the professional directorate in the Material Branch for Naval Architecture policy.

The training of the naval constructors of the first few batches, including ours, was carried out in UK. When it was decided to train them in India, the faculty of Naval Architecture at IIT Kharagpur, which was the only faculty then in India for this discipline, was selected and a further two years course was given to these Naval architecture graduates to become Naval Constructors, by making them Naval Architects for warships. This was achieved by appointing two constructor officers trained in UK at IIT Kharagpur in the Naval Construction Wing set up within the Naval Architecture Department. Gradually, with the reduction in the availability of Naval Architect graduates per se from Kharagpur opting for the Navy, it was decided to recruit graduates in allied branches of engineering such as Aeronautical, Mechanical, Metallurgical etc and cross train them as Naval Constructors, which was again done by the Naval Construction Wing within the IIT. Naturally, the training load increased, because not only was it cross-training to adapt them to warships, but to Naval Architecture and ships as a whole.

At about this time, the faculty at IIT Kharagpur did undergo some dilution and we felt that the quality of training may be adversely affected. At the same time, the available expertise within the Naval Headquarters in terms of the Material Branch as well as Staff who could be called upon to give lectures to the students and the setting up of the Design Directorate which could impart some practical training sessions to the students was the idea behind the proposal to shift the Naval Construction Wing itself from IIT Kharagpur to IIT Delhi, where the basic academic faculty in terms of maths and applied mechanics, which were essential inputs, were certainly of a very high order. It took a certain amount of persuasion within the Navy as well as with the IIT authorities and eventually it was successfully brought about around the mid 70s".

A major objective of the 1969-74 Defence Plan was self reliance in the field of warship design and warship production. The aim was to meet the Navy's requirements through indigenous efforts and conserve foreign exchange. Accordingly the indigenous construction of frigates, patrol craft, submarines, minor war vessels and auxiliaries had been accepted in this plan.

In 1969, Naval Headquarters proposed to Government that a full fledged Directorate of Naval Design (DND) be sanctioned. At that stage, the Navy did not have either adequate design experience or capability. There was also an acute shortage of technical officers. Naval Headquarters had envisaged induction of foreign designers on loan, with assurance of back up from their parent organisations. However, negotiations with the UK for the deputation of such designers did not bear fruit.

Meanwhile, soon after the start of the Leander construction programme, a choice had to be made whether the second and subsequent Leanders were to be identical to the first Leander (the advantage being standardisation and the disadvantage being obsolescence) or whether design changes should be effected from the second Leander onwards to enhance combat capability. It was decided that indigenous frigates should, as far as possible, have the latest equipment.

In 1970, the Directorate of Naval Design (DND) was approved. It started off with the design for new classes of Seaward Defence Boats (SDBs MK2), Survey Vessels, and a Landing Ship Tank (LST). The most noteworthy feature of the DND was that it was conceived and created as an integral part of the Navy, thereby enabling close interaction at all levels, while functioning under the scrutiny of the Naval Staff.

In 1973, a team of designers from the Soviet Union were invited to visit India to suggest an organisation to design frigates and submarines. They quantified a requirement of over 170 qualified designers each for tackling the design of the new frigate and the design of the new submarine. These requirements of manpower were just not implementable within available resources. The Naval Staff therefore accepted the revision of the staff requirements and approved a modified Leander hull with a different weapon package, instead of insisting on an altogether new frigate design. This decision was to result in the GODAVARI class frigates of Project 16, which retained all the indigenous propulsion machinery and other equipment already developed for the six earlier Leanders.

In early 1975, the Design Organisation commenced conceptual design work on Project 16. By end 1975, the Naval Staff and the Government accepted the design. Detailed drawing and design work started in 1976.

The Petya class submarine chasers had been acquired from the Soviet Union in the mid 1960's. They would therefore need replacement in the mid 1980's. Naval Headquarters decided that their replacement would be indigenously designed and constructed as "Corvettes" for the defence of the island territories and off shore oil rigs. In 1975, design work commenced on ships of the Corvette Project, which eventually culminated in the commissioning of the KHUKRI class corvettes of Project 25.

Throughout the decade 1965 to 1975, the non availability of sanctioned manpower constrained the balanced growth of the Design Organisation. The shortage of service officers was particularly acute. In retrospect, the successful achievements in warship design during this period can be attributed to two factors:

(a) Accepting an overlap between the "design" and "production" phases. This enabled a shorter time frame from the concept design stage to the completion of the first ship of the class. It minimised the obsolescence factor. And it ensured lower costs by minimising escalation.

