In my interaction with the innumerable officers, senior and retired, middle aged and serving, naval and civilian, who shared their perceptions on the developments and events in the Navy during the decade 1965 to 1975, they invariably suggested that the Navy was now mature enough to know the truth. This feeling that there is something to hide is the result of the conspicuous non‑availability of authentic, factual information.

Well before the attempt is made to resolve contentious issues like whether or not the Official Secrets Act should be relaxed or whether India should have the equivalent of the Ameri­can Freedom of Information procedure, there is need to resolve some of the difficulties which lie at a much lower level.

For any system of filing to be of value for historical purposes, there has to be a Public Records Office and there has to be an annual scrutiny of old files by knowledgeable scholars having a historical bent of mind. Those files considered to be sensitive should be systematically indexed, preserved and so stored as to be available for reference when required. The re­mainder should be transferred to a Public Records Office who can follow well established archival procedures for indexing, preser­vation, referral and retrieval.

What actually happens is that to minimise the demand for acquiring more and more filing cabinets and cupboards and for more office space to keep them, there is a directive that all files are to be "weeded out" every seven years. Being a dull task, and in view of the perpetual shortage of officers, weeding out gets delegated to the juniormost available officer, who, being young and inexperienced, is most unlikely to be sensitive to the historical relevance of what is being "weeded out". When this task becomes too tiresome, files are bundled into trunks and stowed in "some basement". Since everybody is transferred period­ically, nobody knows (or cares) what is where.

For a Navy steaming smartly into the next millennium, a better system needs to be devised to enable scholars of naval affairs, both Indian or foreign, to access authentic, declassi­fied Indian naval archives. By making them depend primarily on British and American naval archives (which are extremely well organised), scholars perforce derive one‑sided constructs of what drives the Indian Navy's development. Contemporary literature on Indian naval affairs does not do justice, either to India or to her Navy.

This volume of the Navy's history 1965 to 1975 was made possible by the unstinted help extended by each of the partici­pants interviewed. It is clear from their recollections that there were successes and reverses, tensions and disagreements. Factions lobbied for their positions and sometimes went too far in one direction. The right solution had to evolve through exper­imentation. Yet there is no doubt that these were only arguments over ways and means to reach the same end ‑ a strong and modern Navy. This end was achieved by the combined efforts of several people.

The Leander Frigate Project was the achievement of Defence Minister Krishna Menon, exceptional civil servants like Mr HC Sarin and Mr MM Sen and Admirals Nanda and Samson ‑ the first two Managing Directors of Mazagon Docks. The notable progress in achieving indigenisation in these frigates was the achievement of Commodore Paradkar and his team.

The bold decision to replace the obsolescent British radars and fire control systems by modern Dutch equivalents from the second Leander onwards, well before the first Leander had even been completed, was a result of the forceful advocacy of Admirals Ramnath and Bhatia. It gave Bharat Electronics the opportunity to leapfrog into the indigenous production of digital electronic systems. And it built up the confidence of the Navy's construc­tors and electronic specialists like Admiral Baxi to innovate the interfaces in future frigates and corvettes for the Indian Navy's unique mix of Russian, western and indigenous systems.

In the 1971 War, the Navy's achievements in the Bay of Bengal sprung from Admiral Nanda's insistence that VIKRANT be seen out at sea and Captain Parkash's courage in letting his  eager pilots push to the extreme, the safety limits for launching and recovering aircraft in the low wind conditions in the north­ern part of the Bay of Bengal. To Admiral Sarma and his Fleet, and the Navy's intrepid minesweepers, belongs the credit of ful­filling so many tasks with so few ships, culminating in the reopening of the port of Chittagong within weeks of the cease fire.

The Navy's achievements in the Arabian Sea sprang from the decision to acquire the missile boats, the credit for which belongs to Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram, Admiral Krishnan and Additional Secretary DR Kohli. The success of the missile boat attacks on Karachi, which played such a decisive role in the 1971 victory was made possible by Admiral Kuruvila's acceptance of the advice to use missile boats offensively. The tactic to use these frail, essentially defensive, small boats as part of the Fleet's spearhead was entirely unconventional, not believed possible and therefore doubly effective. My role in this has not been men­tioned anywhere in this book as it is hardly proper for an author to appropriate credit to himself. However, in this part of the afterword, I can say that I am justifiably proud of having con­ceived the solution of how to mutate these fragile but lethal craft into offensive vessels.

As Captain of TIR in April 1971, jointly with Commander Yadav, the Senior Officer of the Missile Boat Squadron, we con­ducted trials when towing a missile boat from Visakhapatnam to Bombay using large nylon tow ropes at speeds upto 14 knots in moderately rough sea conditions.

I was anxious to prove that this could be done because their

fragile hulls and limited enurance made it impossible for them to sail in distant waters on their own. Towing missile boats safely and successfully was crucial to being able to get them within striking distance of enemy targets. By the time TIR and NASHAK arrived in Bombay, we had mastered the concept of towing these boats, releasing them within minutes to carry out an attack and taking them in tow again. Just like a falcon is released to pounce on its prey.

In May 1971, I was transferred to Admiral Kuruvila's staff as Fleet Operations Officer. It was already evident that war was a possibility. I convinced Admiral Kuruvila that the use of missile boats could be a big factor in a successful attack on Karachi. He directed Commander Yadav and me to put up a note. Given below is an excerpt of the note which we prepared for him and which he forwarded to Admiral Kohli the FOCINCWEST in June 1971:

"I have no doubt whatsoever that the correct utilisa­tion of the missile boats is to use them offensively, two at a time, in company with the Fleet. If I have these boats with me at sea, as your Fleet Commander I can guarantee total victory once contact has been made with enemy surface units, regardless of his superiority in speed and gun power".

The achievement of Admiral Kuruvila and his Fleet in domi­nating the approaches to Karachi within a week of hostilities, despite the poor material state of his ships and repeated break­downs at sea, is well known. I would like to place on record my appreciation of this big hearted and courageous man who took the advice of his young advisor and implemented it so successfully.

The success of the first series of Russian acquisitions was the result of the detailed discussions held by Additional Secre­tary Sheth's Delegation in 1965 and the painstaking resolution of problems by Additional Secretary Mukherjee's Delegations in 1971. The second series of Russian acquisitions owes its success to the prodigious efforts of Admiral Barboza and his Professional Dele­gation of 1975.

Admiral Bindra's far reaching Reorganisation of Naval Train­ing in 1974 succeeded because of the whole‑hearted support it received from Admirals Kamath and Kohli.

The transfer to the Navy of the control of Maritime Recon­naissance was the outcome of the sustained efforts of Admiral Tahiliani and Captain Puri.

The sound foundations of the Submarine Arm were laid by the highly capable young submariners who manned the first eight submarines, some of whom like Admirals Auditto and Sodhi became Flag Officers Submarines, and Admiral Shekhawat and Ganesh who rose to became Fleet Commanders and Commanders in Chief. Admiral Shekhawat became Chief of the Naval Staff in 1993.

All these achievements were sustained by the commitment with which the Navy's officers and sailors carried out their duties. Most of them were too young then to know what inspired the vision of their elders. It is my hope that this volume has helped them to know what was done and why.