RECONSTRUCTION OF EVENTS

The WSAG Minutes of 3 December 71 state:

"Dr Kissinger said we need to think about our treaty obligations. I remember a letter or memo interpreting our existing treaty with a special India tilt. When I visited Pakistan in January 1962, I was briefed on a secret document or oral understanding about contingencies arising in other than the SEATO context. Perhaps it was a Presidential letter. This was a special interpretation of the March 1959 bilateral agreement".

The WSAG Minutes of 4 December state:

"Admiral Zumwalt thought that the Paks could hold the line in East Pakistan for approximately one or two weeks before the logistic problems became overriding. He expected the Soviets to cement their position in India and to push for permanent usage of the naval base at Vizag. He anticipated that the Soviets' immediate short range objective would be to gain military advantage through their current military relationship with India".

The WSAG Minutes of 6 December state:

"Gen Westmoreland stated there was no means of evacuating West Pak forces from the East Wing, particularly in view of Indian naval superiority.

"Dr Kissinger asked about a legal position concerning the current Indian naval `blockade'. Mr Sisco stated that we have protested both incidents in which American ships have been involved. However, no formal proclamation apparently has been made in terms of a declaration of war, that it is essentially still an undeclared war, with the Indians claiming power to exercise their rights of belligerency. The State Department would, however, prepare a paper on the legal aspects of the issue. Ambassador Johnson said that so far as he was concerned, the Indians had no legal position to assert a blockade.

"Dr Kissinger asked that a draft protest be drawn up. If we considered it illegal, we will make a formal diplomatic protest. Mr Sisco said that he would prepare such a protest.

"Dr Kissinger said that it is quite obvious that the President is not inclined to let the Paks be defeated. Mr Sisco said that from a political point of view, our efforts would have to be directed at Indians from "extinguishing" West Pakistan".

"Mr Helms (CIA) opened the meeting by briefing the current situation. In the East, the Indians have broken the line at Comilla. Only major river crossings prevent them from investing Dacca. The Indians are advancing rapidly throughout East Pakistan. All major Pak L.O.C.'s in the East are now vulnerable. In the West, the Paks are now claiming Poonch, inside the Indian border. However, the Paks are admitting fairly heavy casualties in the fighting. Tank battles are apparently taking place in the Sind/Rajasthan area. Mrs Gandhi has indicated that before heeding a UN call for cease-fire, she intends to straighten out the southern border of Azad Kashmir. It is reported that, prior to terminating present hostilities, Mrs Gandhi intends to attempt to eliminate Pakistan's armor and air force capabilities.

"Mr Sisco inquired how long the Paks might be expected to hold out in East Pakistan, to which Mr Helms replied 48 to 72 hours. The time to reach the ultimate climax is probably a function of the difficulties encountered in river crossings.

"Assessing the situation in the West, General Ryan indicated that he did not see the Indians pushing too hard at this time, rather they seem content with a holding action.

"Dr Kissinger asked how long it would take to shift Indian forces from East to West. General Ryan said it might take a reasonably long time to move all the forces, but that the airborne brigade could be moved quickly, probably within a matter of five or six days.

"Dr Kissinger suggested that the key issue if the Indians turn on West Pakistan is Azad Kashmir. If the Indians smash the Pak air force and the armored forces, we would have a deliberate Indian attempt to force the disintegration of Pakistan. The elimination of the Pak armored and air forces would make the Paks defenseless. It would turn West Pakistan into a client state. The possibility elicits a number of questions. Can we allow a US ally to go down completely while we participate in a blockade? Can we allow the Indians to scare us off, believing that if US supplies are needed they will not be provided?

"Mr Sisco stated that if the situation were to evolve as Dr Kissinger had indicated then, of course, there was a serious risk to the viability of West Pakistan.Mr Sisco doubted, however, that the Indians had this as their objective. He indicated that Foreign Minister Singh told Ambassador Keating that India had no intention of taking any Pak territory. Mr Sisco said it must also be kept in mind that Kashmir is really disputed territory.

"Mr Helms then stated that earlier he had omitted mentioning that Madame Gandhi, when referring to China, expressed the hope that there would be no Chinese intervention in the West. She said that the Soviets had cautioned her that the Chinese might rattle the sword in Ladakh but that the Soviets have promised to take appropriate counter-action if this should occur. Mr Helms indicated that there was no Chinese build-up at this time but, nevertheless, even without a build-up they could `make motions and rattle the sword'.

"Dr Kissinger stated that what we may be witnessing is a situation wherein a country equipped and supported by the Soviets may be turning half of Pakistan into an impotent state and the other half into a vassal. We must consider what other countries may be thinking of our action.

"Mr Helms asked about our CENTO relationships with Pakistan. Ambassador Johnson stated we had no legal obligations towards Pakistan in the CENTO context. Dr Kissinger agreed but added that neither did we have legal obligations toward India in 1962 when we formulated the air defense agreement. We must consider what would be the impact of the current situation in the larger complex of world affairs.

"After discussing various possible commitments to both Pakistan and India, Mr Packard stated that the overriding consideration is the practical problem of either doing something effective or doing nothing. If you don't win, don't get involved. If we were to attempt something it would have to be with a certainty that it would affect the outcome. Let's not get in if we know we are going to lose. Find some way to stay out.

"Turning to the question of the blockade, Ambassador Johnson said that both India and Pakistan have taken blockade action, even though the Pak blockade is essentially a paper blockade. Dr Kissinger said that we should also protest to the Paks. Ambassador Johnson indicated we do not have a legal case to protest the blockade. The belligerent nations have a right to blockade when a state of war exists. We may think it unwise and we may question how it is carried out. We have, in fact, normally expressed our concern. On the other hand we have no problem in protesting the incident of the SS Buckeye State which had been strafed in a Pakistani port.

"Dr Kissinger said that we are not trying to be even-handed. There can be no doubt what the President wants. The President does not want to be even-handed. The President believes that India is the attacker. We are trying to get across the idea that India has jeopardized relations with the United States. Dr Kissinger said that we cannot afford to ease India's state of mind. `The Lady' is cold-blooded and tough and will not turn into a Soviet satellite merely because of pique. We should not ease her mind. He invited anyone who objected to this approach to take his case to the President".