(b) The team of talented young constructors built up over the preceding twelve years by the founding fathers of the Design Organisation, which included Shri S. Parmanandan, Shri Dotiwalla, Shri Dhumal, Commodore V P Garg, Captain Thukral and Captain KK Lohana.

Shri Parmanandan was awarded the PADMASHRI in 1970 in recognition of "his eminence as the leading naval architect in the country and his dynamism, dedication and drive in building up the capability of his organisation".

Warship design and construction comprise five main stages:-

- The first stage is the Formulation of Preliminary Staff Requirements by the Naval Staff. These are the requirements that the ship will be required to meet, based on the evaluation of future threats and the ships' role. These are first conceived as staff targets, which form the basis of the dialogue between the Naval Staff and the designers to establish that what is demanded is technically feasible and conversely, that what is technically feasible will meet the staff aspirations. A number of feasibility studies are carried out. Eventually the Preliminary Staff Requirements are generated which spell out the role of the ship, its weapons, sensors and the other major equipment which the ship is required to carry. In addition, important parameters like speed, endurance, type of propulsion, restrictions on dimensions and complement are indicated.

- The second stage is of Concept Design, which is the first interpretation of the preliminary staff requirements. During this stage, a number of design options are explored and developed up to a stage which enables comparative evaluation. The design proceeds on the basis of inputs from similar past ships, empirical relations, past experience and the designer's judgment. The process is essentially iterative. At the end of Concept Design, the most promising of the options are compared and the one likely to best meet the staff requirements is chosen for further development, in consultation with the Naval Staff.

- The third stage is of Preliminary Design. Various aspects and parameters, provisionally determined during the concept design stage, are investigated in detail. Design proceeds along a converging spiral form, investigating various aspects of dimensions, weights, volumes, stability, speed and powering, until an acceptable compromise of all the important and often conflicting parameters is achieved. All design calculations are prepared during this stage. System schematics are generated to facilitate weight, volume, flotation and stability calculations. At the end of Preliminary Design, a presentation is made to the Naval Staff, indicating aspects/areas in which the design may entail a compromise in Staff Requirements. After the Naval Staff approve the preliminary design, the preliminary staff requirements, as modified, are promulgated as the final or frozen Staff Requirements.

- The fourth stage is of Detailed Design. Hydrodynamic model tests are carried out at the beginning of the Detailed Design stage. These validate the predictions made through the analytical processes. Shortcomings emerging out of the results of model tests are rectified by modifying the design features. During this stage, special studies are undertaken in the critical design areas. Detailed structural drawings, system details, layout and composite drawings are prepared. Comprehensive specifications are written out. A dialogue is then initiated with the ship builder and the detailed specifications and drawings are made available to him.

- For a typical warship project, nearly 2000 drawings, some running into several sheets, and over 15 volumes of specifications of nearly 2000 pages, are required to be generated and over 1000 guidance drawings supplied to the ship builder. In turn, the shipyard generates over 1500 drawings for submission to the designers for approval. These then form the basis for the shipyard to prepare its working drawings, which would number several thousands.

- The fifth stage is of Construction. On the basis of inputs from the designer, the shipyard orders long lead items and materials and proceeds with activities preparatory to commencing production in the workshops. These includes faring of lines, preparation of workshop drawings and assembly of jigs and fixtures. To minimise the overall period of design and construction, the activities are telescoped and shipbuilding functions are commenced in the latter half of the detailed design phase. Throughout the construction stage, a continuous flow of drawings and information has to be maintained between the designers and the shipyard.

The lessons learnt in the 1971 Indo Pakistan War, the detailed discussions with Russia for the next series of Russian acquisitions and the progress made in the development of indigenous systems made it possible for the Naval Staff to consider major improvements in the combat capability of frigates. The Directorate of Combat Policy and Tactics suggested that the entire missile and gun package of the Soviet Nanuchka class missile corvette be installed in the frigates which would follow the VINDHYAGIRI, together with two Seaking anti submarine helicopters, the latest Indian APSOH Sonar, a mix of Soviet and Indian radars and Italian CAIO and EW systems. The Directorate of Marine Engineering suggested that steam propulsion be replaced by gas turbine propulsion.

The Naval Headquarters Technical Team which visited Canada in 1974 saw the Canadian 4100 ton Destroyer DDH - 280 which had two Seakings embarked. Naval Headquarters decided to try and embark two Seakings in the smaller Leander hull.

The Design Directorate was headed by Shri S Parmanandan. The new frigate design was entrusted to a project team headed by Commander (later Captain) NS Mohan Ram, a Naval architect, trained in the United Kingdom and who had worked in the Royal Navy's Leander Design Section. Organisational capability had to be built up concurrently with the design, as there were not enough trained draughtsmen or junior designers. Expertise too had to be developed in-house.

Mr Parmanandan who was then the DGND recalls:-

"The Navy was looking around for a cost effective option where surface to surface, air to surface and anti-air capabilities would be available from a single ship. This naturally required the ship to have helicopter launched air to surface missiles, surface to surface missiles, surface to air missiles, a large stock of anti submarine torpedoes and two Seaking helicopters, so that at any one time you could keep one helicopter in the air be it for an anti submarine mission or an anti ship mission. The staff definitely wanted two Seakings. They were not happy with only one. With surface to surface missiles, surface to air missiles and two Seakings, it appeared to be a cost effective ship. Certainly the Leander hull was in no position to take it.

"The second problem that came up was the economics of it. We had invested more than 150 crores in the indigenous development of the steam machinery. This led to a clear decision that the propulsion package will remain the same, but the ship must have the weapon package, which meant both the L Band and the S Band radars and, to accommodate the Soviet design philosophy and their weapons, a dedicated radar for each weapon. This was too much to go into a Leander design. This naturally meant that a new frigate had to be designed from scratch, except for the propulsion package which should not change.

"Our initial check indicated that we may lose around 2 knots of speed but could provide 20% longer range, 150% more aviation fuel, all weapon packages and additional complement to man the weapons and the helo included. The staff were willing to accept the 2 knot penalty.

"From there, we proceeded to do a serious design. Half way through, we realised the ship was getting longer and thinner and if we adopted the same proportion package, the length advantage may give an edge and we may be able to do just about half a knot less than the Leander. From that proposition, we went for a model test. Of course, we changed the fore part of the ship because the Leander fore part would have posed a lot of obstruction, both for the missile, the gun and the surface to air missile. Starting from that point, there was very little commonality between the Leander and the Project 16.

"There was another technical fineness in ship propulsion and ship model test. When at maximum speed the cut up under the stern of the ship happens to be in the trough of the bow wave, the ship loses speed. If the cut up happens to be on the crest of the bow wave, the ship gains speed. When Mohan Ram, Subaiah and I had a look at the model test results, we found that the ship was comfortably sitting on the crest and we were overwhelmed. It seemed possible that the ship may go even faster than the Leander at full power. This was amply proved during trials. Till 60%, 70%, 75% of full power, she was one and half knots slower than the Leander. But the moment she reached 85% to 90% , her acceleration was higher and she could overtake the Leander.

"We had a group of engineer and electrical officers working with us. Mazagon Dock wanted them and I gladly agreed to let them go. When the ship went out for trials, there were Soviet experts on board. They had their own misgivings about the ships speed but when they observed she was doing 29 knots, 29.5 knots and even upto 30 knots, they were surprised and equally we were surprised. The ship was keeping up with the gas turbine propelled RAJPUT. When both ships were asked to do a zig zag manouvre, the GODAVARI could do better than the RAJPUT.

"The wake of the Project 16 was classic, whereas the RAJPUT was churning the ocean. Any commanding officer would like to have a ship which has no wake at all, or at least a partially suppressed wake.

"I do not claim any credit for me or for any of my design officers. Its one of those things where fortune favours those who are willing to take the risk. And GODAVARI happened to have ended well".

Captain Mohan Ram recalls:-

"All these changes could only be accommodated in a larger hull, with increased internal space for weapons and equipment and deck space for missiles.

"The evolution of the new frigate is a fascinating story of calculated risk-taking, bold innovation and extrapolation of available knowledge. The Navy's marine engineers understandably desired to introduce the latest technology gas turbines in these new frigates. The Naval Staff had specified surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, larger helicopters, modern guns and sophisticated command and control systems.