Admiral Zumwalt was Chief of Naval Operations of the American Navy. In his memoirs "On Watch", he states: (Pages 360 et seq)

"The Naval situation in the Indian Ocean just then was complicated and confusing. Quite by chance, a large British Navy task group, including two carriers, the last ships of the British Fleet to remain East of Suez, was on its way home through the Indian Ocean at the time India marched into East Bengal. Two days after that invasion, a Soviet destroyer and a minesweeper came through the Malacca Straits whose mission had been to relieve the destroyer and minesweeper that had been on station (in the Indian Ocean) for 6 months. In view of the war, the relief became a reinforcement; the original contingent stayed on. Furthermore on 6 or 7 December, the Russians detached a cruiser armed with cruise missiles, and escorts for it, from their Pacific Ocean Fleet and sent them towards the Indian Ocean. They were sighted by the Japanese in the Straits of Tsushima on 9 December. Though these ships did not reach the Malacca Straits until 18 December, we of course knew they were on their way".

Mr Jack Anderson's article states:

"On 7 December a top secret warning was flashed to Washington that three Soviet naval ships, a seagoing minesweeper and a tanker have begun to move northeastward into the Bay of Bengal. The units entered the Indian Ocean from the Malacca Straits on 5 December and were located approximately 500 nautical miles east of Ceylon on 7 December.

"Urgent huddles in the White House led to a decision on 10 December to assemble in the Malacca Straits a United States task force, spearheaded by the aircraft carrier Enterprise, the Navy's most powerful ship. The primary purpose was to make a `show of force' and to divert Indian planes and ships from Pakistan.

"As the task force moved into position, Admiral John McCain, our Pacific commander, inquired on 11 December about `the feasibility of aerial surveillance of a Soviet task group located approximately 180 nautical miles south-west of Ceylon'. Authorisation was flashed back the same day `in the event Task Force 74 is directed to transit the Straits of Malacca, at that time appropriate screening-surveillance flights are authorised".

Mr Anatoly Dobrynin was the Russian Ambassador in Washington in 1971. In his memoirs "In Confidence", he states: (Pages 236 et seq)

"On December 10, Nixon asked us to join him in a joint appeal for a complete ceasefire. In a clear attempt to pressure both the Soviet Union and India, Nixon made an extraordinary disclosure to the Soviet leadership. In strict confidence, he had Kissinger inform us that there was a secret protocol in the agreement between the United States and Pakistan (drafted under the Kennedy administration and handed to then President, Ayub Khan, by the US ambassador on 5 November 1962) saying that the American government would support Pakistan against Indian aggression.

"To build American pressure, Kissinger told Yuli Vorontsov, our able charge d'affairs during my absence in Moscow for consultations, that the American military had already been ordered to start preparations for assistance to Pakistan under the cover of tactical redeployment of its naval forces, including the despatch of an aircraft carrier task force from Southeast Asia. In response, a number of warships from the Soviet Indian Ocean Fleet were sent northward.

"Kissinger made it clear to us that the United States was mostly concerned about the western section of the India-Pakistan front which, Washington feared, would collapse after Pakistan's defeat in the East. As Kissinger later wrote, he believed Mrs Gandhi was planning to attack the Pakistan-held portions of Kashmir, recover them for India, and thus precipitate through a humiliating defeat, the disintegration of what remained of Pakistan in the West. (In the East, the White House had to accept that the war was as good as won by India.) As part of his maneuver, Kissinger then asked Vorontsov to assure Moscow that the White House was not in contact with Beijing over the conflict, even though Pakistan was close to China. He simultaneously proposed referring the matter to the United Nations".

Admiral Zumwalt's memoirs state: (ibid)

"On 10 December, a Presidential order that was not discussed with the Navy in advance, created Task Group 74, consisting of the nuclear carrier Enterprise and appropriate escorts and supply ships and sent it steaming from the Gulf of Tonkin, where the ships had been on station, to Singapore. The order did not specify what TG 74's mission was, nor could anyone, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs tell me. I sought to be sure that these ships either had a mission or were not sent in harms way. The ships were held off Singapore for two days. On 12 December they were ordered through the Malacca Straits into the Indian Ocean. Within an hour, that order was rescinded. Next day it was reissued with the additional proviso that as much of the passage through the Straits as possible be in daylight, ie in full view of the world. At the same time "sources" in Washington let it be known that the object of the exercise was covering the evacuation of American civilians from Dacca in East Bengal.This clearly was a cover story since that evacuation, after having been impeded by the fighting for a week, was successfully completed two days before TG 74 entered the Indian Ocean".

Mr Jack Anderson's article states:

"As the American warships moved through the Straits and headed into the Bay of Bengal, even more ominous reports reached Washington from the Defence Intelligence Agency.

"Recent indicators have been received which suggest the People's Republic of China may be planning actions regarding the Indo-Pakistan conflict'.

"A top secret message reported tersely: `According to a reliable clandestine source, (Pakistan's) President Yahya Khan claimed ... today that the Chinese Ambassador in Islamabad has assured him that within 72 hours the Chinese Army will move towards the border.

"And from New Delhi, the CIA reported: `According to a reliable clandestine source, Prime Minister Gandhi told a leader of her Congress party that she had some indications that the Chinese intend to intervene along India's northern border.. Mrs Gandhi said that the Chinese action might be in the Ladakh area.'

"Russia's Ambassador to India, Nikolai M Pegov, however, promised on 13 December that the Soviets `would open a diversionary action' against the Chinese and `will not allow the Seventh Fleet to intervene.'

"According to Pegov, the movement of the Seventh Fleet is an effort by the US to bully India, to discourage it from striking against West Pakistan, and at the same time to boost the morale of the Pakistani forces.

"Pegov noted that a Soviet fleet is now in the Indian Ocean and that the Soviet Union will not allow the Seventh Fleet to intervene".

Mr Anatoly Dobrynin's memoirs state: (ibid)

"The tension was broken upon my return on December 12. Moscow sent a particularly important message to Nixon: "Our contacts with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi suggest that the Indian government does not intend to take any military action against West Pakistan". With noticeable relief, Kissinger said that was good news. At the same time, he complained that Indian assurances lacked clarity and called upon us to continue close consultations in the confidential channel. But what really mattered was that, after taking Pakistan's side as a payoff for helping open up China, Nixon and Kissinger had to rely on Moscow's word that India would not attack West Pakistan".

Admiral Zumwalt's memoirs state: (ibid)

"The first orders to TG 74 had been to go on station in the Bay of Bengal, off the East Bengal coast. I argued against stationing the ships there. I felt it was taking an unnecessary risk to put a task group without a stated mission in precisely the place where harm was most likely to befall it. I won my argument and the group was sent south of Ceylon, where the Russians, when they arrived, promptly began trailing it. Meanwhile, a second Russian task group, similar in composition to the first - a cruiser with escorts - was sent to the scene, obviously in reaction to TG 74's appearance. What prompted the despatch of the first Russian group is unclear. The best guess is that it was the presence, fortuitous though it was, of so many British ships in troubled waters. In any case, by the first of the year when the second Russian group arrived, the American ships were put at a disadvantage by the Russians. While Soviet ships were in close trail of US ships, the British were no longer on the scene. As soon as Dacca had been evacuated successfully, they had continued on their homeward journey. For the first week or so of 1972, the American and Russian ships circled around each other warily, much as their counterparts had been doing in the Mediterranean for years. Then on 8 January, TG 74 was ordered out of the Indian Ocean as mysteriously as it had been ordered in.

"I still do not know exactly what to think about the TG 74 episode. Obviously it could not have been intended to influence the course of the war in East Bengal. On the contrary, the task group was not formed until the outcome in East Bengal was perfectly clear. Perhaps the President and Kissinger, both of whom quite clearly were frustrated by their inability to influence events on the subcontinent, impulsively organised TG 74 and sent it on its way in a final effort to show the world that America was not to be taken lightly. More likely, they wanted to show China that the US was a relevant military actor in that part of the world and had the will to deploy military power in a situation in which a Soviet client was defeating a Chinese ally. In either case, my hunch is that the gesture was untimely and futile. But that is just a hunch. Mrs Gandhi may have had designs on West Pakistan as well as East Pakistan and the arrival of TG 74 may have caused her to think twice. In other words, the gesture may have been extremely timely and useful. Until the private papers of the "lady" are made public, no one will know for sure".

In their book "War and Secession", Richard Sisson and Leo Rose state:

"On 10 December the Enterprise and four escorts were ordered to sail from their station in the Gulf of Tonkin towards Singapore. On 12 December they met another naval detachment off the Singapore coast and on 14 December, after two days' unexplained delay, sailed down the Strait of Malacca during the daylight hours into the northernmost section of the Bay of Bengal. Task Force 74 then turned south and was operating in the Indian Ocean to the southeast of Sri Lanka when Dhaka surrendered on 16 December and the war ended the next day with the cease-fire on the western front. It remained in this general area until 7 January, when it rejoined the Seventh Fleet off the Vietnam coast.

"A number of explanations and accusations have been made concerning the objectives of Task Force 74, none of which are very persuasive. One that received considerable attention at the time, particularly in India, was the report that the Enterprise was to be used to rescue Americans trapped in Dhaka. But as the Americans who wanted to leave Dhaka had already been flown out on 12 December, two days before the task force left Singapore, a rescue mission made no sense, and nothing in the orders to the task force referred to this subject. Indeed, the orders to the Enterprise were ambiguous and all-inclusive-namely, to conduct "naval, air and surface operations as directed by higher authority in order to support US interests in the Indian Ocean area" - not specifically in the Bay of Bengal.

"Kissinger and Nixon have generally tended to explain and justify the Enterprise episode in broader geopolitical terms, primarily the supposed impact of this symbolic gesture of support for our Pakistani "ally" on China, just at the time when the United States was beginning the process of normalizing relations with the People's Republic. Some others in the State Department placed greater importance on the impact of American support of a Muslim state on the international Islamic community. Both were factors that were considered, but in and of themselves would not have been decisive.

"Another important consideration for the US government was the presence of a Soviet naval force in the Indian Ocean. When the war began, the USSR had only a small force on station-two destroyers, two minesweepers, and an oiler. But on 6 December a three-ship Soviet naval force, including a missile cruiser, left Vladivostok, and on 13 December a second task force, consisting of four ships, including a missile cruiser and missile destroyer, was dispatched to the Indian Ocean from Vladivostok-under immediate American surveillance, of course. The first task force entered the Indian Ocean only on 18 December and the second on 24 December, both after the war had ended: thus neither served as a deterrent to the Enterprise during the couple of days Task Force 74 was in the war zone while the war was going on. This also calls into question the frightening accounts in some American sources about how close the United States and the Soviet Union were to a naval confrontation during the war. Whether the Enterprise task force served any useful purpose is doubtful. But it can be safely assumed that it was basic American policy that, in any crisis in the Indian Ocean area in which the Soviet Union had a fleet immediately available (as happened again in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war), an American naval detachment would be sent in as well, even if there were no obvious tasks, for it to perform".

In his memoirs "The White House Years", Dr Kissinger states:

"Our paramount concern transcended the subcontinent. The Soviet Union could have restrained India; it chose not to. It had, in fact, actively encouraged war by signing the Friendship Treaty, giving diplomatic support to India's maximum demands, airlifting military supplies, and pledging to veto inconvenient resolutions in the UN Security Council. The Soviets encouraged India to exploit Pakistan's travail in part to deliver a blow to our system of alliances, in even greater measure to demonstrate Chinese impotence. Since it was a common concern about Soviet power that had driven Peking and Washington together, a demonstration of American irrelevance would severely strain our precarious new relationship with China. Had we followed the advice of our critics - massive public dissociation from Pakistan and confrontation with it in its moment of desperation - we would have been operating precisely as the US - Soviet condominium so dreaded by Peking; this almost surely would have undone our China initiative.

"Nor were we defending only abstract principles of international conduct. The victim of the attack was an ally - however reluctant many were to admit it - to which we had made several explicit promises concerning precisely this contingency. Clear treaty commitments reinforced by other undertakings dated back to 1959. One could debate the wisdom of these undertakings (and much of our bureaucracy was so eager to forget about them that for a time it proved next to impossible even for the White House to extract copies of the 1962 communications), but we could not ignore them. To do so would have disheartened allies like Iran and Turkey, which sympathized with Pakistan, had the same commitment from us, and looked to our reaction as a token of American steadiness in potential crises affecting them. High stakes were therefore involved. On December 5, I told Nixon that the India-Pakistan conflict would turn into a dress rehearsal for the Middle East in the spring.

"There was no question of "saving" East Pakistan. Both Nixon and I had recognized for months that its independence was inevitable; war was not necessary to accomplish it. We strove to preserve West Pakistan as an independent state, since we judged India's real aim was to encompass its disintegration. We sought to prevent a demonstration that Soviet arms and diplomatic support were inevitably decisive in crises.

"We had to become sufficiently threatening to discourage similar moves by Soviet friends in other areas, especially the Middle East. And if we acted with enough daring, we might stop the Indian onslaught before it engulfed and shattered West Pakistan.