"Early on, the Design Group decided that they would not change the proven steam turbine propulsion of the NILGIRI class frigates to gas turbines. Major investments had been made on facilities and tooling in Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited for the manufacture of steam turbines and auxiliaries. It was felt that it would be prudent to amortise this investment over a larger number of vessels.

"Also the new class of frigates already needed a newly designed hull. The weapon and control systems would be different. If the propulsion systems were also changed, it would lead to too high an intensity of change, which the Design Organisation and the Navy might find difficult to absorb and implement. So a sensible decision was taken to design a larger hull, using well established, conventional, steam turbine machinery and auxiliaries.

"The larger vessel would displace twenty percent more than the 3000 tons of the NILGIRI class frigate and would be about fourteen meters longer. The Naval Staff also wanted the vessel to go at least one knot faster than the NILGIRI class. As the head and naval architect in the Design Group, I serendipitously discovered that with the same capacity of steam turbines as in NILGIRI, the new design ship would go faster, due to improved hydrodynamic conditions at maximum speed. There would however, be a small penalty of fuel consumption at cruising speeds. This surprising discovery was at first pooh-poohed by many, but was subsequently verified in model tests and confirmed during sea trials of GODAVARI, the first ship of the class.

"The major change which had to be implemented in the design, was the decision of the Naval staff to use Soviet weapons and fire control systems together with Western and Indian weapon systems and propulsion systems. This entailed the use of two sets of main electrical power distribution systems, - one 440V, 3 phase, 60 cycles and the other 380V/3 phase, 50 cycles. This had never been done before in any warship, but this radical decision was also taken. For the first time, a hybrid vessel was developed, combining Western and Soviet systems in one hull.

"The decision to go ahead with the design was a bold act of faith on the part of the Navy. It reflected the confidence the Navy had in its young designers and the growing capability of Mazagon Docks. The go-ahead for the ship was given in 1975. The keel was laid in 1977. GODAVARI commissioned in December 1983. She fully met the specifications and exceeded all major performance requirements".

In recognition of this achievement, Commander Mohan Ram was awarded the Vishist Seva Medal.

Captain Lohana recalls:-

"The Project 16 started with a dialogue with the naval staff on what all they could have. Many sketch design studies and concept studies were made. Ultimately what clinched the issue in favour of the Project coming to DGND was that here was a frigate which held the promise to house and operate two Seaking helicopters. I think this was the clinching point which made the Navy decide to go in for this design. At the concept stage, we were all involved but this idea probably emanated not from one individual, but instead got evolved as a result of discussions.

"There was a definite element of selling this concept to the Naval Staff, so that the Design Organisation could take on this challenge and progress it. The credit must go to Mr Parmanandan of course, who was leading the team, but there were people like then Commander Kapoor and Commander Mohan Ram who played a prominent part. Commander Mohan Ram of course then became the project in charge for the rest of the main project.

"I had one other small part to play when we were doing the upper deck layout. When the missile containers were put on either side of the superstructure which was protruding out towards the forward end from the main superstructure, there was not enough space for people to walk past the containers, after allowing for the minimum distance between the containers. My main contribution in this area was suggesting that there should be sponsors on either side of the weather deck to locally create more width to allow for the extra space required. This proved to be a successful and distinctive feature of the ship.

"After this project was finally approved for construction, Mazagon Dock wanted the Navy to send somebody who would help the shipyard in translating the Navy's design into workshop drawings. I was asked to go to Mazagon Dock as the Head of the Warship Design Section and entrusted with the task of doing that. It was a great opportunity. As the work progressed, there was constant interaction between the production side on one hand and the Naval Headquarters design organisation on the other. It was tight rope walking between the two, which we managed to do successfully.

"At the same time, the colleague who was in charge of the Merchant Ship Drawing Office also resigned and left, so I had the opportunity of heading the entire design organisation of the Mazagon Docks. And by the time I was called back to Naval Headquarters as DGND, the GODAVARI, the first ship of the class, had almost proceeded to completion. I attended her commissioning ceremony as the DGND".