"We were concerned that a Pakistani attack in the West would merely supply the final pretext for India to complete the disintegration of all of Pakistan.

"On December 2, Pakistani Ambassador Raza delivered a letter from Yahya to President Nixon invoking Article I of the 1959 bilateral agreement between the United States and Pakistan as the basis for US aid to Pakistan. The American obligation to Pakistan was thus formally raised.

"The treaty with Pakistan was identical to several other bilateral and multilateral agreements - all of which our pronouncements seemed to cast into doubt. And it had been buttressed in the case of Pakistan by many additional assurances of support. The fact was that over the decades of our relationship with Pakistan, there had grown up a complex body of communications by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, going beyond the 1959 pact, some verbal, some in writing, whose plain import was that the United States would come to Pakistan's assistance if she was attacked by India. In an aide memoirs of 5 November 1962, the United States promised assistance to Pakistan in case of Indian aggression.

"Pakistan, moreover, was an ally of other allies - Iran, Turkey - and a friend of Saudi Arabia and Jordan, then isolated in a still largely radical Middle East. And it was a friend of China and in close touch with a Peking that was gingerly feeling its way toward a new relationship with us based on the hope that we could maintain the global equilibrium. A reputation for unreliability was not something we could afford.

"Pakistan was an ally to which we had treaty commitments backed up by private assurances; its fate would thus affect the attitudes of several key countries that had rested their security on American promises. It would be watched carefully by China. And those countries in the Middle East eager to settle the issue by force could easily be tempted to adopt military means. And if its policy in the sub-continent succeeded too easily, the Soviet Union might resort to comparable tactics in other volatile areas - as indeed it later did when Watergate had sapped Executive authority. The dismemberment of Pakistan by military force and its eventual destruction without any American reaction thus would have profound international repercussions.

"Because of India's access to Soviet arms and a large arms industry of its own, India was bound to crush Pakistan's armed forces. Our minimum aim had to be to demonstrate that we would not compound our weakness by fatuousness. We had to act in a manner that would give pause to potential Soviet adventures elsewhere, especially in the Middle East, where Egypt's President had now proclaimed 1972 as another year of decision.

"In foreign policy, Bismarck once said "courage and success do not stand in a causal relationship, they are identical". Nixon had many faults, but in crises he was conspicuously courageous. An aircraft carrier task force that we had alerted previously was now ordered to move toward the Bay of Bengal, ostensibly for the evacuation of Americans but in reality to give emphasis to our warnings against an attack on West Pakistan. We held it east of the Strait of Malacca, about 24 hours steaming distance from the Bay of Bengal, because I wanted to consult the Chinese before we made our next move. In explaining the purpose of the Fleet movement to Mel Laird (American Defence Secretary), I pointed out that we recognized the Indian occupation of East Pakistan as an accomplished fact; our objective was to scare off an attack on West Pakistan. (I did not add that we also wanted to have forces in place in case the Soviet Union pressured China.) As always in crises, Laird was staunch and supportive. When I met Huang Hua, he came to the real Chinese concern - that a precedent was being set by which other countries might be dismembered by Indian-Soviet collusion. I told him that the United States would not be indifferent to further Soviet moves.

"Our Fleet passed through the Strait of Malacca into the Bay of Bengal and attracted much media attention. Were we threatening India? Were we seeking to defend East Pakistan? Had we lost our minds? It was in fact sober calculation. We had some 72 hours to bring the war to a conclusion before West Pakistan would be swept into the maelstrom. It would take India that long to shift its forces and mount an assault. Once Pakistan's Army and Air Force were destroyed, its impotence would guarantee the country's eventual disintegration. We had to give the Soviets a warning that matters might get out of control on our side too. We had to be ready to back up the Chinese if at the last moment they came in after all, UN initiative having failed. The Kremlin needed an excuse to accelerate the pressures it claimed it was exerting on India. However unlikely an American military move against India, the other side could not be sure; it might not be willing to accept even the minor risk that we might act irrationally. It was also the best means to split the Soviet Union and India. Moscow was prepared to harass us; it was in our judgement not prepared to run military risks. Moving the carrier task force into the Bay of Bengal committed us to no final act, but it created precisely the margin of uncertainty needed to force a decision by New Delhi and Moscow".

Mr Anatoly Dobrynin's memoirs state: (ibid)

"The Soviet Union's diplomatic intervention helped prevent the military conflict from spreading to the point where it would have resulted in a total defeat and breakup of West Pakistan, not just an amputation of its eastern province fifteen hundred miles away. I suspect that Pakistan's arrogant behaviour at the start of the conflict was probably to some degree fostered by manipulative American diplomacy, which left the impression that the United States would strongly be on Pakistan's side, but, if so, the Nixon administration failed to fulfill the Pakistani military regime's great expectations. Pakistan, actually an American ally, lost half of its territory.

"The final word came in January when we began work with Kissinger on the details of the summit. Admitting that he had been unduly nervous about Soviet intentions during the Indo-Pakistan War, he virtually admitted that he had taken some "unreasonable steps" at the time. He acknowledged that our assurance about India's intentions at the critical moment was a breakthrough in ending the war. For him, that was an extraordinary confession but not one that he made in public".

INDIAN REACTIONS

Mr Peter Sinai was Director (Bangladesh) in the Ministry of External Affairs in 1971. He recalls:

"On 14th December, the Political Counsellor in the US Embassy in Delhi sought an urgent meeting in MEA with me and handed over a telex copy of US Defence Secretary Melvyn Laird's statement that the Carrier Group ENTERPRISE had been ordered to proceed to the Bay of Bengal "for evacuation and other contingencies". I pointed out that all US nationals desiring evacuation had already been evacuated and demanded to know for whom "evacuation" was intended and what the "other contingencies" might be. Mr Irwin said that his instructions were only to deliver the Defence Secretary's statement.

"I rushed the message to Mr DP Dhar, who said he would inform the PM and that I should meanwhile take a copy of it to NHQ. I took the message to the South Block War Room. The immediate reaction of the naval personnel there was one of incredulity and concern. Awareness that the range of the aircraft on the ENTERPRISE posed a threat to VIKRANT and other naval vessels operating off Chittagong well before they could be in any position to retaliate was the main expression of that concern".

Captain (later Vice Admiral) MK Roy, was the Director of Naval Intelligence in 1971. In his book "War in the Indian Ocean", he states: (Page 212 et seq)

"The composition of the US Task Force as seen from satellite photographs included the nuclear-propelled aircraft carrier ENTERPRISE, the amphibious assault ship, TRIPOLI with helicopters, and an escort of three guided missile ships, four destroyers, nuclear attack submarines and tankers. Prime Minister Gandhi arrived early in the Naval War Room and queried Admiral Nanda as to the implications of this US move. I was asked to give a quick appreciation of the capabilities of the US Task Force. I concluded by stating that it could be any of the undermentioned operations:

(a) Intervene by invitation as the ENTERPRISE could wrest aerial supremacy over the skies of East Pakistan. The marines could then be airlifted ashore by helicopters to assist the Pakistan Army. This was however thought to be impractical as the Vietnam war was not going in favour of the US.

(b) Interpose between the coastline and the Indian blockading forces thus breaking the ring round the East Pakistan coast particularly involving the ports of Chittagong and Chalna.

(c) The US Task Force possessed the vertical lift capacity to evacuate at least one Pakistani division with their personal arms to ships in international waters. It would then be possible to transport them to West Pakistan by sea to bolster their Army facing the impending attack by India after the surrender in East Pakistan. Both Pakistan and US were aware of the restrictions imposed on civilian traffic by the Indian Railways in order to expeditiously move Indian divisions from the Eastern to the Western theatre of operations".

In their book "War and Secession" Richard Sisson and Leo Rose state: (Page 217)

"As several responsible Indian officials around the Prime Minister and in the Defence Ministry noted in comments to the authors, there were no apprehensions that the US Fleet would intervene in the East Pakistani campaign or indeed that it could do much in that sector. New Delhi recognised that the dispatch of the Fleet was a symbolic gesture intended to impress China and the Islamic states in Southwest Asia as well as to counter the reinforced Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean".

In his book `No Way But Surrender', Vice Admiral Krishnan states: (ibid)

"At about 5.30 PM on the eighth day of the war, Friday, 10 December, we intercepted a signal to the effect that the US Navy was sending ships into the Bay of Bengal, for possible withdrawal of the Pakistani Army.

"I also spoke to Admiral Nanda regarding the 7th Fleet but he had heard no more than what was in the signal. We ended our conversation on the note that we should not be surprised by anything that happened from now onwards.

"None of us ever fell for the gimmick that the Fleet's object was to evacuate a handful of American subjects from Dacca. You do not require an elephant gun to shoot at a flea. Obviously, her primary intention was to frighten us into withdrawing our forces from the operational area and let the escape ships break out. Suppose we didn't scare that easily and persisted in our stranglehold on Bangladesh? Evacuation of any but a handful of troops was a possibility, using helicopters. Clearly the use of heavier and very powerful aircraft was quite out of the question as, however thorough the temporary repairs, the runways of both Chittagong and Dacca had taken considerable beating.

"The offensive capabilities of the Fleet, therefore, consisted of:

(i) Landing up to a marine battalion as an assault group using helicopters

(ii) Using the ENTERPRISE's aircraft for ground support role

(iii) Providing close support against aircraft attacking their fleet and

(iv) Surface and aerial attack on Indian warships.

"We did not know if the marine battalion was carried on board the TRIPOLI at the time but even assuming that they were, how were they going to land them ashore except by helicopters. It was quite obvious that manpower-wise, landing some 2,000-odd persons was not going to materially alter the land battle in which some 93,000 soldiers were gasping for breath!

"It was unthinkable that they would commit their aircraft on a ground support role against our army or air force or want only attack our naval forces at sea. If they did, it would possibly mean war between the United States and India and, as I said to my colleagues in the Maritime Operations Room, "that might mean the end of the world or the Americans would find in us a Vietnam to end all Vietnams.

"To my way of thinking, the most effective method of helping the Pakistanis would be to close Chittagong within range of their air power, put up a formidable air umbrella over the merchant ships awaiting escape and actually provide air escort for them till they reached the waiting fleet. They knew that our tiny force of aircraft from VIKRANT could never hope to challenge the air cover and we could at best watch the trapped animals getting away from our clutches.

"Summing up the appreciation, we came to the following conclusions:

(i) A critical point was being reached in the war and the Pakistanis were desperate and would try to break out at the earliest opportunity.

(ii) For this purpose, they had at least five merchant ships ready and camouflaged in Chittagong. They had made desperate attempts to make the runway at Chittagong sufficiently serviceable to take light aircraft and helicopters.

(iii) The safe arrival of the convoy RK 623 would be the starting point of putting their "Scorched Earth Plan" into action.

(iv) The removal of VIKRANT from the scene of operations would ease the way to a break out. The Pakistanis must have hoped that we would withdraw VIKRANT to "get out of the way of the Seventh Fleet".

(v) A break-out of ships could be facilitated by the Seventh Fleet providing an impregnable and continuous air umbrella till they joined the surface forces of the Seventh Fleet.

"Having thought out the various possibilities, it was necessary to plan out our line of action. Clearly, everything turned on the merchant ships assembled in Chittagong for the actual troop carrying. Not an instant must be lost in destroying or so heavily damaging them as to make them totally immobile. Time was running out.

"Having spent the whole forenoon of 11 December on the above thoughts and a series of discussions with Admiral Nanda as well as my army colleague Jagjit Aurora, I signalled the Fleet at 1.15 PM as follows:

(a) Appreciate enemy with senior officers including FOCEF planning major breakout and will try to get away by hugging the coast. Senior officers may try to escape by air. Approaches to harbour likely to be mined.

(b) Your mission:

(i) Put Chittagong airport out of commission;

(ii) Attack ships in harbour by air and surface units if they break out.

(c) This is undoubtedly the most important mission of the war in the East. The enemy ships must, I repeat, must, be destroyed. Good Luck.

"The results of the day's work were summed up by FOCEF in a signal to FOC-IN-C EAST as follows:-

BE PLEASED TO REPORT THAT AT THE END OF TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF CONTINUOUS SORTIES COMMENCING 111930 INVOLVING CONSTANT ALIZE RECCE AND BOMBING AND TWENTY EIGHT HAWK SORTIES, COX BAZAR AND CHITTAGONG AIRFIELD HAVE BEEN RENDERED INOPERATIVE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THERE IS NO MERCHANT SHIP OF ANY SIZE IN THE CHITTAGONG HARBOUR OR APPROACHES WHICH HAS NOT BEEN STRUCK AND INCAPACITATED. THERE IS A COMPLETE ABSENCE OF SHIPPING ALONG THE ENTIRE COAST FROM CHALNA EASTWARD THROUGH MEGHNA SANDWIP UP TO COX'S BAZAR AND SOUTHWARD.