PROJECT 25 KHUKRI CLASS CORVETTES

In the mid 1960's, Government had accepted in principle the Navy's requirements for 500 ton patrol craft. In subsequent years, various options were considered - building them in Bombay in the Gun Carriage Basin near INS Kunjali, building them in the new Naval Dockyard at Visakhapatnam etc. By the early 1970's, two schools of thought had emerged. One view was that with the cost of ships steadily increasing, the Navy had no option but to go in for small, fast, missile armed corvettes. The other view was that in view of foreseeable threats, all the staff requirements could not be met in a 500 ton patrol craft. The outcome was that the 500 ton patrol craft got renamed as the Corvette Project, to be built in two versions - anti aircraft and anti submarine. International tenders were called for and various weapon packages were considered. Eventually, in 1973 the project was dropped because of the serious shortage of foreign exchange. NHQ then decided that the corvettes would be designed and built indigenously.

Mr Parmanandan, the Director General of Naval Design at that time, recalls:-

After five or six years of working with the Petyas, the Naval Staff wanted a new generation of ships. The Corvette Project had been going up and down, with French collaboration, with international tenders and with British private companies putting in a bid. All that took very nearly three years. But nothing came out of the series of discussions we had, either with the French or with the British. The Naval staff then took a decision to go ahead and start work on a design and construct a Corvette to our own specification, which would accommodate a helo plus four Soviet surface to surface missiles and a Soviet gun mounting. After this decision was taken, the normal process of model testing, powering and general layout were all finalised as a preliminary design.

There were a lot of discussions whether for anti missile defence we should go in for the Soviet 30 mm gun mountings or the Bofors 40/70 gun mountings. That took about six to seven months. Ultimately a clear decision was given that we should have four surface to surface missiles plus the Soviet guns. It was also decided to fit some of the Leanders', radars, sonar, communication equipment etc.

The point where the decision got delayed was the propulsion package. There was discussion as regards a single engine room or two engine rooms, two engines per shaft or one engine per shaft etc. The gearing of two diesel engines to one shaft posed problems. Would it be better to have a single robust engine rather than two, in a small ship of this size. Should we have a fixed pitch propeller or a CPP. To settle these issued, NHQ constituted a group of officers to write a service paper. The then COM and DME produced a paper based on which the design proceeded and the final powering calculation was completed. The choice of propeller was also settled and it was decided to go in for a controllable pitch propeller (CPP). However that resulted in a slightly heavier tail shaft and propeller and a higher trim aft. The discussions ove engines, and the mid course correction which some people wanted that it should not be a single engine per shaft or two engines per shaft, did push the project back by about 18 months.

When you are working on a Naval Staff Requirement and when the total project starts sliding back 18 months, every body gets fresh ideas. Fresh weapons, fresh helicopters, fresh radars, fresh sonar and every one wants to pitch in. That has a very deleterious effect.

By the time I left NHQ, the ship had been ordered, the design had been frozen and the model tests had been completed. But I believe the Soviets insisted that the bridge structure should go further aft. And it got shifted. I would not have permitted that to happen. It caused some trim problem and it got adjusted by other means. In my opinion, Project 25 was a fairly well thought out design, it had a well thought out weapon package which I believe is giving good service.

WARSHIP MODIFICATIONS UNDERTAKEN 1965 TO 1975

Major modifications designed and implemented between 1965 and 1975 were:

- The modernisation of and fitment of Soviet surface to surface missiles in TALWAR and TRISHUL, which had been acquired in the early 1960's.

- The conversion to the training role of the British Type 41 frigates, BRAHMAPUTRA, BEAS and BETWA which had been acquired in the end 1950's.

- Phase One Modernisation of and modifications to the aircraft carrier VIKRANT.

Fitment of Surface to Surface Missiles in TALWAR and TRISHUL

In 1973, the Naval Staff commenced a study on the half life modernisation of the two Type 12 British frigates, TALWAR and TRISHUL, which had by then completed over 11 years in service. In view of the proven efficacy of the Soviet surface to surface missiles in the 1971 war, the Naval staff directed that the feasibility be examined of lifting a complete surface to surface missile system from a non operational Soviet missile boat and fit it on board TALWAR. Concurrently, it was decided to fir a modern electronic warfare system which would help in identifying enemy warships from their radar transmissions at ranges compatible with the range of the missiles.

Mr Parmanandan then the DGND, recalls:-

"The Russians were not at all in favour of putting one of the three missiles on the centre line. I did not see anything wrong in putting it, as long as the deflectors were correct and we knew the correct distances and if the flame should strike the bulkhead, there should be no damage done. So we decided to have a forward bulkhead with an air space and also have a walkway for people in case something goes wrong.