"In addition to the air strikes, we also decided to carry out a surface bombardment of Cox's Bazar to obviate even a marginal use of the aerodrome there by any type of aircraft.

"There could now be no question whatsoever of evacuation of the West Pakistani Army by sea and General Manekshaw's warning: "Nobody can reach you from the sea. Chittagong, Chalna, Khulna, Mongla are all totally blocked," was entirely meaningful.

To make absolutely sure, I thought of a deception and sent this signal to Naval Headquarters.

"I SUBMIT THAT SHOULD GOVERNMENT DECIDE TO PREVENT SEVENTH FLEET APPROACHING CHITTAGONG IN ORDER TO BUY TIME SUGGEST ANNOUNCE THAT MINING OF APPROACHES HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT. FOR FAVOUR OF CONSIDERATION".

Lt Gen Jacob who was Chief of Staff, Eastern Army HQ, recalls:

"Admiral Krishnan was very worried. He rang me up on 14 December and asked "What is this about"? I told him "I am already talking to Lt Gen Niazi about his surrender. If on the 14th, the Americans are in the Straits of Malacca and the cease fire is to come on the 15th, how can the American naval task group move up to the North Bay of Bengal in time to give then any help? Why then are you worried"? He seemed to be obsessed with the ENTERPRISE Task Group. I don't know why".

In his book `We Dared' Admiral SN Kohli states:

"On one of my visits to the Soviet Union, Admiral Gorshkov mentioned to me that he had a "brigada" of submarines following the ENTERPRISE squadron. It is now known that Gorshkov surfaced all the Soviet nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean when the US satellite was overhead the 7th Fleets incursion into the Bay of Bengal".

Prof PN Dhar, the Secretary to the Prime Minister in 1971, recalls:

"The impression that the ENTERPRISE was a response to the Soviet move to help us is just not correct. The ENTERPRISE group was followed by the Soviets and not the other way round. The Soviets did tell us where the ENTERPRISE was, they had their own way of checking on ENTERPRISE's progress and they did keep us informed about that. And that is why the American Embassy here was a little surprised at the nonchalant attitude of the Government of India".

ANALYSIS AND COMMENT

The basic issue which precipitated the despatch of the ENTERPRISE Task Group towards India was America's assessment that after completing operations in East Pakistan, India would move its forces to regain territory in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. In the face of the Indian onslaught, the Pakistan Army and Air Force in the West would be shattered. The elimination of armoured and air forces would make West Pakistan defenceless and it would then disintegrate. America was well aware that Pakistan Occupied Kashmir was disputed territory and not recognised by India as part of West Pakistan. However, since the disintegration of West Pakistan, an American ally, was totally unacceptable, America disregarded every Indian assurance that it had no intention of attacking West Pakistan or taking any Pakistani territory. Instead America kept on seeking assurances that India would not try to regain territory in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.

Mr LK Jha was India's ambassador in Washington in 1971. Responding to Mr Kissingers memoirs, he stated:

"Turning now to the second charge that India was determined to dismember West Pakistan, Kissinger makes much of the fact that while I gave the assurance that we had no intention whatever of making any territorial gains in the West, with respect to portions of Kashmir under Pakistani occupation I could give no such specific assurance. Kissinger concedes, what the USA was not prepared to admit at the time, that "on December 3 he (President Yahya Khan) launched his army into an attack in the West". Then, the US asked me for assurances from India of a kind which would reward Pakistan for its attack by our agreeing to treat Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) on par with the other provinces of Pakistan. Further Kissinger does not bring on record that, while giving India's answer, I also asked Under Secretary Irwin whether he was in a position to give India the counter assurance that if Pakistan succeeded in occupying any part of Jammu and Kashmir across the cease-fire line it would not annex it to POK. If not, I asked, how could India possibly give a one-sided assurance to USA on the subject? Jack Irwin admitted that he had no such assurance in his pocket and he could not, without asking Pakistan, give it to me. He was without a positive response from Pakistan till the day on which India declared a unilateral cease-fire".

This American uncertainty on India's intentions in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir was compounded by America's specific treaty commitments to support Pakistan against Indian aggression. In the context of the global geopolitical considerations recounted by Mr Kissinger, America's despatch of the ENTERPRISE Naval Task Group was a symbolic gesture, and Russia's sending its Naval Task Group was an equally symbolic gesture. India's unilateral offer of a cease fire reassured all concerned that India had nothing to gain from the disintegration of West Pakistan.

Dr KB Lall, who was the Defence Secretary in 1971, recalls:

"After Gen Niazi's surrender on 16 Dec, lengthy discussions were held in New Delhi regarding a unilateral cease fire. There were two schools of thought. One in favour of an immediate unilateral ceasefire. The other in favour of consolidating the gains made before declaring a unilateral ceasefire. I recall a discussion on whether the disintegration of West Pakistan was at all in India's interest. My view was and is that the disintegration of West Pakistan would only serve to bring the turmoil of Central Asia to our doorstep on the Punjab border. It was preferable by far to keep it further away on Pakistan's Western border".

It is clear from Mr Dobrynin's account that at the highest geopolitical level, both America and Russia clearly knew each others moves and were acting in concert to minimise escalation.

Whilst the gesture of sending American and Russian naval task groups towards the Bay of Bengal evoked public appreciation in Pakistan and India respectively, there were no risks of any clash between the opposing naval task groups. Indeed, there is a view that the surfacing of the Soviet submarines when a US satellite was passing overhead was to enable the American Task Group to know where the Soviet submarines were and thus avoid incidents due to mistaken identity.

In India, the political level accurately recognised the deployment of the ENTERPRISE Task Group as a symbolic gesture. At the naval level, there was considerable concern. Vigorous action was taken by the Eastern Naval Command to thwart possible attempts to evacuate troops from East Pakistan.

After the war, the ENTERPRISE incident awakened awareness at the higher decision making levels in India of the finesse with which naval forces could facilitate diplomacy. This awareness, combined with the public appreciation of the Navy's other achievements in the 1971 war, helped to reinforce naval proposals for a stronger Navy.

THE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING AT COX'S BAZAR - OPERATION BEAVER

The Army's initial plans for military operations did not envisage the need for any amphibious operation. The Army would help in occupying territory in East Pakistan from which the Provisional Government of Bangladesh would operate. With the help of their Mukti Fauj and the Mukti Bahini, the Provisional Government would gradually enlarge the area under its control until the eventual liberation of Bangladesh from Pakistan. The ten million refugees in India could then return to their homes.

The seizure of East Pakistan's Pussur river ports of Khulna- Chalna-Mongla was to be a purely Army operation. Whilst working out their plan for the occupation of territory in East Pakistan, Headquarters Eastern Army Command in Calcutta foresaw the problem of how to ferry large numbers of troops across the River Meghna. Maj Gen Jacob, was the Chief of Staff in Eastern Command Headquarters in 1971. In his book "Surrender at Dacca", he has stated: (Page 62)

"I had earlier asked the Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief Eastern Naval Command, Vice Admiral Krishnan, whether we could use his landing craft to ferry troops across the river Meghna. Cdr Dabir, who had brought one of them to Calcutta in June, stated that landing craft of Russian origin were unsuitable due to their draught. The question of crossing the Meghna had to be shelved and we shifted our attention to the possibility of obtaining additional helicopters".

Vice Admiral N Krishnan was the Flag Officer Commanding in Chief Eastern Naval Command (FOCINCEAST). In his book "No Way But Surrender" he states: (Page 28)

"Since our aim was on all embracing one of the destruction of enemy forces, our plan required flexibility wherein several options would be individually or collectively implemented. Accordingly an omnibus plan was evolved. One of the courses of action in this omnibus plan was "Diversionary or real amphibious landings" for which elements of the Naval Garrison from the Andamans would be trained."

In September 1971, Army and Naval Headquarters studied the implications of undertaking an amphibious operation in East Pakistan in case this contingency arose. In his book `Sailing and Soldiering in Defence of India', Cdr SD Sinha, who was serving in Naval Headquarters in 1971, has stated: (Page 154)

"An operation of landing troops south of Cox's Bazar from ships had been mooted as early as September 1971. Cdr Vernon F Rebello, along with an Army Lt Col and myself were formed up as a planning group in Naval/Army HQ. However, after about a month, the operation was cancelled".

Cdr Rebello recalls:

"One of the options being considered was that an amphibious landing might be required in East Pakistan. There was concern that the United States might land an amphibious force in the vicinity of Chittagong and establish a beachhead so that Pakistan's right to the territory would be maintained.

"But the planners neither had any intelligence of the area, nor the wherewithal nor proper charts nor gradients of feasible beaches. So it was a futile exercise to plan an amphibious operation. However, certain forces were earmarked by the Army in case the eventuality arose".

Though amphibious operations were not specifically listed in the tasks which Naval Headquarters gave to Eastern Naval Command, the FOCINCEAST's plan catered for an amphibious assault. The three amphibious ships (LSTs) in the Navy were the old, Second World War, Landing Ship MAGAR and the two newer, smaller, Polish built Landing Ships, the GHARIAL and the GULDAR. All three LSTs were already in Eastern Naval Command and were constituted as the 4th Landing Craft Squadron. "4th LS."

In the months till December 1971, MAGAR was modified to carry oil for refuelling VIKRANT. GHARIAL and GULDAR continued to be deployed for logistic duties, ferrying men, rations, spares and stores to the Eastern Fleet and to the Andaman Islands.

On 1 December, Naval Headquarters informed Eastern Naval Command at Visakhapatnam and Eastern Army Command at Calcutta that an amphibious landing may be required to land a battalion of the Army and an element of the Naval Garrison at Cox's Bazar.

On 2 December, MAGAR and GULDAR were in the Andamans, and GHARIAL was enroute to Paradeep from Visakhapatnam.

In response to Pakistan's air attacks on Indian airfields on the evening of 3 December, full scale hostilities against East Pakistan commenced on 4 December. By 8 December, the Indian troops which had entered from West Bengal had captured Jessore and arrived at the ferry on the River Madhumati. The Indian troops which had advanced from eastward in Tripura were within reach of three key points on the eastern bank of the River Meghna: Ashuganj, Daudkandi and Chandpur, the capture of which would lay open the approaches to Dacca from the east. Indian troops were also advancing towards Dacca from the north.

The Eastern Army's rapid advance between 4 and 8 December led to an assessment that Pakistani troops might attempt to escape southward into Burma past Cox's Bazar.

Captain (later Admiral) Dawson, was the Director of Naval Operations in 1971. He recalls:

"At the height of the land battle in East Pakistan, it became evident that the Pakistan Army, numbering about 90,000 troops would try to retreat from the area by one of the following means:

- By air through Ceylon if that country permitted the movement or by cutting across the southern peninsula of India.

- By sea in Pak merchant ships which were at that time berthed in Chittagong, Khulna and Chalna.

- By the land route into Burma.

It was assessed that it would not be possible for Pakistan to evacuate the large number of troops by air owing to its inadequate air lift capabilities. Since the sea lift capability had been neutralised by the air strikes from VIKRANT, the only other means available to the Pakistani Army was by the land route from Cox's Bazar to Burma. To prevent this from happening, it was decided, though at very short notice, to mount an amphibious landing at Cox's Bazar".

On this very same day, 8 December, an Argentinean resolution in the United Nations General Assembly, demanding a cease fire and withdrawal of troops, was passed by an overwhelming majority. The disadvantages of indefinitely defying the UN's ceasefire resolutions which had been stalled, thanks to the Soviet Union's veto, combined with the need to conclude military operations in East Pakistan as swiftly as possible.

OPERATION BEAVER

On 9 December, the Chiefs of Staff decided to launch an amphibious operation to cut off the escape route into Burma of any Pakistani troops retreating southwards. NHQ directed the Eastern Naval Command to carry out Operation Beaver "To land and support a battalion group at dawn on 12 December to capture Cox's Bazar".

In his book, Lt Gen Jacob has stated: (Page 124 et seq)

"Gen Manekshaw telephoned me on 9 December ordering us to send a force by sea to Cox's Bazar to prevent Pakistani troops escaping from there into Burma. I told Gen Manekshaw that there was no indication of this, but he was adamant. I pointed out that we had no troops trained in amphibious operations, that there were no life belts, scrambling nets or suitable landing craft and most importantly, the troops he wanted us to send (ie the Gurkhas) had never been to sea. He cut me short saying that these were the orders of the three Chiefs of Staff".

Naval Headquarters immediately deputed two officers to Calcutta. Cdr (later Commodore) RP Bhalla was nominated the Naval Force Commander. He was accompanied by Cdr VF Rebello who had recently undergone the Amphibious Warfare Course in the USA. Cdr Rebello recalls:

"Suddenly, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon of 9 December, the Director of Naval Operations came to me and said "Pack up and go to Calcutta. You have to do an amphibious landing. I have fixed up a merchant ship for you. The two LSTs will meet you at sea, you transfer the troops to the LSTs. VIKRANT will give you air cover. One of the gun firgates will give you gunfire support and will give you the communication facilities for air support.