We had a group of scientists in the first firing for which we wrote down the specifications for firing the missile. That raised the eyebrows of some officers in the Material Branch, specially in the DWE. They said "who are these jokers in Ramakrishna Puram to tell us what to do with the weapon on board?" But we were worried about an accident, nothing more than that. We had asked for many measurement gadgets. One of these was to put a series of shoe strings along the deck and on the bulkhead. We knew what their charring temperature was. That would immediately indicate how far the deflectors were effective and how far they were not effective. a salvo of three missiles was fired successfully."

Captain Lohana recalls:-

It was a very very bold step to remove the P 15 missile containers from one of the missile boats and fit them in the Type 12 frigates. Not only that, the Soviets were not particularly enthusiastic about such a proposal. It was therefore decided that we would do it on our own. Secondly, the three missile configuration, which was planned for TALWAR's foxle deck to get maximum benefit out of the deck area available, was something unique. There were definitely inherent doubts and risks as to how the flight paths would be affected and what were the clearances required and what should be the interface with the rest of the equipment and so on. This assignment became an article of faith with Mr Parmanandan, the then DGND. In the absence of clear cut documentation and data, quite a large amount of study had to be carried out of the existing fittings in the missile boats in order to decide what equipment was to be removed in addition to the containers themselves, what was the interface, how the fire control would work and so on. And I must say that the whole exercise, inspite of certain technically inspired assumptions, was something which went off very well and the Navy could well be very very proud of it".

Conversion of BRAHMAPUTRA, BEAS and BETWA for Cadets Training.

With the starting up of the Naval Academy in 1971 to increase officer intake, it became necessary to increase the capacity afloat for training cadets and midshipmen at sea. The cruiser DELHI was converted to undertake the sea training of midshipmen. Thereafter the three Type41 frigates which had joined the fleet in 1958, 1959 and 1960 were converted in the 1970's for undertaking the sea training of cadets.

Phase One Modernisation of VIKRANT.

After the 1971 war, VIKRANT needed a long refit to replace her cracked boilers. Since this was expected to be a long refit of about three years, it was decided to concurrently undertake as much modernisation of weapons, sensors and AIO as possible.

Mr Parmanandan, the then DGND recalls:-

"There was a serious proposal to put the large Soviet combined surface warning - height estimating - S band radar on the ship. Vikrant's masts were already saturated. We were asked to find out some way of putting the antennae up there. We worked with the IIT Madras on the structural side and we gave a proposal which was workable. But the cost factor and the time required was such that the Staff decided to forego that radar.

"The second thing we spent a lot of money and a lot of time on was that a lot of DC/AC alternators were put on board Vikrant to create a larger AC power capacity for dedicated services. There was a proposal to fit Bofors guns and a new type of laser sensor for anti missile defence. I do not know whether it ended up as a success or not. The initial proposal was to fit the Soviet 30 mm gun mountings in lieu of the hand operated Bofors. If we had gone firm on that, probably we would have achieved it at a much lesser cost and much quicker. While the Soviet weapon systems had their own deficiencies, they had the advantage that it suited our culture and way of working and maintainability. Each 30 mm mounting had its own dedicated radar and its own display which made it autonomous for operation. So if one mounting did not work, at least the other one would be available. That philosophy was not accepted half way through. And when they changed over to the new weapon system, our Directorate was not any further involved.

During this phase of modernisation, VIKRANT was fitted out with:

(a) Signaal LW 04, DA 05, ZW 06 radars and DS 22 AIO system as in the Leanders.

(b) LIOD Optronic Sights and Bofors 40/70 gun mountings for anti missile defence.

(c) The main and auxiliary machinery were refurbished to the maximum extent feasible.

INDIGENOUS WARSHIP DESIGN IN RETROSPECT

As in the case of the Leander Frigate Project, the Navy's achievements in Indigenous Warship Design were astounding. The transfer of talented young officers between the Frigate Project and the Design Organisation generated enormous synergy. Soviet warship designers and the Soviet weapon system supply organisations were generous and unstinting in their help. The exchange of detailed information in the 1970's regarding the new Soviet acquisitions enabled weapon planners in the Naval Staff to suggest cost effective staff requirements which would achieve the much mished for standardisation of systems and economies in weapon inventories. The confidence built up in Mazagon Docks during the Frigate Project helped to build the ships which earned much praise from the Navies of the world.

INDIGENOUS NAVAL YARD CRAFT BUILT BETWEEN 1966 AND 1975