"When we arrived in Calcutta on 10 December, the Navy was nowhere to be seen. We met only the Trade Warfare officer who had gone and requisitioned a coal carrier, Vishwa Vijay, who was carrying bulk coal from Calcutta to Tuticorin".

On 10 December, Maj Gen Jacob chaired a meeting. Cdrs Bhalla and Rebello were present. Two decisions were taken. The landing scheduled for 12 December would have to be postponed since the troops to be embarked were being pulled out from the front line and had yet to assemble in Calcutta. The second and more important decision, which changed the nature of the subsequent operations, was that instead of the force being landed in Cox's Bazar, it would land on a beach further south near the town of Ukhia. The Army felt that if Pakistani troops were escaping into Burma, they would first secure Cox's Bazar; a landing there would therefore meet with opposition. The beach at Reju Creek was closer to Ukhia town, which was located on the main road to Burma and a landing on the beach there was unlikely to be opposed.

Commodore Bhalla recalls:

"The place where the amphibious landing was to take place had not been very clearly spelt out. It was to take place south of Cox's Bazar, in the vicinity of Reju Creek, where some practice amphibious landings had taken place during the Second World War. Cox's Bazar was considered to be heavily mined and therefore unsuitable for landings. It was clear to me that we did not have any detailed knowledge about the beach conditions and also that some runnels were present."

Cdr Rebello recalls:

"The beach was selected by Gen Jacob because he had practised on that beach in the Second World War".

In his book, Lt Gen Jacob has stated: (ibid)

"At the meeting in Eastern Command with the Navy, we discussed the operation. I had taken part in several amphibious operations and was aware of the special training and equipment required. I had served in Burma during the Second World War and had trained for amphibious operations on the beaches stretching south of Cox's Bazar, I was familiar with the coastline and beaches there. The beach at Ukhia was gently sloping and there were a number of runnels on the approaches to the beaches. I brought this to the notice of the Navy.

As life belts and other necessary equipment were not available and the troops to be used had not seen the sea, I persuaded the Navy to beach the landing craft and refloat them at high tide. The troops would then land dry shod. The Navy agreed, but later changed its plan with disastrous consequences at sea.

The force was to be transported in a merchant ship that was to sail on 10 December and be in position by 12 December. Two LSTs were to transfer the troops from the merchant ship at sea and land them dry shod. The aircraft carrier VIKRANT was to provide air and fire support. The force, code named `Romeo', was hurriedly assembled. We earmarked Headquarters of 8 Mountain Artillery Brigade commanded by Brig SS Rai, 1/3 Gurkha Rifles, two companies of 11 Bihar and a detachment of artillery. A naval contingent of 150, which was to participate, did not arrive. The force sailed from Calcutta on 12 December, two days behind schedule".

As a result of the Army's delay in embarking troops, Naval Headquarters had to postpone Operation Beaver by two days from 12 December to 14 December. Meanwhile on 10 December, America announced the despatch of a Naval Task Group, headed by the nuclear powered aircraft carrier ENTERPRISE, towards the Bay of Bengal. This resulted in NHQ ordering the immediate embarkation of troops so that VISHWA VIJAY, the merchant ship requisitioned for this purpose, could sail from Calcutta as early as possible and land the troops on 14 December. VISHWA VIJAY eventually departed from Sandheads, off Calcutta, in the early hours of 13 December.

The Regimental History of the 1st Battalion Gurkha Rifles states:

"On 10 December, the battalion was ordered back to Fort William to form part of a Task Force "Romeo" under Brig SS Rai which was allotted the task of moving up the coast of East Pakistan and cutting off the withdrawal routes of enemy forces. At 1830, hours that same day orders were received to moved to Kidderpore Docks immediately for loading into a merchant navy ship, `VISHWA VIJAY'.

"Romeo Force' consisted of 1/3 Gorkha Rifles, two Companies 11 Bihar, 881 Light Battery, an Ambulance Platoon and an ASC Detachment.

"Being a cargo vessel, there was much confusion during the loading as guns, vehicles and supplies had to be loaded by cranes, whilst the men were to climb a vertical rope gangway up the steep sides of the ship, as high as a three-storey building. A sad incident occurred when Maj Mastana, AMC, Officer Commanding the Ambulance Platoon slipped off the ropeway into the water between the ship and the dock and was drowned. It was an inauspicious start to the venture.

"As the high tide off Hooghly River is crucial to sailing times, and the loading could not be completed in time, the ship sailed at 0445 hours leaving behind most of the supplies of the Battalion. However, Maj HS Jaswal had the presence of mind to rush the stores to the flood gates of the Docks and managed to load all stores before the ship entered the Hooghly.

"VISHWA VIJAY with a cargo capacity of 15,000 tons had only limited crew space for living and cooking for about 50 to 60 men. Cooking and toilet facilities for 1500 men therefore posed a major problem onboard'

"The Battalion was to establish a beachhead near Nidania Airdrome on Ukhia Beach at first light on 14 December and thereafter erect blocks at Remu and Idgaon to prevent the escape of East Pakistan forces into Burma.

"For the initial landing, fire support was available from INS VIKRANT, INS BEAS and INS BRAHMAPUTRA. After the landing, fire support was to be given by the Light Battery and own 4.2 inch mortars.

"Sailing across the Bay of Bengal on 13 December, the Task Force reached the rendezvous with INS VIKRANT and LSTs `GHARIAL' and `GULDAR' on the night 13/14 December. A submarine alarm postponed the landing to 15 December.

"On night 13/14 December the Battalion was transshipped to the LSTs as follows:

 

A and B Companies	- INS `GHARIAL'
C and D Companies	- INS `GULDAR'
	- with Battalion HQ

B Echelon of the Battalion remained on VISHWA VIJAY. Naval divers who had reconnoitered the beach raised an `All Clear' flag to denote that the beaches were not mined and no enemy were present".

VISHWA VIJAY was a bulk carrier and urgently needed scrambling nets to assist disembarkation of troops. These were to have been delivered to her at Sandheads. The scrambling nets never arrived and this was later to delay the transfer of troops from VISHWA VIJAY into the LST's. The particulars of frequencies for communicating with VIKRANT had also been placed on board VISHWA VIJAY for VIKRANT to collect at Sandheads. This too never took place because VIKRANT was busy with air strikes. The inability to communicate delayed VISHWA VIJAY's R/V with VIKRANT.